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A logical control extension surrounding cashless means of exchange is a permanent personal 
verification mark. An implanted micro chip such as ones that have been successfully 
implanted into humans could identify and store information. Connected with global 
positioning satellites and a computer system, a cashless monetary system could be formed in 
the future. The system would provide complete and continual real time records for 
individuals, businesses and regulators. It would be possible for all trading to occur in this way 
in the future. A modified Technology Acceptance Model was developed based on Davis’ 
(1989) model and Fishbein and Ajzen’s (1975) theory to test the acceptance level of the new 
monetary system by professional accountants in Australia. The model includes perceived ease 
of use, perceived usefulness, perceived risk, and a subjective norm component. 523 
accountants were surveyed in December 2003 with a response rate of 27%. 13% either 
strongly agreed or agreed that they would accept the implantable chip. The analysis showed 
that Perception of Risk, Subjective Norm and Perception of Usefulness were all significant in 
explaining the dependent variable at the 95% confidence level for all responses. The 
Perception of Ease of Use was not proved to be significant. In consideration of response bias, 
it was found that with respect to the perception of usefulness at the 0.01 level, two elements 
were not significant, those being “not having cards” and “having medical information”. The 
difference here was not seen as fundamental for the credibility of the research given the main 
theme of the research is a monetary system based on the “mark” rather than the convenience 
factors of the two elements where there were differences. The perceived risk variable was not 
significant for early responders. The responses were also used to analyse the Technology 
Acceptance Model developed by Davis (1989). The model had a significance of 0.327 
 iii 
compared to 0.000 giving validation to the contributions of the modified Technology 
Acceptance Model. Davis’ (1989) model found Perception of Ease of Use was significant at 
the 95% confidence level and Perception of Usefulness was not proven to be significant. In 
further analyzing the developed model, each of the elements in the model used as independent 
variables were separately regressed against contributions established in open questions 
relating to them. Subjective norm had a regression R-squared of 0.403 and of the thirty-four 
explanatory variables the only significant contribution, at the 95% confidence level was 
“clients”. Significant at the 10% level, were religion, public figures and friends. The 
professional bodies variable was not significant in determining the subjective norm. Perceived 
Ease of Use and the nine explanatory variables had an R-squared of 0.143. There were only 
two significant contributions for ease of use, at the 95% confidence level being “privacy” and 
“technology”. Perceived Usefulness and the eleven explanatory variables had an R-squared of 
0.205. There were only two significant contributions for usefulness, at the 95% confidence 
level being “privacy” and “easy”. Perceived Risk and the eleven explanatory variables had an 
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1.1.1 Research introduced 
 
Professional accountants are trained to deal with change. Their opinions are sought in 
new uncertain financial circumstances such as an emerging taxation system. This 
research solicits accountants’ views of accepting an emerging cashless monetary system. 
The system revolves around microchips implanted into humans accessed by individual 
scanners and embracing global positioning satellites supported by computers which 
record transactions. A person would present their implanted microchip (referred to as a 
verification mark) which would most likely be implanted in their wrist to the scanner 
which would scan the microchip in the same way a barcode of a product is scanned at a 
supermarket. The scanner would make a transfer of the amount agreed should sufficient 
funds or credit allow, otherwise it would be disallowed and an error message would be 
displayed on the scanner. Personal monetary exchanges would happen in the same way 
using small portable scanners normally part of a mobile phone. The debits or credits in a 




1.1.2 Cashless monetary systems explained  
 
A cashless monetary exchange does not use a physical or tangible token of exchange 
(including cash such as an Australian coin or note) in the fulfilment of a financial 
transaction. In the simplest form a cashless medium of exchange can be represented by 
an isolated payment method without the need for cash such as a store value card for the 
payment of a particular service.  
 
Cashless mediums of exchange can also be part of a more sophisticated payment system 
such as the use of credit cards either over the counter, online or over the phone. The less 
need there is for physical forms of cash for transactions the more sophisticated the 
cashless system is seen to be.  
 
The cashless monetary system envisaged by this research examines a system that does 
not require any cash whatsoever. A microchip would be implanted into every person’s 
body complemented by infrastructure in place so that every person had the hardware to 
pass and receive exchanges of wealth via a scanner that would be carried in a similar 
way that a wallet, purse or a mobile phone might be carried currently. The implanted 
chip and scanner would eliminate the financial and identity need for a purse or wallet. 
As an example the scanner could be conveniently placed in a mobile phone so that it 
was not additionally needed beyond what a person might usually carry with them. The 
scanner would require a person’s implanted chip to activate it, so it would become 
useless without the person. Should a forced robbery occur, making use of the person and 
their chip, the destination of the funds could be easily traced and subsequently followed 
up by police who could reverse the entry and make arrests regarding the crime. 
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1.1.3 Factors driving a cashless monetary system 
 
1.1.3.1 Perceived need to reduce fraud 
 
The purpose of the following sections is to demonstrate that with a sophisticating 
society, there is a movement toward a cashless monetary system. The trend is firstly 
driven by a perceived need to reduce fraud. Secondly the development of various 
components of the technology enables the system to become a reality.  
 
The existence of cash transactions has allowed money laundering to become a large 
issue, prompting planned changes to eliminate cash transactions to ensure transfers are 
traceable. The Federal government on 13 July 2006 released the Anti-Money 
Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Bill. The proposed bill will bring 
Australia in line with international standards issued by the Financial Task Force on 
Money Laundering up-dating the Financial Transaction Reports Act 1988 which was 
developed to control money laundering (http://www.cpaaustralia.com.au/cps/rde/xchg/ 
cpa/hs.xsl/1017_19312_ENA_HTML.htm, accessed on 1st September 2006). Until a 
single identifier and an audit trail which traces to an individual has been developed it 
will remain a problem. According to the Financial Action Task Force on money 
laundering, “a key element in the fight against money laundering and the financing of 
terrorism is the need for countries’ systems to be monitored and evaluated” (Strasser 
1998, p. 1). International standards have been developed which will be assessed by the 
International Monetary Fund and World Bank (Strasser 1998).  
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The cost of money laundering and over a billion dollars of identity fraud exists in 
Australia alone. The government is bearing much of this burden as significant amounts 
are linked to welfare fraud, and they are very keen to find a solution and are even 
considering biometric solutions. The world agenda on terrorism is also driving non-
removable individual identification. An implantable chip using biometric identification 
processes provides an auditable number.   
 
Businesses also have motivation to drive non-removable identity numbers via a cashless 
monetary system. For example, the banking industry is keen to eliminate their liability 
for fraud, while retail environments are also seeking to reduce the amount of consumer 
theft they are encountering.  
 
The banking “industry is facing combined losses of more than $100 million in credit 
card fraud alone” and are seeking solutions (Connors et al 2005, p. 1). For example, 
“Westpac has held high-level discussions with its competitors and it expects customers 
to be using their fingerprint, face or some other form of biometric identification to 
access Internet banking within the next 18 months” (Connors et al 2005, p. 1). The new 
technology is being adopted internationally by Europay, Mastercard and Visa.  
 
According to Moullakis (2005), there are legal ramifications for banks not adopting 
microchip based technology.  
 
“Without the newer computer chip-based technology, banks will be liable for fraud 
perpetrated regardless of whether they issued the card, processed the transaction or the 
purchase was made locally or overseas” (p. 68). 
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There are many reasons driving the compulsory use of such a monetary system. One of 
which being the importance of using the chips to enhance identity controls. Attorney-
General, Philip Ruddock MP, in the opening keynote address to Australian Smart Cards 
Summit (2005), indicated the identity fraud as a serious threat to business community 
particularly in electronic commerce.  
“The Australian Bankers’ Association estimates the cost to the banking industry at $25 
million a year. And two years ago Austrac estimated the annual cost of identity crime in 
Australia at $1.1 billion. Globally, we are looking at a figure as high as $2 trillion” 
(Opening keynote address to Australian Smart Cards Summit 2005, available: 
http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/WWW/MinisterRuddockHome.nsf/Page/Speeches_2005_Spe
eches_29_June_2005_Speech_Opening_Keynote_Address_to_Australian_Smart_Card
s_Summit_2005, accessed on 3rd  November 2006). 
 
Identity fraud costs Australia about $1.1 billion annually according to Moullakis   
(2005). Tinkler (2006) also documents that estimates of “identity and credit card fraud 
costs the country about $1.1 billion a year” (p. 17). 
 
Moor (2002, p. 1) notes that “law enforcers want every Australian to be finger or eye 
scanned “to counter” the identity fraud crisis. The unique identifiers would be stored on 
a government database”. Proposed uses would be for those “seeking welfare payments – 
or applying for documents such as passports or driving licences” Moor (2002, p. 1). 
 
The government are pursuing biometric and identity card solutions, which are advertised 
as voluntary for anyone wishing to receive welfare support. Compulsory identity cards 
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are currently being proposed for anyone wishing to receive welfare. Henry (2006) 
documents that government tenders have been calling for the trials to a new ID smart 
card. “The access card is expected to replace 17 health and social services cards and 
vouchers, including the Medicare card” (p. 1). “One of those tenders states that the trials 
for the new ID Smart card will begin in 2008 for full implementation during 2010”. The 
Australian Law Reform Commission (2006), in Issue Paper 31 - Review of Privacy, 
addresses as the issue of the “Multi-Purpose Identifiers”, referred to as “The Access 
Card” (section 12-42). 
 
The Australian Law Reform Commission, Issue Paper 31 states: 
 
“The Access Card will replace 17 existing health care and social services cards and 
vouchers. It will display the cardholder’s name and photograph on its front, and the 
cardholder’s signature and card number on its back. The card number will be the 
cardholder’s current Medicare number, reformatted with extra digits where necessary to 
ensure it is unique. Other personal information, such as the cardholder’s photograph, 
address, date of birth, concession status, and details of the cardholder’s children or 
dependants will be stored on a microchip embedded in the card. The cardholder may 
also choose to store further information on the card’s chip, such as ‘emergency contact 
details, allergies, health alerts, chronic illnesses, immunisation information or organ 
donor status’”. (Section 12.42) 
“Registration for the card is scheduled to commence in 2008 and conclude in early 
2010, after which a card will be required in order to access any health or social services”. 
(Section 12.43) 
 
Michael et al (2005, p. 22) note that “more sophisticated auto-ID devices like smart card 
and radio-frequency identification (RFID) tags and transponders that house unique 
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lifetime identifiers or biometric templates” are being considered for transactions 
between businesses and their consumers and by governments and citizens. An 
implantable chip is a microchip, which can be implanted into a person’s body such as 
those currently in use, which use radio frequency to allow external identification. The 
components of the described cashless monetary system are currently in use.  
 
1.1.3.2 Current availability of technology 
 
Johnston (2005) in examining technology used by accountants predicts that soon “nearly 
every CPA will need to understand” (p. 96) RFID (radio frequency identification). 
Strasser (1998) contributes that “advances in encryption and computer networks have 
paved the way for a purely electronic-based currency substitute: digital money” (p. 1).  
 
According to Phillips G. (2004):  
“chip implants seem to be catching on”, “and the day mightn’t be far away when you’ll be 
having yourself computerised. Indeed the day mightn’t be far away when it becomes 
compulsory, to help in the fight against terrorism” (p. 21). 
 
Supermarket chains in the United Kingdom are using the radio-frequency identification 
(RFID) chips to reduce shoplifting (Engberg et al 2004, p. 89). Trials have also been 
carried out in Australia (Houghton et al 2005, p. 77).  
 
“Britain has announced that it is considering implanting illegal immigrants with RFID 
transponders (Michael et al 2005, p. 22) allowing them to be constantly traced by global 
positioning satellites. Internationally, “countries are taking measures against fraudulent 
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claims made on social security with more secure end-user devices” (Michael et al 2005, 
p. 22). 
 
“Visa is piloting the service in Japan with Telco NTT DoCoMo where phone subscribers 
download a soft version of their credit card’s details or insert a SIM-size chip into special 
m-commerce phones. These beam payments to infra-red ports attached to terminals at 
selected merchants” (Timson 2003, p. 7 - 9). 
 
In Australia mobile phones are currently being used as an electronic wallet for payment 
of such items as soft drinks and parking meters.  
 
Mastercard also uses a Pay Pass that uses a chip, which uses radio frequency readers that 
receive the card’s signals and transmits them to the terminal. “Security remains a big 
concern” (Timson 2003, p. 7) and implanting the chip could solve at least part of the 
problem of lost phones. 
 
Smartcards are increasingly common in our society. Recently a “smartcard giving 
tourists access to more than 60 of Victoria’s best attractions” was offered for sale 
(Metlikovec 2003, p. 17). 
 
“Already customers of South Korea’s department stores can pay for purchases on credit 
cards by waving their mobile phones at payment terminals” (Timson 2003, p. 7). Any 
third generation mobile phone could carry a number of tokens or smartcards, including 
one for a public key infrastructure authentication certificate, all separated by firewalls. A 
recent survey found “10 percent of mobile phone users were interested in banking with 
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In summary, there are enormous motivations for the international community’s war on 
terrorism and money laundry to adopt unique identity controls. The cost of fraud on 
businesses and the government highly motivates a move towards a traceable cashless 
monetary system. The technology supporting a cashless monetary system based on 
implantable chips is developing at a rapid rate. Microchips implanted in humans are 
currently being used for various applications including the identification and tracking 
via global positioning satellite of sex offenders. Computer networks are currently 
sophisticated enough to handle the volume of transactions required in the described 
cashless monetary system. Development in data protection processes including 
encryption software are sufficiently developed for use in the system and are becoming 
increasingly advanced. Biometric solutions are currently being used matched with an 





1.2 Motivation for the study 
 
There is evidence of a move towards cashless systems of exchange. The long-term goal 
of the Swedish cash card system “is to replace cash” (Holmstrom and Stalder 2001, p. 
190), “the short term goal; is to offer an alternative means of payment in places where 
cash is prevalent, for example, in small shops and on buses”. Michael et al (2005, p. 23) 
reports that  
 
“we are witnessing the transition period in which auto-ID devices especially are being 
trialled upon those who either desperately require their use for medical purposes, or 
cannot challenge their application, such as in the case of armed forces or prison 
inmates. Eventually, the new technology will be opened to the wider market in a 
voluntary way but will become a de facto compulsory standard (such as with the mobile 
phone today), and inevitably mandatory as it is linked to some kind of requirement for 
survival. This is the pattern that most successful high-tech innovations throughout 
history have followed”. 
 
Consider a situation where the Australian dollar loses its value due to a catastrophic 
event in the market. People who have lost their purchasing power may be very keen to 
adopt a system that re-established their wealth and may be more likely to accept a 
solution such as a cashless monetary system based on implantable chips than those 
without the loss of value of the currency. An international currency may replace the 
Australian dollar in conjunction with cashless system. This may occur in a similar 
manner to how the Euro was adopted. Especially with self-funded retirement, the 
lifestyles of people in Australia are very attached to their assets and would be vulnerable 
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to requirements to re-establish their wealth. Cashless monetary systems with a new 
currency may become the logical solution to re-establish monetary value to people. 
 
The cashless system described revolves around permanent identification via chip 
implants. Referring to a prediction made by a Franklin Piece Law Centre report, Michael 
et al (2005, p. 25) note that:  
 
“A national identification system via microchip implants could be achieved in two stages: 
Upon introduction as a voluntary system, the microchip implantation will appear to be 
palatable. After there is a familiarity with the procedure and knowledge of its benefits, 
implantation would be mandatory”. 
 
In the United Kingdom on 14 February 2006 the government introduced the Chip and 
PIN programme, which requires that 
 
“cardholders must use their PIN to be sure of being able to pay with their chip and PIN 
card. If shoppers don’t use PIN, their card may be declined and the option of signing can 
no longer be guaranteed” (http://www.chipandpin.co.uk/reflib/chipandpin _10oct05.pdf, 
accessed 13th May 2006). 
 
“There will still be some instances where cardholders will continue to sign even after 14 
February 2006. These include: 
• Purchases in outlets which are not yet using chip and PIN technology 
• Purchases made on cards which have not yet been upgraded to chip and PIN 
• Disabled customers using a chip and signature card instead of a chip and PIN 
card will always continue to sign” (http://www.chipandpin.co.uk/reflib/ 
chipandpin_10oct05.pdf, accessed 13th May 2006). 
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Chips are becoming more commonplace with the federal government “set to introduce 
new Australian passports which will include electronic identity chips. The chips will 
carry biometric fingerprints-iris and retinal images and details of the holder’s hand 
geometry” (Haberfield 2003, p. 2). The US Congress in 2002 approved legislation 
requiring passports that could store fingerprints, iris scans and other biometric 
identifiers.  
 
Morrissey (2005) reports that an Australian football team based in Sydney has adopted 
technology which uses a global positioning satellite system in an attempt to monitor 
how the players are performing. “Players are wearing a GPS locator the size of a mobile 
phone strapped to their backs linking them to several satellites above Australia” (p. 35). 
 
Traceable chips may also become part of “a high-tech attack on cheating” which would 
allow federal police to investigate an extra 1200 identity fraud cases each year (Wallace 
2003 p. 14). 
 
Phillips, G. (2004, p. 21) in contemplation of compulsory chip implantation being 
unthinkable makes the point that so also was  
 
“the idea of compulsory fingerprinting and face scanning a few years ago. Yet, that now 




The observance of sophisticated cashless forms of exchange, the proliferation of these 
forms of exchange and the move towards compulsory identity checks led me to consider 
Revelation 13:16-17 which could be seen as a reference to a cashless society: 
 
"everyone, small and great, rich and poor, free and slave, receive a mark on his right 
hand or the forehead, so that no one can buy or sell unless he has the mark…..”.   
 
Making use of global positioning satellites, emerging technological and communication 
capacities a monetary system could develop and facilitate a cashless society and so it is 
deemed important and appropriate to discuss what professional accountants thought of 
the prospect. 
 
1.3 The development of cashless mediums of exchange 
 
This research can be justified on the basis of the rapid development of cashless mediums 
of exchange world wide and the need to study effects on personal rights. This section 
presents the definition of money and then proceeds to consider various forms of cashless 
mediums of exchange including electronic banking, electronic cash and smart cards. The 
legal aspects of money are also considered in the context of a cashless society. 
 
1.3.1 Defining money 
 
Solomon (1991, p 15) defines money as:  
“a form of value generally acceptable in payments of goods and services. It ought also to 
serve as a unit of account and a medium for storing value effectively”.  
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Crowley (1995), on the other hand, defines money as: 
 
“the store of purchasing power universally used and generally accepted by the public in 
the settlement of economic transactions. It allows the purchase of goods and services 
and the settlement of financial transactions to proceed with minimal effort and cost” (p. 
2).  
 
He states:  
 
“essential properties which money must have to carry out tasks include public 
confidence that money will hold its value in terms of purchasing power and that the 
issuers of money are prudentially sound” (p.15). 
 
What has constituted a medium of exchange has changed considerably over time. What 
is clear, however, is that some system is necessary to place a value on exchange even if 
this is as simplistic as the rudimentary system of barter. The modern manifestations of 
barter are systems like “Barter card” (http://www.bartercard.com/au/page.asp?2083= 
501306&E_Page=79280&contentID=501306&parentcategory=501306, accessed on 30th 
November 2006). Using a plastic card, purchases of goods or services can be made in 
participating organisations with special “trade credit” which is an accumulation of 
wealth gained when a good or service is contributed to another within the scheme that 
allows the contributor the rights to that amount of goods or services from other 
participants in the system. Participants pay using the credit generated from the sale of 
their own products or services with a discount equivalent to the gross margin. The 
Barter Card’s currency of a “Trade Dollar” is equal to one Australian Dollar for 
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accounting and tax purposes. The system extends to overseas locations where offices are 
available (http://www.bartercard.co.nz/index.asp?PageID=2145829501, accessed on 
30th November 2006).  
 
Originally the awkwardness of the barter system of exchange eventually led to physical 
forms of wealth and exchange, which then led to cash. Cash was previously linked to 
gold but now is related to monetary policy. Credit providers also contribute to the 
money supply and the diversity and volume of the offerings are increasing. The 
awkward non-cash alternatives such as cheques are being replaced by debit cards, credit 
cards and other more sophisticated forms of exchange. Niman (1985 p. 1) states, 
“technological developments are making possible the issue of money outside the 
traditional banking system”.  
 
As economies become more sophisticated, pressure is brought to bear on the system of 
exchange to reflect this. Technological improvements have allowed significant advances 
in the mediums of exchange including cashless varieties. Some economists model 
electronic money as “new types of barter” or “new types of money” or refer to it as 
“netting arrangements” (Green 1999, p. 668). 
 
1.3.2 Electronic banking 
 
Al-Hajri (2005) suggested in his PhD thesis: Internet Technology Adoption In The 
Banking Industry, a “strong banking industry supports economic developments 
significantly through its efficient financial service” (ii). In order to make the financial 
service sector efficient, banks are required to “introduce changes such as the banking 
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industry moving from traditional distribution channel banking to electronic distribution 
channel banking” (Al-Hajri 2005, p. ii), especially with fast growth of the modern 
technology, the need for using electronic banking is more obvious.  
 
According to Bollen (2001) electronic banking can be divided into two categories, the 
first being “pure” which is “where no card, terminal or other proprietary device is 
needed”. The second is called “hybrid” which is “using both an electronic network and 
physical tokens” (p. 6) such as a credit card.  
 
For businesses, “the Internet enables much lower cost communication and processing, as 
a result many financial institutions have begun to offer various forms of electronic 
banking using Internet facilities” (Bollen 2001, p. 5). Some banks only provide such 
services, known as cyber banks. A “cyber bank may be no more than an operator with a 
computer and Internet connection” (Snedden 1997, p. 65). Mara (2000, p. 6) states, “the 
race is on to see which major Australian players’ consolidate positions in the Internet 
market place before global institutions do.”  
 
If cashless forms of transactions are cheaper for financial institutions then financial 
incentives and disincentives will apply to clients to motivate them to use these forms. 
Already banks charge more to visit them in person. Niman (1985, p. 1) argues, 
“electronic impulses offer a lower cost alternative”. 
 
Convenience to the consumer is another major reason cashless forms of exchange are 
growing. For instance, Internet banking allows “consumers 24 hour access to their 
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accounts and greater control over fund transfers, especially those of an international 
nature” (Bollen 2001, p. 5).  
 
1.3.3 Legal aspects of money 
 
Crowley (1995) explains that “the creation and issue of money in Australia has, in the 
post-war period, been strictly limited to the Reserve Bank of Australia and the banks” 
(p. 2) which were strictly regulated. Legislation dealing with monetary systems has its 
history steeped in “deposit-taking and the creation of accounts”.  
 
Kreltszheim (2003) notes when examining the legal nature of electronic money that 
“given the embryonic nature of the new payment technologies, the legislators have – by 
and large-adopted a policy of ‘technological neutrality’ (p. 262). Specific references to 
the underlying technologies have not been used when defining the scope of the 
regulation, which apply to the new technologies. In the main, electronic payments have 
been considered “surrogates for coins and banknotes” (p. 264). There has also been a 
“marked desire not to impose undue regulatory burdens on prospective new entrants into 
the payment system industry” (p. 264). 
 
1.3.4 Smart cards 
 
Stored-value-cards have also developed and are becoming more common. These cards 
contain a silicon chip capable of storing large amounts of information interactively. 
Aardsma (2001 p. 12) defines them as “portable memory devices that can be used to 
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store and transfer information from central computers” and details that the smart cards 
are “equipped with a built-in microprocessor that supports more advanced information 
management and security methods”. 
 
Smart cards are being used as a substitute for cash and some suggest smart cards are 
indeed replacing cash (Ling 2001).  Internet banking is likely to be linked to smart cards.  
 
“…these could include virtual Automatic Teller Machine (ATM) functions through 
the recharge of a consumer's smart card. That is, a consumer may be able to 
transfer funds from their account to their smart card using an Internet banking 
service and a unit attached to their personal computer capable of reading from 
and writing to the card…” (Bollen 2001, p. 7). 
 
Microchip technology continues to develop in capacity and sophistication. Samsung 
Electronics Company, the world’s largest memory chipmaker, in 2002, developed the 
world’s first, two-gigabyte flash memory chip, which can store the equivalent of four 
movies. The flash memory chip can retain power even if the power is cut off. 
 
Microsoft is developing a multi-use card on which consumers can download their own 
application software, which possibly means information can be consolidated on to one 
card (Hansen 2001) enabling readily accessible information available to a person at any 
time.  
 
Smart cards are invading every aspect of daily life, including public transport of which a 
$500 million tender was won by Keane Incorporation recently (Ferguson 2005). 
Haberfield (2005) reported that “smart cards, capable of storing a mass of personal 
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information including medical and welfare details, could replace Medicare cards from 
2006, though no official announcement was made with respect to the commencement 
date” (p. 22). On 13 May 2006 on Good Morning Australia it was announced that to 
reduce welfare fraud, identity cards would be used on a “voluntary” basis to claim 
welfare.  
 
The chip in a mobile phone is being used as a medium of exchange whereby consumers 
can buy products such as cans of drink, which are debited to their phone account. Telstra 
and Coca Cola are testing new vending machines which allow customers to “use their 
mobiles to a dial a number displayed on the vending machine and a charge of $2.20 for 
the drink, plus a call cost of 0.33 cents, is automatically debited to the customer account 
Chris Field (Haberfield 2003, p. 9), “What we are seeing is mobiles becoming de facto” 
(Haberfield 2003, p. 9). According to Consumer Law centre executive director credit 
cards”. 
 
1.3.5 Electronic cash 
 
The company, Keyware, has worked with Proton World to create a biometric e-purse 
which is a smart card secured by a fingerprint (Dubois 2001), because a “person’s 
unique characteristic” can be identified (Young 2003, p. 69).  Telstra has also developed 
a smartcard to “replace coins at vending machines” (Black 2003, p.21).  
 
Cashless options are expanding, fuelled by improving infrastructure and changing 
commercial demands. Examples include digital cheques and digital cash which enable 
many small scale purchases over the Internet to be conducted without the costs inherent 
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in the credit card networks. An example of the micro payment system is the pay-by-view 
online newspaper and reference system which uses digital cash that is a completely 
intangible software-based payment system. The system uses a unique “digital ‘coin’ 
which contains information including a serial number, expiration date, the name of the 
issuing institution and the value represented” (Bollen 2001, p. 7). The digital cash “can 
be redeemed at a bank for cash or the equivalent credit to an account” (Bollen 2001, p. 
7).  
 
E-cash systems are evolving such as Proton used by thirty percent of Belgium’s 
population and Moneo used by ten percent of the population in France (Matlack et al 
2002). Bankers and merchants are eager to cut down on the labour and expense of 
processing small transactions made with cheques and bank debit cards “It’s the future: 
everyone will soon use it” (Matlack et al 2002, p. 4)”. 
 
“…E-money has taken the form of (1) electronic bank notes, such as the embedded chip 
card known as Mondex or ecash for transfer open computer networks; (2) an electronic 
check (the researSIC), for transfer over the open computer networks; and (3) 
enhancements to credit card communications…”. (McAndrews 1999, p. 349) 
 
Electronic bank notes, electronic cheque and enhancements to credit card 
communications can be collectively referred to as digital cash and are designed for 
electronic transfer over the Internet making use of the network to transmit the necessary 
information. The electronic bank note contains embedded chips referred to as a “smart 
card” (McAndrews 1999, p.350) and it is designed as an adjunct to transfer value over 
the Internet.  
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Electronic cheques come in various forms but require special details including account 
numbers which need to be entered on to an Internet site which fulfils the payment 
requirements. CyberSource offers four electronic cheque options, “CheckFree”, 
“TeleCheck”, “AmeriNet” and “Paymentech” (http://www.cybersource.com/products 
_and_services/electronic_payments/electronic_check_processing/, accessed on 20th 
December 2006), each with variations of the transfer theme. Credit card enhancements 
include features using the “smart chip” which allows information to be stored such as 
enabling special offers and reward points. An example of the enhancements is the 
American Express card which has been strongly marketing the “smart chip” offering 
benefits at the point of purchase including chip stored information about retail 
discounts, special offers and reward points. American Express advertises that the smart 
chip also has the capacity for additional applications to be added as they are developed 




The existing forms of electronic payment, such as EFTPOS and creditcards, continue to 
replace coins and notes. Many types of cashless mediums of exchange have been 
developed to improve convenience, save time, increase security and allow entry into the 
global market. In Australia, Wahlert (1996) has observed the relentless advance of 
electronic payments has already made us a community with “less cash” (p.8). Many 
believe that a complete switch to electronic delivery modes is a fait accompli. For large 
financial payments this is because of their relative safety and speed (Matlack et al 2002, 
p.1-2).   
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1.4 Problems of cashless mediums of exchange 
 
With the advantages of convenience and speed of developing money, there also comes a 
variety of issues.  
 
“The rapid growth of electronic commerce has been accompanied by an increased 
number of fraudulent acts facilitated by the unregulated nature of the medium” (Baker 
2002, p. 1).   
 
Electronic movement of money has reportedly stripped Russia of much wealth by 
massive transfer of funds to offshoots of legitimate banks in America. Friedman (2000) 
quoted by Fossen, (2003) recorded that: 
 
 “of all Pacific tax havens, Nauru has been the most closely associated with the largest 
money laundering case in world history, the Bank of New York’s so-called “Russiagate” 
scandal” (p. 244). 
 
Fossen (2003) also contributed when talking about the Bank of New York that: 
 
 “Law enforcement agencies contended that the bank case involved at least 87,000 
electronic transfers of up to $15 billion (some for capital flight, some for tax evasion, but 
also some from criminal activities such as contract murder, narcotics trafficking, and 
prostitution)” (p. 244). 
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Fossen (2003) used various sources in examining this case including Banks and 
Exchanges Weekly, Moscow Times, Prime Tass, and Segodnya. From these sources, 
Fossen (2003) recorded that: 
 
 “Victor Melnikov, deputy chairman of the Russian Central Bank, had stated that $70 
billion had been transferred to Nauru from Russia in 1998, compared to total Russian 
exports of $74 billion. In March 1999, Alexander Pochinok, head of the Russian Finance 
Department, also claimed that 90 percent of Russian banks maintained 6,600 offshore 
banking accounts in Nauru, which was receiving $10 billion of Russian flight capital each 
month” (p. 245).  
 
Tracing the flow of money via a system requiring unique identification would contribute 
to the solution of these problems. The issue of “crime, fraud and deceit on the Internet” 
is taken up by Baker (2002) who also examines “a new type of abusive social behavior” 
(p. 1). Baker examines misuse such as hacking, extortion and perpetrating fraudulent 
securities schemes.  Carding cash or ringing up fraudulent charges to a merchant’s 
account has become easier through the Internet. Baker notes that there is an “emerging 
electronic black market for stolen credit card numbers” (p. 8).  
 
When trading using cashless mediums of exchange, record keeping functionally replaces 
cash. Encryption software used as protection is continually challenged by criminals who 
are trying to break the code. Consequently encryption software needs to be continually 
updated or else they may not be useful. Legislation has been reviewed but does not seem 
to be sufficient to protect privacy issues related to cashless mediums of exchange 
(Young 2003, p. 1). 
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Other commentators such as Everett-Green (1996), Agre and Rotenberg (1997) and 
Whittaker (1999) warn of the dangers to privacy, recognising that the more transactions 
are conducted in cyberspace the easier it becomes to track spending habits, private 
interests and political beliefs. This is despite the fact that cashless forms of trading such 
as Internet banking, are highly regulated by Australian finance legislation including 
specific legislation which deals with electronic payment mechanisms. There are also 
numerous industry-based codes of conduct including the Electronic Funds Transfer 
Code of Conduct and the Code of Banking Practice (The Banking Code). 
 
1.5 Verification mark  
 
As discussed this research examines a cashless monetary system involving a portable 
scanning device, an implanted chip that can be accessed by global positioning satellites 
that can make use of sophisticated computers for recording fund movements. This 
system is considered a logical extension of current cashless systems. The system under 
examination makes use of technologies currently available and affecting work 
environments locally and internationally but which are not currently used collectively 
for the application considered by this research. Current applications of the microchip 
specifically will be examined in this section to show that they are currently available and 
being used in a range of applications which make it likely that they could be used in the 
monetary system described. 
 
In Australia the Sydney Swans, an Australian Football League club, are using “computer 
chips relaying player stress readings directly to coach’s box and a stadium scoreboard” 
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(Phillips, S. 2004, p.21). Xerox plan to monitor staff movements using satellite 
technology. Australian Services Union NSW branch president Sally McManus 
commented that the plan was considered an issue of trust and another layer of 
monitoring, or surveillance that they are not prepared to bear. The Xerox workers were 
prepared to ‘strike over spying’ (2004).  
 
In international applications, a microchip has been inserted under the skin of an arm of 
Mexico’s Attorney-General Rafael Macedo in order “to give him access to a new crime 
database and enable him to be traced if he is ever abducted” (http://www.wired.com 
/science/discoveries/news/2004/07/64194, accessed 20th Dec 2006). Some of the 
Attorney-General’s staff have also been fitted with microchips, which give them 
exclusive and secure access to a national, computerised database for crime investigators. 
The chips enable the wearer to be found anywhere inside Mexico with the emphasis on 
the event of an assault or kidnapping. According to Mr. Macedo in the article ‘Mexican 
officials get chipped’ (2004), “it’s an area of high security; it’s necessary that we have 
access to this, through a chip, which, what’s more, is unremoveable,” (http://www.wired 
.com/science/discoveries/news/2004/07/64194, accessed 20 Dec 2006).  
 
A further example of international applications of traceable microchips occurred in 
Britain where “paedophiles will be tracked by satellite under a new government 
scheme”, “if they go near playgrounds or schools, alarms will sound” (Mancey 2004, p. 
34). 
 
Implantable chips are being used in hospitals as identification devices by America’s 
Food and Drug Administration as evidenced by Phillips, G. (2004) who noted that: 
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“By implanting microchips in their patients, doctors and nurses will be able to 
immediately identify the patient just by running a scanner over them. And at the same 
time they’ll receive readout of the person’s recent medical history” (p.21). 
 
“Sufferers of Alzheimer’s disease who can’t remember their names” “could be scanned 
and identified easily if found wandering” (p.21). 
“And the chips might also be useful for people suffering cancer, who often have to go 
through quite complex chemotherapy and other treatment regimes. A chip under the 
skin should make it easier to keep track of their various medicines and procedures, 
making mix-ups less likely” (p.21). 
 
Implantable chips can be used as a control feature as evidenced by Applied Digital 
Solutions , “the US company that makes the implants is hoping gun owners will go for 
an insert in the hand. That way personalised smart guns could be developed” (Phillips, 
G. 2004, p.21). Weapons that would only fire if the gun’s owner was the one pulling the 
trigger could be an example. The system would work via a scanner in the gun 
interrogating the chip in the shooter’s hand. If the gun finds the wrong person is holding 
it, it simply does not fire. Police officers and security guards could be fitted with the 
system. That way, no one could steal their weapons and use them against them. 
 
Patrons of particular bars in Amsterdam, Barcelona, Scotland and Spain have the option 
of getting a chip implant allowing them to enter the clubs unimpeded, “they just walked 
past a scanner at the entrance and straight to the bar” (Beer with microchip 2005, p. 7)  
no longer queuing to get into the club. The chip also allows management to keep a 
running total of their tab, “the bartender simply scans their chip and the drinks are 
automatically added to the bill” (p. 7).  
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A school in Japan has recently introduced a wearable, rather than implantable, version 
of the chip (Philips, G. 2004, p.21). These allow the teachers to keep a better eye on the 
children and determine who is and who is not at school. Legoland in Denmark has 
wearable chips too. They say they are to prevent kids getting lost. 
 
Evidence has been provided to show that the requisite features of the microchips for the 
facilitation of the cashless monetary system described currently exist. The features 
include that it is able to be implanted successfully into humans, it can be used as an 
identification device that can store and exchange information in real time and via 
satellite communications. As the system is a recording device rather than an exchange in 
itself, various credit and debit applications can easily be managed if authorised. 
 
1.6 Benefits of a verification mark 
 
The microchips currently available have high-speed reaction time and can deal with 
multi-purpose recording functions. If the chip were the culmination of a cashless 
economy, accounting for personal transactions would become easier including budgets 
and taxation, which may well be done centrally given all expenditure and receipts would 
be stored. Non-financial information would additionally be stored which would make 
personal management of more than just finances possible. The tracking of payments to 
final consumers would allow a sophisticated audit trail reducing the possibility for 
fraud. There would also be a convenience factor since a microchip would have plenty of 
room for other kinds of data (Ramesh, 1997). Cash or credit cards would no longer need 
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to be carried, and information such as driver’s licence and contact details could be 
stored.  
 
The current benefits of the implantable microchips that were evidenced in the section 
above include the ability to track people if they are abducted or if they are under a 
surveillance order such as sex offenders, are prisoners or parolees or for the tracking of 
young children, people with physical disabilities or those with mental illnesses such as 
Alzheimer's disease (Crews 2002, p. 2). The implantable microchips can currently 
provide medical information and increase safety features of weapons.  
 
For national security issues, Defence Minister Robert Hill and Immigration Minister 
Amanda Vanstone acknowledged an ID card (like microchips) would have to include a 
biometric element, such as fingerprinting, to be of any real benefit and only if a card 
could be developed that was not too intrusive (Conway, 2005). 
 
1.7 Hazards of a verification mark 
 
Many of the features that have been described as advantages can also be seen as 
disadvantages, for example, the ability that allows tracking, increased information and 
safety features could also enable control. 
 
The storage of records electronically requires very little space. Whilst this record 
keeping is handled ethically and vast decentralisation of the record keeping exists, 
privacy can be partially maintained.  A perception may arise that the verification mark 
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would make confidential information about private and business financial affairs 
vulnerable. Issues of privacy are identified by Phillips (2004, p.21) who states that the 
problem with an implantable chip is that “you are effectively walking around with a 
permanent ID tag on you. Anyone with a scanner could point it at you and identify you” 
(p.21). He is also concerned about information being used as a marketing identification 
tool. 
 
The more sophisticated the system of collection and the resultant information, the 
greater the potential for information and, therefore, power asymmetry.  Such 
sophisticated information has the potential also to be misused either by an authority or 
by unauthorised access, for instance, hackers. A perception may exist that a verification 
mark would increase the control that regulators, banks or other institutions, have over 
one’s life. 
 
The recent spate of computer viruses (Markoff 2006, p.1-2) indicates the nature of the 
potential problems that can occur with computer systems. If a cashless medium of 
exchange reliant on computerised storage global positioning satellites and implantable 
chips comes to fruition, corruption to the system could have a catastrophic effect.  
 
1.8 Theory introduction 
 
Davis (1989) explored user acceptance of computer technology in business, making use 
of Fishbein and Ajzen’s (1975) and Ajzen and Fishbein’s (1980) Theory of Reasoned 
Action (TRA) as it was “an especially well-researched intention model that has proven 
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successful in predicting and explaining behavior across a wide variety of domains” 
Davis et al (1989, p. 983). 
 
The Theory of Reasoned Action was, “born largely out of frustration with traditional 
attitude-behavior research, much of which found weak correlations between attitude 
measures and performance of volitional behaviors” (Hale et al 2003, p. 259). In general, 
the Theory of Reasoned Action aims to contribute to determining the likelihood that a 
person will undertake a specified behaviour.  
 
The theory “proposes that behavioral intention is a function of both attitudes toward a 
behavior and subjective norms toward that behavior” (Miller 2005, p.127). By 
measuring a person’s attitudes and subjective norms towards a specific behaviour, 
which affect a person’s intention, the person’s actual behaviour could be predicted. 
Subjective norms are refered to as:  
 
“the influence of people in one’s social environment on his/her behavioral intentions; the 
beliefs of people, weighted by the importance one attributes to each of their opinions, 
will influence one’s behavioral intention” (Miller 2005, p. 127).  
 
Davis (1989) adapted the Theory of Reasoned Action model to tailor the model 
specifically for user acceptance of information systems, which he called the Technology 
Acceptance Model (TAM). Davis posits that two particular beliefs are of primary 
importance for technology acceptance behaviour. These are the perceived usefulness of 
the technology for the intended tasks and the perceived ease of use of the technology, 
which Davis (1989, p. 320) describes as “the degree to which a person believes that 
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using a particular system would be free of effort”. Davis removes the subjective norm 
from the model completely due to the difficulty “to disentangle direct effects of 
subjective norms on behaviour intention from indirect effects via attitudes towards 
behaviour” (Davis 1989, p. 983). 
 
This research disagrees with Davis on the issue of subjective norm and returns to the 
precepts of the Theory of Reasoned Action model and includes the component before 
making use of Davis’ TAM. A perception of risk is also included as it is seen as 
important in such a significant and personal decision from a cost benefit perspective. 
The modified model is designed to apply to the issue of society’s acceptance of a 
verification mark. 
 






























































1.9 Research question 
 
The research question of this research asks: What level of acceptance would 
professional accountants have in adopting a cashless monetary system using an 
implantable chip technology supported by global positioning satellite and large 
computer systems? The level of acceptance is considered to be refined by the Modified 
Technology Acceptance Model which specified four elements that have an effect on the 
acceptance behaviour of a verification mark. The four elements are perceived usefulness, 
perceived risks, perceived ease of use, and normative beliefs and motivation to comply. 
 
1.10 Method of Thesis 
 
The lack of research in this area drove the research method towards a broad-based mail 
questionnaire, reaching greater numbers than would be possible in interviews, focus 
groups or case-study styles of research. Full members of CPA in Australia and the 
Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia were deemed to have appropriate 
qualifications to address this issue and were selected as the population for this research.  
 
The survey included a series of questions (both open-ended and closed) with the closed 
questions using a Likert-scale response with a scale between one and five. The survey 
tested for consistency by using techniques such as asking similar questions in the 
negative form and found no conflict in the communications of the respondents. The 
survey was divided into distinct groups including descriptive information, responses 
relating to the model, acceptance and respondent’s belief about the status of existing 
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technology that would allow the mechanics of a monetary system revolving around an 
implantable chip.  Pre-testing was undertaken to minimise response bias.  
 
 
1.11 Structure of Thesis 
 
This thesis consists of seven chapters. The introduction provides an overall insight of 
the research which is followed by the literature review in Chapter 2. This chapter 
explores cashless mediums of exchange both from a traditionalist and critical 
perspective of accounting. The chapter traces the development and proliferation of 
cashless mediums of exchange and new methods of identifications especially the 
implantable chip as well as their advantages and disadvantages. 
 
Chapter three reviews the various relevant theories including diffusion theory, theory of 
reasoned action, theory of planned behaviour, and technology acceptance theory. The 
review led to the methodology used in this research being the Modified Technology 
Acceptance Model. The four independent variables established from the model 
(perceived ease of use, perceived usefulness, perceived risks, and normative beliefs and 
motivation to comply) were then described in chapter four. The research question and 
hypotheses were also developed and discussed in chapter four.  
 
Chapter five focused on the research method and questionnaire design. Chapter six 
provides analysis of the responses and the acceptance of the “mark”. The descriptive 
results were presented and the responses was analysed based on each of the four 
independent variables. The chapter discussed the availability of technology and analyses 
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was undertaken on the validity of the research. Early and late response bias were 
examined and the hypotheses were tested. Further, the chapter examined the responses 
of open questions in the context of the model. Chapter seven forms the conclusion of the 
research, provides recommendations and suggests relevant further research.  
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Chapter Two: Literature review of mediums of 
exchange 
 
2.1 Traditionalist perspective 
 
Broadly, this research focuses on how financial information affects individuals 
including their rights. More specifically, the research relates to the acceptance by 
accountants of a new monetary system based on an implanted microchip (verification 
mark) as part of a fully automated cashless system which will change how information 
is gathered, what information is gathered and how that information will be used. The 
research relates to individual’s finances and not the effect on businesses of the 
verification mark. 
 
If every monetary transaction in which an individual is involved requires transfers using 
an individual’s verification mark, authorisation and a scanner then the amount of 
centralised data collected would be extremely complete both in amount and 
coordination. The verification mark would be an implanted chip either in the wrist or 
forehead. This would contain an individual’s record of wealth and personal details. 
Centralised accumulation of transactions would be automatically up-dated in the same 
way that a supermarket using a perpetual system and computerised bar-coding scanners 
can deal with levels of stock. Just as stock purchases increase stock, receipts increase 
bank balances and just like sales of stock reduce stock levels, payments would decrease 
bank amounts.  
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Rights of access to a person’s centrally produced records would be available. 
Individuals and businesses alike would have detailed transaction reports which would 
cross-reference each other. Primary reports would look like bank statement records or 
credit card reports.  
 
Electronic information can easily be translated into accounting and taxation reports and, 
in fact, as all information is contained by central computers an ongoing record of 
taxation obligations and, therefore, deductions would be available. Scanners would be 
carried by individuals in convenient locations such as in their mobile phone. This 
system would stop data being manipulated before, during, or after it has been entered 
into the information system (Metrejean, Smith and Elam 2004, p. 11-12). 
 
Accountants are interested in financial information in the fulfilment of their traditional 
pursuits such as completing taxation returns, auditing and preparing financial 
information and reports. They have the regulatory, professional and individual’s 
permission to undertake these and other related tasks on behalf of clients. For instance, 
in order to be accredited as a tax agent a person must be qualified under Section 156 of 
the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 which requires them to be a member of one of the 
two premier accounting bodies in Australia and have "successfully completed a course 
of study in basic accounting principles” (Income Tax Assessment Act 1936, s 
156(1)(d)(ii)).  
 
Section 1280 of the Corporations Act requires auditors to hold “a degree, diploma or 
certificate from a prescribed university or another prescribed institution in Australia” 
(Corporations Act 2001, s. 1280 (2A)(a)) embracing “accountancy (including auditing) 
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of not less than 3 years duration” (Corporations Act 2001, s. 1280 (2A)(b)(i)). The Act 
also requires auditors to be a “Registered company auditor” with the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) to audit publicly listed companies. 
Once again only accountants can act in this capacity for large corporations. 
 
Relevant extensions to their traditional pursuits are also of interest whether that is an 
anticipated taxation system, a technological change which affects the collection and 
manipulation of data or the extension of information surrounding financial information. 
A verification chip would increase the amount and type of information that is currently 
available on a person’s spending behaviour. This trend has been developing as cashless 
forms of funds have required the support of information trails. Computerisation has 
made the storage of this information easier and more transferable. One only needs to 
look at an average credit card statement as evidence of the details available on spending 
habits that are currently available.  
 
Accountants should be interested in this emerging financial issue as their traditional 
roles will be affected by it. Accountants have a delegated right to examine sensitive 
individual information. The preparation of taxation returns on behalf of individuals is an 
example. With the introduction of a verification mark, taxation accountants will be 
affected by government regulations on how the information will be collected and how 
taxation is charged. The hiding of assessable income will take on different forms with 
the facilitation of the verification mark which will undoubtedly affect the extent and 
working of the black-market and bartering systems. 
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Another example of accountants’ rights to be involved in personal information is the 
financial advisor’s preparation of a Financial Statement of Advice on behalf of a client. 
The extent of information that could become available with the adoption of a 
verification mark would significantly alter how a Statement of Advice is prepared and 
the extent of that advice. The information available with a verification mark could affect 
the budgeting of an individual’s personal finances which relates not only to financial 
advice.  
 
From a traditionalist perspective, then, if the verification chip supports collecting 
increased information then accountants should be interested in the type of information 
that will be collected and how the information will be used. In accountants’ traditional 
endeavours such as collecting, reporting and managing transactions, they have a 
delegated right to deal in clients’ financial information, from its collection to its use and 
dissemination. The verification mark will have the potential to alter drastically how 
financial information is dealt with and accountants’ views reflecting the financially 
literate are important. 
 
There is a plethora of evidence to show that people are concerned with the issues arising 
from new forms of cashless mediums of exchange. According to Gartner (NYSE:IT) 
and Jupiter Research in the context of the United States population at the 300 million 
mark, “80 million consumers who use the Internet do not buy online” and on the other 
hand, the majority of the online shoppers are concerned about safety and security issues 
(http://www.technewsworld.com/story/53866.html, accessed on 23rd November 2006).  
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In making cashless payments removed from the individual, identity is paramount and in 
the digital era it is embodied in information rather than flesh as evidenced by 'spoofing' 
(http://www.caslon.com.au/idtheftprofile.htm, accessed on 12th January 2006) or 'joe 
jobs' (http://www.caslon.com.au/idtheftprofile.htm, accessed on 12th January 2006) 
where emails or websites purport to emanate from a public figure or private individual 
in an effort to perpetrate frauds. The Australian Bankers’ Association's Code of Banking 
Practice states that “A Bank may require a customer to notify the Bank as soon as 
possible of the loss, theft or misuse of his or her payment instruments by unauthorised 
access by others” (http://www.bankers.asn.au/Default.aspx?ArticleID=95, accessed on 
12th January 2006).  
 
In conclusion, accountants have a traditional interest in the development of a cashless 
monetary system based on implantable chips and real time transactions. Accountants 
have expertise that would be useful in the context of the monetary system.  
 
2.2 Accounting’s role in social development 
 
In the previous section it was argued that a traditional view of accounting entitles 
accounting researchers to examine issues that may impact upon traditional boundaries 
such as the sophisticated cashless monetary system using implantable chips. This 
section argues that other accounting perspectives would also embrace such research as 
important and legitimate. 
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The various elements of accounting to many traditionalists are just part of a 
sophisticated system of collection. They are seen as merely an extension of their 
historical double-entry origins. To others, like Littleton (1953), when discussing income 
in the context of it being a force as part of a measurement relationship between input 
and output and in contemplation that, “income itself confers social benefits” (p. 21), 
states that in “a large sense, the relations are like those of chemical processes of life 
itself” (p. 21). 
 
Critical theorists would not want to abrogate responsibility for an evolving accounting 
process to an authority without input and a full examination of the issues at a macro 
level and the implications at a micro level. The emerging monetary system discussed in 
this research would redefine collection and audit processes and deserves investigation 
prior to its support or introduction even at a voluntary level. Critical theorist literature 
would be concerned about the method that information is collected, the type of 
information collected and the use of the information in this emerging cashless monetary 
system. 
 
Francis (1990) has drawn attention to the way in which critical theorists consider that 
accounting and the accounting profession have escaped social responsibility. Examples 
given include its role in the depreciation of the natural environment, and its collusion in 
denying the legitimacy of the interests of stakeholders other than shareholders. Funnell 
(1998) contends that the “tendency for accounting researchers is to have been so 
preoccupied with the processes that form the accounting function that they have 
overlooked its extended consequences, which do not fall within the quantifiable net” (p. 
439). He argues that the link is rarely made between “broader social consequences and 
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the role of accounting as a constituent element in engendering existing social and 
political arrangements” (p. 439). Hopper et al (1991) warns accounting researchers not 
to ignore the “wider social and political collectives” (p. 5). Francis (1990) adds 
accounting “can influence the lived experience of others” (p. 7). Funnell (2001) even 
challenges the lack of encapsulation of ethical utilitarian principles stating that it has 
“contributed little to the interpretation of justice based upon need” (p. 191), in his study 
of the role of accounting in the Irish famine. Funnell (2001) argues, still referring to the 
Irish famine, that “accounting played an essential role in confirming the conditions 
under which property entitlements were determined to be just and in providing 
apparatus for the State to laager these entitlements” (p. 189). It is, therefore, argued that 
consideration should be made of the implementation of the verification mark. The way 
information is gathered, the amount and type of information collected in this system 
may place an unfair burden on the individuals in the community. The real time 
collection method also may be considered to be too invasive as it places people at a 
certain spot at a certain time. The sophistication of the collection system detailed may be 
seen as unjust. 
 
A system put in place by an authority like a government or businesses like banks 
extends a sense of legitimacy to it. Many psychological aspects underpin the acceptance 
decision of a system implemented in such a way. The needs of the community are 
inferred as more important than the needs of an individual. An individual who does not 
support the system may be labelled a recalcitrant, unable to deal with change or 
stubborn. The financial, physical and emotional cost of fighting an established authority 
where such an asymmetry of power exists, leads to a feeling of being defeated, apathy 
and preparedness to accept the system even if you do not want to or have doubts. The 
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social and ethical issues are difficult to argue once a system is in place as you may be 
labelled as weird. 
 
Hilberg (1985) dramatically argues the Holocaust would not have been possible without 
the cooperation of the German civil bureaucracy. In this context Funnell (1998) outlines 
the role of accounting as a component of bureaucratic practices used in the preparation 
of the Jewish Holocaust. He further highlights accounting as an “ethical practice and 
therefore having a moral character” (p. 439). Perhaps a pre-acceptance of this may have 
assisted in diverting the tragedy. If accounting has such responsibility it stands as a 
justification of research into accounting’s roles in future significant projects such as the 
introduction of a personal verification mark. 
 
Hilberg (1985) contends that “every stratum of society was represented in the 
envelopment of the victims” (p. 3) of the Jewish Holocaust. Rosenberg (1983) has 
referred to the bureaucrats as “desk killers” (p. 17) referring to their role in the 
“labyrinth of bureaucratic routines and apparatus” (p. 17) which contributed to the mass 
Jewish deaths. “Morality came to be seen as synonymous with discipline and 
subjugation of all the inner measures of right and wrong” (p. 17). 
 
In this light it seems appropriate to examine whether the verification mark is good in 
itself and what good might be achieved by its implementation added to the context of a 
biblical warning against the adoption of “the mark”.  
 
The issue of identification and numbering people arose in this Jewish Holocaust tragedy 
because many Jewish people were indistinguishable based on physiognomy alone. At 
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one time Jews where forced to wear a Star of David on themselves or their clothing. 
Identification numbers where also given to the Jews. Some had numbers and/or the Star 
of David tattooed on their bodies including the back of their heads raising personal 
rights issues. The numbering system imposed on their bodies was seen to have 
dehumanised them. An identity number implanted into one’s body could also be seen as 
dehumanising.  
 
Despite the reader’s opinions on the views presented in this critical perspective section 
an argument has been made that justifies further examining the issue of a cashless 
society based on an implantable chip and associated technology.   
 
The past two sections have represented different accounting positions both traditional 
and the critical perspective with respect to this cashless monetary issue. Both lead to the 
conclusion that it is important to examine issues involving the adoption of a verification 
mark given its potential to affect decision making and accounting systems due to the 
comprehensive way that information could be collected.  
 
2.3 Proliferation of cashless mediums of exchange 
 
The system of exchange has a history of becoming more sophisticated and in Chapter 1, 
the development of mediums of exchange was documented. Originally, barter systems 
moved to physical forms of exchange which eventually led to cash. Systems supporting 
the value attributed to cash such as cheques and money orders still survive but more 
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sophisticated debit and credit card systems are common now and allow payment over 
the phone or Internet in addition to the mail option.  
 
There is evidence to suggest that cashless mediums of exchange are becoming more 
prolific. There are many applications of cashless mediums of exchange. Cheques, 
money orders and electronic transfers developed to facilitate payment for goods and 
services without the need to be present physically. Other associated products establish a 
store of value such as vouchers and reward points earned from loyalty programs. Debit 
and credit cards more recently have become normal mediums of exchange. Following 
on from the physical use of credit and debit cards, bills can now be simply paid by 
phone or via the Internet by the average consumer. The Internet allows connected 
computers with protocols that allow interface with different operating software and 
different applications. “Although a system of networked computers is not new, the 
recent growth in the significance and use of Internet banking has been astounding” 
Bollen (2001 p. 5). 
 
Moines (2000) reported that approximately 73% of payments made in the United States 
are made electronically. The Development Bank of Singapore’s debit smart card 
“money smart” is accepted globally at over 17 million Mastercard locations and can be 
used to withdraw cash at over 485,000 Mastercard/Cirrus automated teller machines 
(Ling 2001). The card is highly accessible and can require as little as $100 as a deposit. 
 
Thirty percent of Belgium’s ten million citizens use an e-cash program called Proton for 
purchases expected to total some five hundred million dollars annually (Matlack et al 
2002). E-cash is a prepaid store of cash that can be used at participating vendors via 
 45 
special readers. In France, the e-card called Moneo has been adopted by ten percent of 
the people in the regions where it has been introduced. The Moneo e-cash option has 
been offered to customers on the same card as their credit and debit card (Matlack et al 
2002). Moneo is expected to be very successful as the card only costs between five and 
twelve dollars annually compared with the high fees attached to the debit card system in 
addition to the propensity of the French to use cheques and money orders. 
 
 
Harper et al (2005, p. 2) stated that: 
 
 
“The technology to support electronic payments, both communications networks and 
cards, has been available for many years. Credit cards, for example, have been used for 
more than 50 years. However, the use of electronic payments instruments, especially 
plastic credit and debit payments cards, has accelerated sharply over the past decade.” 
 





Chart 2.1 shows the “trends towards alternative non-cash payments transactions are 
pronounced in all developed markets in Australia from 1996 to 2004” (Harper et al 
2005, p. 3). 
 
The project team of Exploration of Future Electronic Payments Markets estimates that: 
 
“in 2004 there were approximately 1.1 billion cash withdrawal transactions in Australia, 
for an average amount of $160 while the average purchase amount of a cash 
transaction ranges between $13 and $20” (Exploration of Future Electronic Payments 
Markets 2006, p. 34). 
 
As electronic payment products become more popular, the total value for cheques has 
steadily decreased over time. The Chart 2.2 also points out the percentage change of 
each payment alternatives in Australia from 1995 to 2004 (Commonwealth of Australia 
2006, p. 36). 
 
E-commerce overall is an economic powerhouse; “2007 online sales are forecasted at 
US$291 billion” (http://www.technewsworld.com/story/53866.htm, accessed on 23rd 
November 2006). In just three years, “alternative payments volume is expected to jump 
from 12 percent to 26 percent, while credit card volume will drop below 50 percent” 
(http://www.technewsworld.com/story/53866.html, accessed 23rd November 2006). 
 47 
Chart 2.2: Combined value and volume for products other than casha 
 
Chart 2.2 evidences the substantial increase in the use of cashless mediums (except for 
cheque) in both number of transactions and value throughout year 1995 to 2004. 
Overall, cash transactions “constitute only approximately two percent of the value of all 
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payments made in Australia”. (Exploration of Future Electronic Payments Markets 
2006, p. 36). 
 
In 2004, the New Zealand Banks Authority reported that there were “50.8 million 
‘Internet banking’ transactions, and 131.8 million ‘PC banking’ transactions, illustrating 
the rapid penetration of these access methods” (http://www.rbnz.govt.nz/finstab/fsreport 
/fsr_may2005.pdf, accessed on 14th December 2006). It can also be established from this 
source that there is a trend towards increasing non-cash usage, including credit card 
usage, arguably because of the convenience of its use. “For example, in the year 2000, 
New Zealand had 194 million credit card transactions” (Wright 2002, p. 311).  
 
Over the five years reported in Table 2.1, there was an 87% increase in credit card use, 
from 200 million in 2001 to 375 million in 2005. 
 
Table 2.1: Credit card usage 
Year  Credit Card Usage  % Change 
  in million   
2001 200   
2002 262.5 31.25% 
2003 287.5 9.52% 
2004 350 21.74% 
2005 375 7.14% 
 
Direct debits have also increased substantially (60%) during the period from 2001 (62.5 




Table 2.2: Direct debits usage 
Year  Direct Debits Usage  % Change 
  in million   
2001 62.5   
2002 56.25 -10.00% 
2003 75 33.33% 
2004 81.25 8.33% 
2005 100 23.08% 
 
In 2000, “New Zealand had 483 million electronic funds transfer at point of sale 
(EFTPOS) transactions accounting for around 60 percent of retail sales” (Wright 2002, 
p. 311). EFTPOS has also been increased dramatically (43.6%) after that as can be seen 
from Table 2.3, from 487.5 million to 700 million. Further, of all the industries surveyed, 
the findings indicate that New Zealand organisations are more likely to have EFTPOS 
(Ratnasingam 2001, p. 7). 
 
Table 2.3: EFTPOS usage 
Year EFTPOS Usage  % Change 
  in million   
2001 487.5   
2002 550 12.82% 
2003 587.5 6.82% 
2004 625 6.38% 
2005 700 12.00% 
  
Electronic credits have overall maintained its usage throughout year 2001 to 2005 as 







Table 2.4: Electronic credits usage 
Year 
Electronic Credits 
Usage  % Change 
  in million   
2001 312   
2002 300 -3.85% 
2003 287 -4.33% 
2004 300 4.53% 
2005 312 4.00% 
 
Automatic Teller Machine usage has increased at a slower rate (21.4%) from 1.75 
million in year 2001 to 2.215 million in year 2005 compared to the non-cash 
alternatives. 
 
Table 2.5: ATM usage 
Year ATM Usage  % Change 
  in million   
2001 1.75   
2002 2.00 14.29% 
2003 2.00 0.00% 
2004 2.065 3.25% 
2005 2.125 2.91% 
 
EFTPOS is widely used and dominates cheques and credit cards (Wright 2002, p. 315). 
Cheques are less widely used for retail fuel purchases in New Zealand (Wright 2002, p. 
313). Cheque usage, the non-cash alternatives without the immediate verification of 
other non-cash alternatives such as credit card and EFTPOS has been decreasing at a 
substantial rate (21%) over the five years (2001 to 2005) examined in Table 2.6.  
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Table 2.6:  Cheque usage 
Year Cheque Usage  % Change 
  in million   
2001 237.5   
2002 237.5 0.00% 
2003 225 -5.26% 
2004 200 -11.11% 
2005 187.5 -6.25% 
 
2.4 Advantages of cashless mediums of exchange 
 
The various cashless options provide specific advantages to the user. Amongst the most 
important of these advantages is the convenience of payment. With cashless forms of 
exchange it is not necessary to carry sufficient cash for purchases, which could be large 
amounts which, in turn, could be lost or stolen. There is also no need to be physically 
present to pay a bill which can often be conveniently paid via the mail, over the phone 
or via the Internet. Credit facilities can also accompany cashless mediums of exchange 
so purchases and payments can be made without the need to have cash actually available 
at that time. For example, ANZ Frequent Flyer Credit cards offer up to 55 days of free 
credit, associating with reward point accumulations which can be used to redeem 
products or services including airline tickets. The monthly statement is considered an 
organised documentation of expenditure. This can be an important source of information 
for the preparation of taxation returns, personal budgets or an analysis of spending. The 
documentation involved in a credit transaction enables security advantages such as the 
ability to trace the payment to its source in order to determine its legitimacy; this is not 
possible in a cash transaction without associated paperwork.  
 
 52 
When prepayments are made for a good or a service the manner in which the payment is 
made when the payee becomes bankrupt or goes into liquidation affects the payer’s 
entitlements. “The cash payer is in the worst position and will become an unsecured 
creditor whilst other forms of payments such as a cheque, credit cards and possibly 
electronic payments may allow revocation of payment” (Edwards 2004, p. 81). 
 
“Many firms, particularly those involved in handling large amounts of coinage and bank 
notes, are finding the costs of handling cash to be increasingly onerous” (Stuber 1996, p. 
8). “Cashless mediums of exchange makes a clear way to consolidate and extend such 
means of reducing the costs of undertaking small-value retail transactions” (Ioannis 
2000, p. 8). 
 
“Consumers would no longer need to have the correct change for a transaction or to 
handle numerous small coins. The incidence of error in calculating change from a 
transaction would also be reduced” (Stuber 1996, p. 9). 
 
Finally, “cashless mediums of exchange makes improvements in the efficiency of 
financial arrangements that reduce or destabilize the demand for the monetary” 
(Woodford 1998, p. 218). Cashless mediums of exchange “need not be a source of 
macroeconomic instability” (Woodford 1998, p. 218).  
 
The costs of cash include the risk of handling it including the risk of loss, theft, 
safekeeping, deposits of currency and security. Recording cash is also costly including 
the point of sale collection of the transaction details, accounting and dealing with the 
associated financial institution.   
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2.5 Disadvantages of cashless mediums of exchange 
 
Godschalk and Krueger (2001, p. 13) outlined the disadvantages of using e-money 
including the need for hardware, the expenses and “conflicts with anonymity” (p.13) of 
security and the fact that it is not suitable for hoarding. 
 
With the convenience of cashless mediums of exchange often comes the reality of 
dealing with lines of finance that are often associated. The success of credit cards and 
the high establishment fees and interest rates are a testament to people’ inability to 
manage their money and, for many, to spend within their means. That credit is provided 
does not guarantee that the recipient will be able to manage the repayments and often 
financial difficulties result. 
 
In the search for greater convenience of exchange new social issues are created. The 
tracking and generation of information that is created as a function of cashless mediums 
of exchange create issues such as the control an authority has over an individual. A 
related issue is the level of privacy afforded to a person by the system and the use that is 
made of the information by authorities in controlling behaviour and by those who may 
misuse the information in illegal or immoral ways. As systems of exchange develop, 





“Digital cash is ideally suited for international money transfers and, aided by computer 
software, could be routed and re-routed to several destinations internationally within 
seconds” (Wahlert 1996, p. 24).  
 
“The advent of cashless payments mechanisms erodes the monopoly position of the 
central bank as the sole supplier of currency which represents a return to privately-
issued currency, something not observed in Australia since the early years of this 
century” (Grabosky and Smith 1997, p. 3). 
 
“The proliferation of electronic funds transfer systems has enhanced the risk that such 
transactions will be intercepted and funds diverted. Existing systems such as ATMs, and 
EFTPOS technologies have already been the targets of fraudulent activity, while home 
banking and internet shopping with the use of electronic cash will provide rich new 
avenues of fraud in the future” (Grabosky and Smith 1997, p. 3). 
 
2.5.1 Cashless mediums of exchange’s propensity to magnify an 
authority’s control  
 
The bartering system is predominantly free of social control issues as there is no primary 
evidence of the exchange other than a good or a service. The time, amount, subject of 
the exchange and other details are not documented primarily in the exchange. The barter 
system obviously lacks the sophistication required in a developing society. The nature of 
cash itself also lends itself to a lower level of concern regarding control. Likewise cash 
is not typically traced to a particular person even though the notes themselves are 
individually coded. A secondary system of tracking is required to ascertain how much 
cash a person receives and spends which has always been an issue in the appropriate 
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collection of taxation. The lack of information that a regulator has about cash 
transactions not supported by documentation reduces the potential the government has 
over the transaction including the collection of relevant taxation, the legality of the good 
or service. This lack of control over the transaction manifests in a lack of control over 
the person making the transaction at least from this source and includes an inability to 
gather information to profile the individual making the transaction. 
 
“Under the table” cash payments to avoid taxation or other regulations are an issue with 
cash. The New Zealand Warriors organisation had been caught paying undisclosed cash 
payments in excess of a million dollars to its players during the 2004-2005 season. 
These transactions had not been recorded as a method to avoid the salary cap restrictions 
(Warriors ponder appeal to get points back 2006) imposed by the National Rugby 
League (NRL) who, upon investigation, fined the club $430,000 for salary cap rorting. 
As cash is typically not traced to a specific person, how a person spends their money can 
be kept relatively private. Misuses, in the first instance, are contained to the transfer of a 
physical currency, for example, a robbery or blackmail situation. The government to 
some extent controls the amount of cash in circulation via monetary policy, but as it is 
in a physical form and not an electronic form, then it is not dependent on a recording 
system which could be tampered with or corrupted.  
 
Non-cash transactions often require documentation and often generate an electronic 
record. Examples include credit card transactions and interest payments made to a 
customer by a financial institution whereby the client and financial institution have 
electronic records and the client is sent a paper version at some predetermined time. 
With a credit card, the vendor, customer and the financial institution have a copy of the 
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transaction whether in paper or electronic form. When an electronic trail is established, 
potential access by various bodies including the government or a legal authority is made 
possible. No longer is the transaction anonymous. For example, it is common taxation 
audit practice in the Australian Taxation Office to match electronically generated 
income such as interest that is recorded by a financial institution with an entity’s 
taxation return. If the amount is not disclosed in the entities tax return, this can trigger a 
more expansive audit or at least an official letter to the taxpayer requiring the income to 
be included. Another example of an authority’s intervention is where amounts are 
considered fraudulent or illegal and a warrant is obtained allowing the governing body, 
most often a police squad, access. A police squad may freeze the amounts and examine 
the electronic trail for evidence of infractions. 
 
The increased knowledge facilitated by the necessary record keeping of most cashless 
mediums of exchange adds to the asymmetry of power between the individual and the 
government. The government is in a stronger position with respect to the information 
available to it than before the recording of such transactions. The fact that an authority 
can, if it chooses, view a person’s transaction history with most cashless mediums of 
exchange, is analogous to Bentham’s concept of a Panopticon (Rabinow 1982). 
Rabinow (1982) stated that Foucault was intrigued with this concept because of the 
underlying social issue of control. The Panopticon was a society, built for observation, 
designed for the eradication of disease. Rules were developed to limit the spread of the 
disease, for instance, affected parties were not allowed to leave the vicinity. A viewing 
quarter was established whereby authorities could see out at any time they chose but 
physical characteristics meant no one could look into the viewing quarter. When 
referring to the supervisor in the Panopticon, Bentham states the “invisibility is a 
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guarantee of order” (Foucault 1982, p.200). He warned, “visibility is a trap” (Foucault 
1975, p.200) stating that “he is seen but he does not see; he is the object of information 
never a subject in communication” (Bentham 1791, p. 60). In this analogy cashless 
payments can be viewed as desired forming a strong system of control. Bentham’s 
panopticon was a control-based system developed for a worthy cause, nevertheless 
Foucault warns of the social control issue. A cashless society may be viewed similarly. 
 
Broadbent (1995) also examined the issue of visibility when he stated “making certain 
aspects of reality ‘visible’ creates the possibility of controlling these elements” 
(Broadbent 1995, p. 4). He continues that “its control potential which constitutes its real 
social influence as well as its social danger”. 
  
2.5.2 Privacy issues arising from cashless mediums of exchanges 
 
The bartering and cash systems often did not provide the opportunity for privacy to be 
compromised outside those involved in an exchange. Recording systems are required to 
make a cash or barter exchange subject to privacy issues. “When trading using cashless 
mediums of exchange, however, record keeping functionally replaces cash. These 
ubiquitous records imperil privacy” (Young 2006, p.1). Already much information has 
been collected about individuals for many reasons including the developing cashless 
means of exchange.  The trend towards increased stored information is continuing. 
According to Jackson (2003), 
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“an important concern about e-commerce shared by consumers has been a fear that 
their credit card information may be used fraudulently or be disclosed to others who then 
use them fraudulently” (p. 28).  
 
Despite the legal attention that privacy issues gain, common law has not defined it. “The 
Victorian Law Reform Commission observes that: the term [privacy] has different 
meanings in different contexts” (Doyle et al 2003, p. 238). As there is no clearly 
accepted meaning of the term, privacy, Doyle examines the literature from the narrow to 
the very broad noting the definition by Warren & Brandeis (1890) which is the “the right 
to be let alone” (Doyle et al 2003, p. 239) which “has been described as influential for 
over a century” (Doyle et al 2003, p. 239).  
 
In recent times with the pressure of the information technology age, Gavison’s broad 
definition of privacy stated in Doyle et al (2003) has been useful. Her definition is 
“limited access in the senses of solitude, secrecy and anonymity” (Doyle et al 2003, p. 
239). Gavison views privacy 
 
“as a measure of the extent to which an individual is known, the extent to which an 
individual is the subject of attention and the extent to which others are in the physical 
proximity to an individual. Her definition of privacy was to include …such “typical” 
invasions of privacy as the collection, storage, and computerisation of information; the 
dissemination of information about individuals: peeping, following, watching, and 
photographing individuals intruding or entering private places; eavesdropping, 
wiretapping, reading of letters, drawing attention to individuals, required testing of 




Doyle et al (2003 p. 239) observes that  
 
“…control of personal information” underlies all the definitions and contributes that 
the right to privacy amounts to the ability to keep from others information about 
oneself. There is no scope of this information; it extends to such matters as 
employment history, current income, political persuasion, religious beliefs, sexual 
orientation, hair colour, height and one’s hopes and fears”.  
 
Electronic transfer of exchange over the Internet creates a plethora of privacy issues 
including the ability of the web server via the cookie features in browser software to 
identify a web client “and enables certain features that are useful for surfing and online 
commerce, such as retaining screen preferences, storing passwords, and creating virtual 
shopping carts” (Riley 1998, p. 89). In addition,  
 
“it is possible that every Web site visited, every message sent or received, and 
every purchase made can be recorded in a database available to a wide range of 
users for a modest fee” (Shapiro 2000, p. 190).  
 
Cashless mediums of exchange add to the records kept about an individual and in 
potentially highly sensitive areas. The mere consolidated visibility affects a person’s 
privacy whether that information is specifically used or not. 
 
As an example of data collection, Australia Post recently undertook an “Australian 
Lifestyle Survey” (Australian Post Survey, July 2002). Recipients were asked to 
complete a form containing questions about personal details and preferences with a 
promise to ask only relevant “information” (Australian Post Survey, July 2002). A lure 
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of a $25,000 prize was used to entice participants. The information was assembled as a 
marketing tool but more clandestine purposes such as selling the information is 
expected; however, this is not advertised. 
 
Privacy is an increasing social issue. Can the controller of the increased and 
consolidated personal information be trusted to use it in a manner that the community 
finds acceptable? Recently, personal information had been collected and sold for profit 
by an Australian business entrepreneur raising privacy issues (Carroll 2002, p. 48). In 
July 2000, Toysmart.com, an internet retailer, planned to sell its consumer information 
database as its most valuable assets after its declaration of bankruptcy sparked the 
enforcement action by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the company ordered 
not to sell its consumer database information (Carroll 2002). 
 
In an effort to protect privacy two methods arise: first, the technical protection afforded 
to a person’s information, and second, a person’s formal protection. 
 
2.5.2.1 Technical protection of information 
 
On technical protection, the encryption software sourcing from the United States has 
been of significant technical quality enabling information to be sent across computer 
networks without fear of tampering. However, technical protection is a moving target as 
those trying to penetrate the measures become increasingly sophisticated as well.  
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“The United States government had curbed the export of these encryption software 
products via legislation before introducing amended legislation that has ended many 
restrictions on the export of the products” (Tigre 2002, p. 39). 
 
Business will inevitably pressure legislators to sacrifice security for profit as evidenced 
by this bipartisan group of technology companies and trade groups who argued that the 
existing export controls would have put the United States products at a disadvantage in 
the global market place as demand for computer-security products grew. The United 
States federal government are now allowing the market to decide the appropriate forms 
of encryption for electronic data, but what of the interests of the powerless?  
 
2.5.2.2  Formal protection of information 
 
Is legislation sufficient to protect the privacy of the community? The Australia Card 
proposal in many ways raised the issue of privacy in a public forum in Australia. The 
referendum to introduce the Australia Card failed. Privacy issues may have been a factor 
in the cards’ rejection. The government subsequently introduced a unique numbered 
identification system via the Australia Business Number. The Tax File Number is also a 
unique identification number system used by the government. If these numbers are not 
quoted when required by law there is significant impact on the taxpayer. In terms of 
tracking every individual, the Australian Business Number system does allow entity 
owners to have more than one number that they can use and not all people are required 
to have a number.  
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“The right to privacy as such does not exist at common law in Australia. Such legal 
protection as exists is provided incidentally by other causes of action” (Doyle et al 2003, 
p. 237). High Court Senior Judge Skoien in ABC v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 
208 CLR 199; 76 ALJR. Dean (2004, p. 114) declared that:  
 
“there cannot be a civil action for damages on the actionable right of an individual 
person to privacy. But I see it as a logical and desirable step. In my view there is such an 
actionable right.”  
 
On 16 June 2003 a Queensland district judge in Grosse v Purvis [2003] QDC 151, 
(Dean 2004, p. 114) declared a preparedness to take up the challenge of the High Court 
to declare a tort of privacy when the district judge awarded $178,000 in damages with 
respect to the right of an individual person to privacy. In commentary Dean (2004, p. 
114) noted the “Australian legislature’s hesitancy” and put pressure on the courts to fill 
the void left. 
 
The data protection regime in Australia includes the Information Privacy Act 2001 
(Vic), the Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 2000 (NSW) and the 
Information Act 2002 (NT) along with the Australian Federal Privacy Act 1988 which 
authorised the implementation of the eleven principles developed by the Organisation 
for Economic Cooperation and Development in 1980. The eleven principles are as 
follows: 
1 - Manner and purpose of collection of personal information; 
2 - Solicitation of personal information from individual concerned;  
3 - Solicitation of personal information generally;  
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4 - Storage and security of personal information;  
5 - Information relating to records kept by record-keeper;  
6 - Access to records containing personal information;  
7 - Alteration of records containing personal information; 
8 - Record-keeper to check accuracy etc. of personal information before use;  
9 - Personal information to be used only for relevant purposes;  
10 - Limits on use of personal information; and  
11 - Limits on disclosure of personal information.  
 
Guidelines to the “National Privacy Principles” (Jackson 2003, p.22) were written by 
the Commissioner which included how information is collected, used and disclosed. The 
guidelines also consider the data’s quality, security and openness along with how the 
data were accessed and corrected. Data identifiers were considered along with the 
anonymity of the data, trans-border data flows and how sensitive information was 
handled. 
 
The Act was extended in December 2000 via the Privacy Amendment (private sector) 
Act to include most private organizations and set out how organizations should use, 
keep and disclose personal information. The Privacy Commission has jurisdiction not 
only over the Privacy Act but also over other related areas such as the entitlement to 
investigate breaches under Part VIIC of the Crimes Act 1914 and jurisdiction over the 
Data-Matching Program (Assistance and Tax) Act 1990. The Commissioner also has 
monitoring and compliance functions under the Telecommunications Act 1997 and 
responsibilities under the National Health Act (1953).  
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In deference to the amount of information in the community, the Corporations Act 2001 
requires a company to keep a register containing certain personal information such as a 
shareholder’s name, address, the number of shares held, the date of the first purchase of 
shares and the shareholder’s Tax File Number. This information is to be protected and a 
privacy policy is to be adopted and disclosed. Australian Mutual Provident Society 
(2002) in its policy states that the information “can only be disclosed to members of the 
group and other members of the computer share group, your broker, external service 
supplies, mailing and printing companies, Australia Post, banks, building societies and 
credit unions, ASX and other regulatory authorities and anyone you authorise”. 
 
The Australian Law Reform Commission in 2006 released Issue Paper 31 entitled, 
Review of Privacy. The paper outlined the privacy regulatory environment in Australia 
including the Privacy Act 1988 and the Privacy Principles. The project confronts the 
issue of the impacts of developing technology on privacy. The paper concentrates on the 
internet and, in particular, on cookies, web bugs, hypertext transfer, protocol and 
spyware. 
 
The paper also tackles the issue of “Unique Multi-Purpose Identifiers” 
(http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/alrc/publications/issues/31/12.html, accessed on 6th 
February 2007) and then proposes the “Australian Government Access Card” or “Health 
and Social Services Access Card” (http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/alrc/publications/ 
issues/31/12.html, accessed on 6th February 2007). 
 
The examination of the attempt to protect privacy begs the question; can the government 
be relied upon to protect privacy? Does the community believe that either legislation or 
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an amended constitution can always protect their privacy in the way that they desire? In 




Cashless forms of exchange changes the potential related risks. Rather than the physical 
stealing of goods or cash, more clandestine frauds revolve around the recording and 
transfer of the exchange. A stolen credit card, a forged signature or a forged transfer of 
funds are also examples. Various forms of fraud exist online. Phishing is an activity 
attempting to “fraudulently acquire sensitive information such as usernames, passwords, 
and credit card details, by masquerading as a trustworthy entity in an electronic 
communication” (Jakobsson 2007). Trojans is one of the programs that is designed, in 
the context of computer software, to do various harmful things such as remote access, 
data destruction, and adding or copying data from infected computers 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trojan_horse_(computing), accessed on 10th March 2007). 
In 2005, in the United Kingdom, 
 
“total losses from online banking fraud reached £23.2 million, an increase of 90% from 
the previous year’s total of £12.2 million. This figure is relatively small when compared 
with plastic card fraud losses £439 million” (http://www.apacs.org.uk/resources_ 
publications/documents/FraudtheFacts2006.pdf., accessed on 4th December 2006). 
 
In Risk Management for Electronic Banking and Electronic Money Activities prepared 
by the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision (http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs35.pdf, 
accessed on 4th December 2006), “employee theft of smart cards” (p.18) has been 
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identified as an abuse which may result in possible losses from redeeming electronic 
money for which no corresponding prepaid funds were received. As a result of this 
fraud, customers may perceive the bank as being unreliable and the bank may face legal 
or regulatory sanctions, and negative publicity (http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs35.pdf, 
accessed on 4th December 2006). 
  
2.5.4 Technology issues 
 
An examination of the control environment surrounding cashless mediums of exchange 
raises issues of fraud at a level perhaps not thought of with physical mediums of 
exchange. The Australian Institute of Chartered Accountants Australia President, Byram 
Johnston, explained that simple fraud on the Internet involving stolen identities and 
passwords to encrypted information protection on the Internet “allowed organised crime 
to do away with banks transferring money across national boundaries” (Johnston 1997, 
p. 35). It is possible for “an untraceable virtual currency for international criminals to be 
created on the Internet (Johnston 1997, p. 35). 
 
Computer hackers deploy a Trojan horse into programs that copy passwords when 
Internet users log on to remote computer systems through the vast network. Estimates of 
the amount of money lost to taxpayers each year due to fraud in the Commonwealth 
Government vary wildly. At the low end, the amount has been put at less than $2.5 
billion. The Australian Institute of Criminology believes fraud in the public sector is as 
high as $13.8 billion (AIC 2003 Annual Report Identity Fraud: An evaluation of its 
nature, cost and extent). As solutions are sought to reduce potential problems in cashless 
mediums of exchange, a method of identification linked to a numbering system may be 
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considered as a final verification of the recipients of funds making tracing culprits easier 
and fraud harder.  
 
The solution to unauthorised use of cashless mediums of exchange may be in the unique 
identification of individuals via such means as a fingerprint identification solution 
linked to a numbering system. This may be considered as a final verification of the 
recipients of funds making tracing culprits easier and fraud harder (Michael et al 2006, 
p. 12). 
 
2.6 Method of identification 
 
2.6.1 Identification has become a national issue 
 
Identification of individuals is an increasing national issue for reasons including 
combating terrorism and identity fraud which “cost Australia about 1.1 billion in 2001 
and 2002” (Crawford 2005, p. 31). Evidence of the issue is the federal government’s 
integration of “national databases to better identify Australians” (Lapthorne 2005, p. 
15). According to Attorney General Phillip Ruddock, “the government was trawling 
through databases including Medicare and the Australian Taxation Office to cross 
reference Australian identities partly to prevent identity theft” (p. 15).  “With the Blair 
government contemplating a national ID card system, Mr Howard said he was open to a 
renewed debate in Australia” (Harvey et al 2005, p. 17). 
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Fake identification has caused great concern for government agencies who have 
progressively added security features to identification documents such as holograms, 
shadow pictures and bar codes; however “the Internet sites that sell fake IDs appear to 
have kept pace” (Moor 2002, p. 28). Tinkler 2006 (p. 17) reports that realistic fake ID’s 
can be bought for around $25 and that it is so easy to obtain the ID’s that photo IDs 
were obtained for Victorian Premier Steve Bracks, police commissioner Christine Nixon 
and fugitive drug baron Tony Mokbel which were received within two weeks of 
ordering them. 
 
Crawford (2005) talks of new supervisory powers which allow a registration database of 
sex offenders, which “records current and previous names, addresses, car registration 
and even distinctive birthmarks” (p. 11). The new supervisory powers allow “up to 15 
years monitoring possibly by electronic bracelets under the Serious Sex Offenders 
Monitoring Act 2005, Section 9c.  
 
The Health Minister’s acknowledgment that it has tested a system to share patient 
information has raised concerns about the possibility of an Australian card or national 
identity card” (Nicholson 2003, p. 2). 
 
Hundreds of murders, rapes, abductions and other serious crimes have been solved using 
DNA taken from Victorian prisoners. The latest statistic reveals that since June 2000 
DNA tests have lead to 922 inmates being charged in connection with 1552 previously 
unsolved crimes (Haberfield 2004). According to Victorian Police Minister Andre 
Haermeyer, another 243 cases had been solved after court orders were taken out to force 
prisoners to give DNA. In more than 600 cases DNA evidence from one crime scene 
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had been linked to another. DNA matches had been found in the cases of 1300 
burglaries, 48 aggravated burglaries and 70 thefts. Victorian Police also used DNA 
evidence to prosecute prisoners for murder, rape, abduction and assault.  Andre 
Haermeyer said that “DNA evidence is giving criminals nowhere to hide and has been 
an enormous success story for Victoria police,” (Haberfield 2004, p.21). “The Office of 
Attorney-General Rob Hulls will examine a legal loophole that has allowed police to 
collect genetic material free from regulation or independent review” (Giles 2004, p. 14). 
The Ombudsman has warned “the covert police checks are not covered by law” (Giles 
2004, p. 14).  
 
Even parents are storing DNA from children as part of an identity kit offered by 
ChildsafeID which for $25 includes “a fingerprint, DNA swabs kit” (Papadakis et al 
2005, p. 30). 
 
Other physical identity controls are also becoming a reality. Wallace (2003) describes a 
federal government “probe into the use of iris scanning, fingerprinting and other 
biometric technologies on welfare recipients” (p. 14). This has been ‘in response to 
growing identity fraud problems leading to cheats claiming the dole under up to 33 
different names” (p. 14).  
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2.6.2 Identification is a global issue 
 
The identification issue is not confined to the local environment. In the USA in 2001, 
bills were passed in Congress to allow for the creation of three new acts related to 
biometric identification of citizens and aliens, including the Patriot Act, the Aviation 
and Transport Security Act, and the enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Act” 
Michael et al (2005 p. 25). Ten states in the USA continue making use of fingerprint 
technology, and occasionally, of face recognition technology, to screen individuals for 
duplicate applications (Bunney 2003, p. 12), which is to prevent people from holding 
more than one identification. 
 
In South Africa, a biometric solution was found for approving pension payments to an 
illiterate rural population where claimants verify “their identity by presenting a 
fingerprint for matching against one previously enrolled to the database” (Bunney 2003, 
p. 11). “False negatives do occur with fingerprints damaged or eroded by the typical 
rural way of life” in those circumstances a “verification based on a stored photograph of 
the claimant” is used. 
 
In Malaysia the national ID card is already in use to support welfare payments (Bunney 
2003, p. 13). The Malaysian identity card has convenience factors as it has eight 
applications being “driver’s licence, passports, Touch ‘n Go card, health information, e-
cash, automated teller machine (ATM) card, and the public infrastructure key” (Pardas 
2004, p. 2). 
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“The Philippines recently began deployment of a Social Security Card system designed 
to record entitlement and protect welfare and retirement payments” (Bunney 2003, p. 
13). 
 
The Straits Times documents that  
 
“residents in Thailand’s Muslim-dominated southern border province of Yala are flocking 
to the local districts offices to apply for the new ‘smart’ ID cards, according to local 
government officials. The demand is so high that the authorities have decided to register 
applicants until 10pm everyday even on weekends. Thai expatriates living in Malaysia 
have also shown interest in having their current IDs replaced with the ‘smartcards’. The 
government is introducing the new ID cards throughout the country in stages”. (Southern 
Thais eager for "smart cards", 14 Oct 2004, p.42). 
 
In a joint project between the Malawi government and the United States Federal Reserve 
Bank a “low-cost memory smart cards storing encrypted fingerprints offers ATM access 
to cash, point-of-sale payment with PIN or fingerprint, and a fuel payment system” 
(Bunney 2003, p. 13). 
 
2.6.3 Types of identification solutions 
 
There are various ways of identifying people. The uniqueness of people is a very well 
used area of identification referred to as biometrics. These vary from fingerprints, retina 
or iris scans, facial characteristics, keystroke style, voice patterns to DNA.  
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Biometric input devices usually consist of a device such as a camera or scanner that 
collects image data. A template is then developed by an algorithm which allows it to be 
matched.  
 
The fingerprint is the most commonly used authentication biometrics. Bunney (2003, p. 
12) confirms the “matching of fingerprints” “technology certainly does work, as police 
forces worldwide have proven”. Fingerprinting makes use of distinctive patterns of skin 
ridges.  
 
“The principal types of patterns are arch, tented arch, radial loop, ulnar loop, and whorl. 
Most fingerprint scanners use technologies that measure the optical, capacitive thermal or 
ultrasonic characteristics of the fingerprint. Newer devices incorporate solid-state 
scanners that consist of a piece of silicon containing an array of sensors” 
(PriceWaterHouseCoopers Risk Management Forecast 2001, p. 206). 
 
The physical identification can provide a sophisticated audit trail of exactly who 
authorised a particular transaction. Questions, however, are now being raised about how 
unique a finger print actually is. Tim Robinson from BioPay, one of the largest 
companies involved in fingerprints at checkouts, believes “it’s inevitable that people 
will use biometrics to initiate financial transactions (Saitz 2003). 
 
De Souza (1997, p. 58) describes an inkless electronic fingerprint reader using credit 
cards at point-of-sale terminals which uses a “low cost silicon tactile imager for reading 
embossed characters on credit cards”. 
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Another popular biometric uses the human eye as a unique identifier. The uniqueness of 
the iris and retina are currently used for authentication. The iris is the “opaque 
contractile diaphragm around the pupil, which is the coloured part of the eye” 
(PriceWaterHouseCoopers, Risk Management Forecast 2001, p. 206) which has folds 
and freckles which are unique. “The retina is the area at the rear of the eyeball on which 
images are formed” whose “blood vessels form unique patterns” 
(PriceWaterHouseCoopers, Risk Management Forecast 2001, p. 206). 
 
Recently the technology became available to video images of people’s retina as part of a 
recognition program dismissing the perception that a laser was necessary as part of the 
recognition process. It was estimated that the majority of banks would use the 
technology before the year 2008. 
 
Another biometric is hand recognition which is accomplished by “comparing the length, 
width, thickness and surface of the hand and four fingers. Scanners use a 32,000-pixel 
charge-coupled device” (PriceWaterHouseCoopers, Risk Management Forecast 2001, p. 
206). 
 
The human voice can also be used for authentication purposes as it is affected by the 
“shape of the throat, larynx, and sinus cavities” PriceWaterHouseCoopers Risk 
Management Forecast (2001, p. 208) even though it is “not a true biometric” (p. 208) 





“The quality of the signal that reaches the central processor can affect the validity of the 
tool. Microphones can have frequency responses that distort the signal whether they are 
freestanding or via the telephones which are often noisy” PriceWaterHouseCoopers Risk 
Management Forecast (2001 p.147). 
 
The Age, a Melbourne newspaper, (5th September 2005, p. 3) reported that one 
application of voice recognition software is the checking that soccer hooligans are at 
home during soccer matches via computer generated voice verification software. 
 
Handwriting recognition, also known as “dynamic signature verification, is behavioral 
and not a true biometric but is often used for recognition purposes” 
(PriceWaterHouseCoopers Risk Management Forecast 2001 p.147). Typing or 
keystroke is also behavioural. “Keystroke recognition measures the rhythm of the typing 
of a key word or phrase” (PriceWaterHouseCoopers, Risk Management Forecast 2001, 





“Uniqueness is an important element of control” (Young 2003, p.69) as an identifier 
which needs connection “with a logical numbering system” (Young 2003, p.69). 
Without direct access to the system, an identification number would have to be 
remembered and vendors and authorities would need some style of traditional 
identification such as a card. To facilitate a monetary system, a permanent record would 
be required so that it will never be forgotten or lost as a means of eliminating fraud and 
 75 
extortion. People would need to be numbered in a manner similar to the way products 
are often bar-coded. An application of the success of numbering is Fong’s (2006) report 
that a new database of the identity card numbers of stolen phones has contributed to a 20 
percent reduction in mobile thefts in Singapore. 
 
Biometrics can be stored on a smart card to verify that the holder of the card is actually 
the owner of the card (Dubois 2001) whether this is via voice, face, fingerprint or other 
feature. Alternatively, a number could be applied to each individual using methods such 
as the new “black light” tattoos which are “almost invisible in day light but show in 
great detail in black light” (http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/popup?id=2339802, 
accessed on 6th February 2007). Black light is a reference to ultraviolet light. The laser 
painlessly destroys the pigment of the skin but it is so extremely fine, that it is invisible 
to the eye. (http://www.wilmingtonstar.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20060613/ 
NEWS/606130323/1050&template=currents, accessed on 6th Feb 2007). 
 
At a Round Table United Nations meeting, with Ministers including Australian 
Immigration Minister, Philip Ruddock, Pascal Smet, the Head of Belgium's independent 
asylum review board put forward a plan in late 2002 that every person in the world 
would be fingerprinted and registered under a universal identification scheme to fight 
illegal immigration and people smuggling (Sickler 2002).  
 
The European Union favours “a single number identifier” (Bunney 2003, p. 10). Already 
Luxembourg, Finland and Sweden “give their citizens a single number that is uniquely 
applicable to all governmental applications”.  
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2.6.5 Implantable microchips 
 
Another identification alternative is an implantable chip. The chips are widely used as a 
pet identity device, which in America started voluntarily but is now mandatory if a pet is 
travelling overseas. The Ming newspaper in Hong Kong on 15 October 2004 reported 
that the European community recently proceeded with a cat and dog passport, which 
requires the implantation of the chip.  
 
Implantation of chips is widely used in the agricultural sector as a means of 
identification, tracking and information collection. An example of the use is the 
monitoring of oestrogen levels in cows to identify the correct time to mate them. In an 
attempt to eliminate mad cow disease, the tracing of calves with chips has become 
compulsory (http://www.rfidgazette.org/2006/02/federal_governm.html, accessed on 
10th March 2007). The styles of chips available will now be examined. 
 
The human implantable microchip “contains a unique 16-digit electronic identifier. This 
unique number is used for such purposes as accessing personal medical information in a 
password-protected database or assessing whether somebody has authority to enter into 
a high-security area.” (http://www.verichipcorp.com/content/company/corporatefaq#r7, 
accessed on 25th February 2007).  
 
 77 
2.6.6 Radio Frequency Identification 
 
Micro chips referred to as RFID (Radio Frequency Identification) can also be put in 
furniture or anything of value for tracking in case of theft. They can also be put in food 
to record temperature and location as it is shipped across the country (ElAmin 2006). A 
group led by the European Central Bank began work on embedding chips in the EURO 
bank note during 2005 (Yoshida 2001, p.1-3). A consortium of major manufacturers has 
sought to push the technology as a replacement for bar codes in everyday products 
ranging from cereal boxes to shaving cream cans, but the cost has not dropped low 
enough yet to make that feasible (ElAmin 2006). 
 
Science writer and reporter Graham Phillips (2004) on ABC TV’s Catalyst also asks 
“will a computer chip in the arm become compulsory for all of us?” “The entire 
population would essentially have super-ID cards implanted in them 24 hours a day” 
(Considine et al 2005, p. 385).  
 
2.7 Microchips used as human identification 
 
Clarke (1994) acknowledged the use of microchip for human identification purposes. 
“Subcutaneous Microchips for Human Identification (SMHId) has been created and 
used to isolate and differentiate this very specific human identification system from 




Michael et al (2005, p. 25) reports that “During the SARS outbreak, Singapore and 
Taiwan considered going as far as tagging their whole population with RFID devices to 
monitor the spread of the virus automatically”. With an implanted microchip under the 
skin, every human has a unique identification number and information about the owners 
is properly recorded (Clarke 1994).  
 
Numerous identification chips are currently available and a representation of these will 




The VeriChip is a 12mm by 2.1mm radio frequency device about the size of the point of 
a typical ballpoint pen. The chip can be implanted via a simple procedure that could be 
performed in an outpatient or office setting. It requires only local anaesthesia, a tiny 
incision and perhaps a small adhesive bandage. Each VeriChip could contain a unique 
identification number and other critical data (Stewart 2006). 
 
Chips embedded in passbooks and ATM cards will identify and profile customers as 
they enter bank lobbies. Chips embedded in U.S. passports can track citizens as they 







As Young (2003, p. 70) suggested, in relation to the banking industry:   
 
“Any system requiring an implantable VeriChip would reduce the risk of theft of identify 
protecting related financial accounts and records. The threats of theft, duplication or 
counterfeiting of data are substantially diminished or eliminated with a system requiring the 
implantable chip.”   
 
Some companies like AmeriPride and Cintas are embedding this Radio Frequency 
Identification Device in company uniforms to track employees’ behaviour (Albrecht & 
McIntyre 2005). Wal-Mart mandated its top one hundred suppliers to affix verichips to 
crates and pallets. Other retailers such as Albertsons, Target, and Best Buy (Albrecht & 
McIntyre 2005) followed the precedent. There are now sixty thousand companies 
operating under RFID mandates and scrambling to get with the verichip program as 
quickly as possible (Albrecht & McIntyre 2005). 
 
2.7.2 Digital angel 
 
Also available is the Digital Angel, which is a computer chip that measures just 11.1 
millimetres x 2.1 millimetres including the microchip and its antenna, which is smaller 
than a grain of rice (Stein Washington Post, 2006). The assembly can be injected 
through a syringe and implanted in various locations within the body under the skin. The 
chip sends a signal to cell phone towers and satellites, it can tell the body temperature, 
pulse, heartbeat, and insulin levels. The chip also tells the location of a person anywhere 
in the world. All this information on a person would be available over the Internet. The 
chips are similar to those that are already implanted in about six million dogs and cats in 
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America (Stein, Washington Post 2006) to enable pet owners to identify and reclaim 
animals that have been temporarily lost or can be notified if their pet has been injured 
and has been taken to a veterinary facility for treatment.   
 
Applied Digital Solutions maintain a website with archived chip-related news articles. 
Smith (2004) reported in Business Week that RFID tags in dogs and cats allow for 6,000 
lost family cats and dogs each month to be reunited with their legal owners. The article 
concludes that with such technology already being used in the welfare and management 
of pets and livestock it is only a matter of time before humans will become part of the 
chipping process. 
. 
Currently Digital Solutions and other companies such as Verichip Corporation, use a 
tracking bracelet or wristwatch containing the chip (Sullivan, 2005). The chip transmits 
a signal to the Global Positioning Satellite. A person can be located within 60 seconds. 
According to Feder and Zeller (2004), Digital Solutions is shortly expecting to unveil 
the tracking microchip, which can be embedded beneath a person’s skin. 
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2.8 Human implantation 
 
The chip for humans differs from those used in animals mainly in the biocompatible 
coating that is used to stop the body rejecting the implanted chip. New Jersey surgeon, 
Richard Seelig, injected two of the Applied Digital Solutions chips into himself (‘The 
Privacy Act: Your Privacy, your choice’ 2002). He placed one chip in his left forearm 
and the other near the artificial hip in his right leg. He was motivated after he saw fire 
fighters at the World Trade Centre in September 2001 writing their Social Security 
numbers on their forearms with Magic Markers and he thought that there had to be a 
more sophisticated way of identifying people. Seelig, who serves as a medical 
consultant to the company, had the chips implanted in him for three months without any 
signs of rejection or infection. 
 
Implantation has been described as “virtually painless” (Halamka 2005, p.331), due to 
the use of local anesthesia. In the process that Halamka (2005) describes, the chip sits in 
the posterior aspect of the user’s right arm, between the elbow and the shoulder. 
Halamaka (2005) follows the process of the implantation of the chip and finds in the 
days after implantation “no pain, no infection, and no restriction of activities” (p.331). 
Halamaka (2005) describes that: 
 
“when a scanner is passed within 6 in. (15 cm) of container’s arm, his/her medical 
identifier is displayed on the screen of a radiofrequency-identification (RFID) reader, and 
any authorized health care worker can turn to a secure Web site hosted by the 
manufacturer and retrieve information about his/her identity and the name of his/her 
primary care physician, who can then provide details of his/her medical history” (p.331). 
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Implantable chips are attracting global attention, as evidenced by the fact that even the 
Chinese Ming newspaper reported in Mandarin on 15 October 2004 that “Americans 
allow the implanting of a medical chip in the body for the first time” (p. 30). The article 
continued to state that the  
 
“FDA on Wednesday for the first time allowed a chip that can be implanted into a human 
body for medical purposes. Every chip has a unique PIN. The medical staff in the 
hospital only need to use the computer to scan the chip. They can then find out the 
history of the patients’ medical record and personal information” (p. 30).  
 
The article recorded the price of the medical chip as 1,200 Yuan, approximately $203 
Australian at the time. The uses reported, included identifying the blood type or any 
allergies of patients implanted with the chip, and, for locating people with mental 
illnesses such as dementia, who are implanted with the chip. 
 
Since two young girls, Holly Wells and Jessica Chapman were kidnapped in 2002, 
approximately 75% (Lane 2003) of English parents have considered implanted chips or 
a tracking device for their children to facilitate finding them if they were kidnapped.  
Professor Kevin Warwick of Reading University who implanted himself with a chip and 
is a keen advocate of this technology had publicly offered to chip an 11-year girl to 
demonstrate its effectiveness but was publicly criticised for making such an offer, by 
child welfare agencies and support advocates that he subsequently withdrew the offer. 
This indicates that while child safety is a major concern to parents there is still a strong 
resistance by the community at large for the acceptance of people being chipped in this 
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manner proposed by Professor Warwick (Lane 2003, p.1-3). Lane continues to explain 
that the community takes the view that the implantation would create a false sense of 
security and make children become complacent if they perceive the technology, which 
can fail, will take care of their personal safety. The long-term health effects of such 
devices, especially microchips transmitting signals from inside young bodies are also a 
concern for the community according to Lane. Lane argues that existing mobile phone 
technology is considered to play a similar role as the technology would help trace 
children’s location by triangulating the signal if the phone has not been switched off 
(p.1-3). With respect to the implantable chip allowing access to medical records, 
Barclay (2004) documented the opinion that irrespective of the governments mandates 
patients would make their own minds up about the chips. 
 
2.9 Real-time up-date 
 
The chip would use a real-time up-dating facility allowing immediate documentation of 
expenditure or receipts to a master file enabled via satellite communications and 
establishing an up-to-date record. Transactions would be simultaneously added to a 
transaction file in case there is a need for subsequent verification, facilitating an audit 
trail. For example, an implanted chip would be scanned to make a payment for a 
purchase transaction and the information could be updated immediately in the bank. 
Currently, real-time up-date of information is achieved for implantable chip through 
Global Positioning Satellite (GPS), which relay the information via on-board cell phone 
technology to a data center, which then displays it on the Internet within seconds 
(Murray 2002).  
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2.10 Benefits of a verification mark 
 
The ability to inject the chips opens up a variety of applications of human identification 
such as the high-security tracking of prisoners or parolees or the tracking of young 
children to protect against kidnapping. The September 11th, identification of body’s 
issues could be solved by the chip, rather than the last-ditch efforts of victims using 
magic markers (Murray 2002). If a chip was implanted into all humans, this would make 
terrorists more easily detected and perhaps lead to their activities being prevented. These 
implantable chips would assist police to be more able to identify criminals.  
 
An implantable chip would help in the fight against identity fraud as it would be 
required when establishing one’s identity. Identity fraud is currently “one of the fastest 
growing crimes in the world” (Gee 2003, p. 68). Currently identity theft can be 
perpetrated when “some elements of a person’s identity are obtained and used by 
another person for unlawful purposes generally for financial gain” (Gee 2003, p. 68).  
The type of information could include bank account details, credit card details, or motor 
registration details. The way of obtaining this information could be as simple as being 
stolen from a person’s letter box or as sophisticated as hacking emails which invited 
customers of various banks to follow a link and log on to what appeared to be a 
legitimate bank site but was only being used to obtain details about the log on details of 
the customer. In November 2002 U.S. authorities “cracked the largest identity case to 
date with total losses estimated at US $2.7 million” (Gee 2003, p. 68).   
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Medical records could be included in the verification chip, preventing catastrophes such 
as administering drugs on an unconscious patient to which they may be allergic. The 
blood group of the patient could also be shown, making it easier in an emergency 
situation. The implanted chip could help adults with Alzheimer's disease or other mental 
and physical disabilities to be identified.  
 
There would be a convenience factor; information such as driver’s licence and contact 
details could be stored. As an example, Visa International's Executive Vice President for 
Australia and New Zealand, Bruce Mansfield stated that:  
 
"Fifty per cent said they would like to have Visa smart cards that can double as a driver's 
licence and significant numbers said they would like to use them to track expenses, to 
hold cinema tickets and as a frequent flyer card" (http://www.andreae. 
com/New_releases_of_interest/Selected_press_releases_2006_May.htm, accessed on 
1st  December 2006).  
 
The implantation of a chip would make it possible in the future for all trading to occur 
electronically and there would no longer be a need to carry cash or credit cards to the 
surf beach or swimming pools, eliminating the chance of it being lost or stolen as you 
swim.  
 
A chip would replace the need for a password which can be discovered. An example of 
another type of theft includes the scam at the Automated Teller Machine where recently 
thieves watched their victims re-enter their pass number, frustrated by the clear sleeve 
the thief had previously installed. The thief then works the victim’s card out of the 
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machine using the plastic sleeve once the victim has left (Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission - Scam Watch 2006). Visa International's Executive Vice 
President for Australia and New Zealand, Bruce Mansfield also said that “Australians 
had a positive attitude towards the introduction of smart cards because of their enhanced 
security features” (http://www.andreae.com/New_releases_of_interest/Selected_press_ 
releases_2006_May.htm, accessed on 1st December 2006). The ability to trace using a 
verification mark could mean that credit card fraud could be eliminated completely. 
 
Accounting for personal transactions such as budgets and taxation returns would 
become easier if the chip was used as part of a cashless monetary system. Taxation 
returns may well be done by government bodies themselves. Feige (2000, p.2) describes 
a system emanating from America where “tax is automatically assessed and collected 
when transactions are settled through the electronic technology of the banking/payments 
system”, refereed to as the Automated Payment Transaction (APT) tax. Feige (2000, 
p.2) states that “the automated recording of all APT tax payments by firms and 
individuals creates a degree of transparency and perceived fairness that induces greater 
tax compliance”. Feige (2000) describes a system whereby  
 
“the chip or software modification would create a virtual tax payment account (TPA) that 
is directly linked to every customer’s financial account. The linked TPA would be 
required to maintain a positive balance somewhat in excess of expected tax payments. 
Every debit or credit to the primary account would trigger a corresponding debit in the 
TPA account equal to the debit amount multiplied by the flat tax rate. This amount of 
assessed tax would be electronically transferred to the account of the government. All 
taxes are automatically assessed and collected at the time the transaction is 
consummated by payment” (p.2). 
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The justification of the APT tax revenue collection system is to “eliminate the free use 
of government currency to defeat its revenue collection function by imposing a tax on 
all forms of final payment, including cash payments”. 
 
 In a similar way that Feige (2000) describes, the verification mark could track payments 
to final consumers which would allow a sophisticated audit trail reducing the possibility 
for fraud. Non-financial information could additionally be stored which would make 
personal management of more than just finances possible.  
 
2.11 Problems with implanted chips 
 
Michael et al (2005, p. 22) report “academic papers on human transponder implants 
have surfaced, addressing specific themes such as legal and privacy concerns, ethical 
and cultural impacts, technological problems and health concerns”. 
 
“Most alarming is the rate of change in technological capabilities without a 
commensurate and involved response from an informed community on what these 
changes actually “mean” in real and applied terms, not only for the present but also for 
the future. It would appear that the accepted standard nowadays is to introduce a 
technology, stand back to observe its general effects on society, and then act to rectify 
problems as they might arise” (Michael et al 2005, p. 33). 
 
Civil libertarians, religious advocates and conspiracy theorists are concerned about the 
use of the information gathered and the functionality of the technology, claiming that the 
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auto ID technology will eventually lead to totalitarian control of the population (Michael 
et al 2005).  
 
The potential for social control was discussed earlier in the context of cashless mediums 
of exchange. If this system were coupled with a more sophisticated system of collection 
using an implantable chip and all information about a person were consolidated, the 
issues of social control would be magnified. 
 
The use of a verification mark will potentially greatly affect personal privacy. To some 
extent the information without a verification mark is fragmented.  
 
System corruption could also effect the smooth operations of a system of cashless 
mediums of exchange. Heng (2004, p.1) stated that: 
 
“security is a key criterion for electronic payment systems. Critical issues are 
authorisation, authentication, privacy, integrity, theft and data corruption. The possibility 
of unauthorised access by third parties, misuse and manipulation must be excluded.”  
 
Heng (2004) continued on p.4 to state that “electronic payment systems must be 
prepared for the possibility of accidental data corruption.”  
 
2.11.1 Propensity to magnify an authority’s control 
 
The asymmetry of power between government and individuals is likely to increase with 
the introduction of a verification mark, which has the potential to increase the 
information collected and to consolidate existing information. The concern is the control 
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government has over society in a way that Bentham, cited by Foucault, describes well in 
the example of the panopticon or a viewing area which was set up and established to 
control the outspread of disease (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982). This concept has been 
discussed earlier with respect to cashless mediums of exchange, however, the 
verification chip would further facilitate this to an unprecedented, even exponential, 
level. Elements of a system embracing the verification mark increase the similarity of 
the social implications, for instance, referring to the panopticon, Dreyfus and Rabinow 
(1982, p.134) note that “surveillance is based on a system of permanent registration” 
where the individual is “constantly located”, all “complaints” and “irregularities” are 
“noted down and transmitted to the intendants”. The verification chip could be thought 
of in this sense congruent with Foucault’s extrapolation of the physical panopticon into 
social control.  
 
2.11.2 Privacy issues 
 
Additional information could be collected and consolidated as a result of the verification 
chip. People have different tolerances to privacy invasions. Up to 68% of respondents to 
a Community Privacy Survey conducted by the Federal Privacy Commissioner, felt 
comfortable with an increase in an authority’s knowledge about them “if fraud and 
crime are being reduced” (Federal Privacy Commissioner 2004, p.6). For instance, if 
cashless mediums of exchange are encouraged or even enforced with the sophistication 
of technology the collection of such information is not only possible but also necessary 
to maintain the system with advantages such as reducing taxation fraud. The new 
taxation system introduced in 2000 under the guidelines of the Ralph Report (June 6 
2000) is working towards a fuller reporting system and computer records seem to be the 
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logical extension. The rhetoric that there is only concern for those committing fraud 
reveal a failure to understand that every person is caught in the privacy dilemma. Some 
proffer the view that it is only the people with something to hide that would be worried 
about extra information being collected about them. Some have heightened levels of 
sensitivity. Jackson (2003) reported that 90 percent of people surveyed by the Federal 
Commissioner in 2001 “wanted businesses to seek their approval before using their 
personal information for marketing” (p. 22). The report was entitled ‘Privacy and the 
Community, July 2001’ (http://www.privacy.gov.au/publications/rcommunity.html, 
accessed on 21st December 2006). Interviews were conducted in May 2001 on 1,524 
Australians aged 18 years and over which was the most comprehensive privacy research 
into the attitudes of individuals in Australia. The research found that even though 
participants exhibited a low level of knowledge and understanding in relation to privacy 
they showed a “high, and increasing level of interest in their own privacy” 
(http://www.privacy.gov.au/publications/rcommunity.html, accessed on 21st December 
2006). 
 
France-Presse (2006, p. 9) documented the development of the Life log Pod by Japan’s 
telecom operator KDDI Corp that electronically record almost every event in a person’s 
life. “The Life log Pod jots down every activity made through a cell phone or computer, 
including taking photographs, searching for a restaurant, listening to music and 
managing money” (France-Presse 2006, p. 9). 
 
In establishing a monetary system based on an implanted chip it should not be assumed 
that a legal system will easily cater for naturally ensuing privacy issues. Brennan J in 
Halliday v Nevill (1984) examined the difficulty of the legal protection of privacy. He 
 91 
acknowledges “tension between the common law privileges that secure the privacy of 
individuals” “and the efficient exercise of statutory powers in aid of law enforcement”. 
He contributed that “it is not for the courts to alter the balance between individual 




Given the ability of computer hackers to “have accessed top secret files inside the 
Department of Defence” (Mcllveen 2003, p. 5) it is reasonable to be concerned that a 
monetary system based on computer storage may be hacked into and tampered with. 
Whether the access resulted in temporary or permanent changes would be a concern. 
Third parties would gain unauthorised access of personal information via implanted 
chips with a reader and this will exacerbates the potential for improper use of 
information such as medical data (Barclay 2004).  
 
The implanting of the chip does not preclude the physical interference with the chip. 
Perhaps a person could be kidnapped and the chip in their wrist or forehead could be 
misused. Barclay (2004) addressed other possible abuses concerning chips being 
removed, stolen, and put into someone else as a form of identity theft. A computer 
security and privacy expert highlighted RFID device that only sends out an ID number 
would not appropriately protect financial transactions and medical information (Barclay 
2004). “The potential exists for building a device which will clone the ID number 
embedded in such an RFID device” (Barclay 2004). 
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2.11.4 Technology issues  
 
A cashless society based on technology and an implantable chip would exaggerate the 
reliance on technology. If a predominantly cashless medium of exchange exists 
corruption to files could have a catastrophic effect. Data corruption is defined as 
computer data that when transmitted it arrives at the destination in a different format to 
the original source. The difference often results in the data being unusable to the 
recipient (Bagozz et al 1992). 
 
Computer viruses, on the other hand, could be a potential problem that can occur with 
computer systems. A virus is a computer program “that attaches itself to a legitimate 
program data file and uses it to transport mechanisms to reproduce itself without the 
knowledge of the user” (PriceWaterHouseCoopers, Risk Management Forecast 2001, p. 
236). Generally there are three types of viruses file infectors; system or boot-record 
infectors and macro viruses that infect data rather than programs. 
 
Attacks on computer systems present a major problem with cashless money as they are 
so reliant on them. The Australian Newspaper, 4 June 1996, reported that cyber 
terrorists have amassed millions of dollars worldwide by threatening to wipe out 
computer systems. The article continued by stating  that the City of London financial 
institutions are one such example as they have paid 400 million pounds to international 
gangs of sophisticated criminals (Macko 1996, p.156). Two underground publications 
have published code that allow hackers to launch “denial of service” attacks that can 
cripple servers serving any transmission control protocol-based function, such as web-
hosting and e-mail. The United States General Accounting Office (1996, p. 4-9) outlines 
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the number of underground hacking groups that exist and how information is posted and 
shared on the Internet in planning and orchestrating “denial of service” attacks 
between/by individuals and/or groups. 
 
Even a U.S. Air Force web site was hacked by a 13 year old who managed to manipulate 
credit card accounts (Aiken 1998, p.23). Tracing perpetrators can also be a difficult task 
despite the existence of a firewall. A firewall is a set of related programs, located at a 
network gateway server that protects the resources of a private network from users from 
other networks in addition to other security policies that are used with the programs 
(http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/sDefinition/0,290660, sid14_gci212125,00.html, 
accessed on 21st December 2006). When an attacker breaches the firewall, it can be 
nearly impossible for the network administrator to determine what occurred, and which 
systems were compromised. Once entry has been gained evidence of an attacker’s traces 
vanish if the intruder installs a password sniffer. “An intruder can compromise a system 
in many ways that can be difficult or impossible to detect” according to the Internet 
security newsletter in 2002 (http://infodev-security.net/handbook/part5.pdf, accessed on 
21st December 2006). It is important that computer systems relied upon to protect 
personal and financial information are protected from abuse. 
 
Control systems could, of course, be in place and effective back-up systems could be 
designed but the mere extensiveness of the potential for this problem makes this an 
issue worthy of thoughtful analysis. A focus on cashless mediums of exchange may 
have ramifications not thought of at this point in time. Consider the effect that computer 
generated purchase and sale of equities had on the 1987 share crash, Rubinstein (1988, 
p. 41) argued that computer trading, known as program trading, that was being used by 
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large institutional investing companies to order large stock trades when certain market 
trends prevailed, may have contributed to the crash (Itskevich 2002, p.1). Computers 
were programmed to sell equities if a certain low point was reached thus fuelling a 
downward spiral. The consequences of the computer had not been anticipated. If 
people’s abilities to buy and sell are affected by a corruption of files real anarchy may 
result.  
 
Advancements in technology create new challenges and there is an uncertainty about the 
level of protection afforded to information that is collected. Encryption softwares and 
other technological controls could at some level be used to protect users from hackers or 
abuse. Jackson (2003) states that “public key encryption makes it possible to ‘sign’ a 
document so that no one other than the recipient can open it”. She also states that public 
key encryption can be used on the Internet to ensure confidentiality of information” (p. 
29). The level of confidence argued by Jackson (2003) is surprising given the 
uncertainty of the advancement of technology and the determinations some have to 
break the encryption codes. This journey of the advancement of encryption controls and 
the attempts to break the controls would be expected to continue. Neiger (2002) 
investigated the available technology to protect businesses from “attack” (p. 54). Neiger 
suggests that protection is a moving target and needs to be secured on an “ongoing 
basis” (p. 54). It would be expected that much effort and finance would be expended to 
protect the information system supporting the cashless monetary system. It would be 
reasonable to expect the devotion of effort both financial and intellectual to break the 
implantable chip monetary system.  
 
PriceWaterHouseCoopers Risk Management Forecast (2001, p. 149) states: 
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“in practice, cryptosystems do not provide perfect secrecy. Rather, in a cryptosystem, 
the amount of work required to break the cipher is more than an attacker can manage or 
economically justify”.  
 
As crypt-analytical research progresses hackers are more able to break codes 
“considered unbreakable”. The implantable chip would enable systems which provide 
sophisticated protection on the information collected. “Encryption technologies are a 
collection of techniques and applications for transforming information into a form that 
is impossible to read without special knowledge” (p. 150). Encryption and decryption 
require the use of some secret information which is called the key”. Such a key could be 
a digital signature which is “a digital code attached to an electronically transmitted 
message uniquely to identify the sender and guarantee message integrity” (p. 154).  
 
Michael et al (2005, p. 26) indicated: 
 
"Another important aspect is the potential effect of the battery when using active 
responders …. When using electronic monitoring with current available technology, a 
battery is necessary to guarantee correct functioning of sensors when the transponders 
are outside the antennae field. If the transponder should break fluid may escape, and 
the question of toxicological effects has to be answered”. 
 
Certification systems such as eSign, now known as Verisign Australia that is a provider 
of Internet trust services, have been adopted by various government departments. For 
instance, the Australian Customs Service, SPEAR – Land Victoria and EC: Land 
Exchange use such a system to identify individuals and businesses and “to make the 
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Internet and telecommunications networks more intelligent, reliable and secure in the 
area of connectivity and transactions” (Versign.Com 2006 – On-line web solutions 
statement). 
 
2.12 Public position 
 
The research considers individuals’ acceptance of the implantable chip technology in the 
survey instruments. Civil libertarians would consider such a mark to be an invasion of 
personal liberty where some others would perceive that only the guilty who have 
something to hide would object to a permanent numbering system embedded on their 
body if it was not visible to the naked eye. The views of the financially literate 
represented by professional accountants in terms of allowing such a technology to 
culminate so personally are examined. The pertinent considerations to be used in this 
research to study acceptance of the technology and risks involved in such acceptance are 
identified via the development of acceptance theory and the use of a survey instrument.  
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Technology has made a great impact on both the business and private lives of many and 
there are many authors evident in the literatures who consider the issues of its adoption. 
For example, Ives et al (1983) considered acceptance of technology from a business 
perspective, Long (1993) and Medcof (1989) studied the relationship between the extent 
of use of information technology and task characteristics. Pentland (1989) considered 
the effectiveness of the computer as did Quinn et al (1987) who argued that adoption 
should “substantially boost the quality of output and productivity” (p. 27). Studies such 
as Aramis or the love of technology (Latour 1996) look at adoption from a sociology of 
technology perspective. Drifting technologies and multipurpose networks: the case of 
the Swedish cash card (Holmstron et al, 2001) have used theories such as the dynamics 
of large socio-technical systems - technology drift and actor-network theory to address 
how and why information technologies often need to change, relative to their initial 
conceptions, during implementation. 
 
The current research considers technology adoption from a personal perspective. Many 
authors have considered the acceptance of technology and its personal impact. Rafaeli 
(1986) considered the correlation “of employees’ attitudes towards working with 
computers” (p. 89). Kraut et al (1989) and Lepore et al (1989) looked at the quality of 
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work-life of computer users. Robey (1979) looked at computer-user satisfaction in the 
work place.  
 
Whilst it is clear that there have been many studies dedicated to this area of technology 
and individuals, still as DeLone and McLean (1992, p. 1) state “the dependent variable 
in these studies – Information System success - has been an elusive one to define”. 
However, from the literature it can be concluded that the two major approaches to 
considering technology which compliment consideration of the adoption of the 
monetary system described in this research are diffusion theory and acceptance theory 
which will now be considered in detail in order to develop a theoretical framework for 
the research.  
 
3.2 Diffusion theory 
 
The diffusion of innovation literature provides a set of characteristics that may affect an 
individual’s opinion on adoption. Zaltman et al (1973, p 33 - 40) has examined the 
attributes of innovation including costs, return to investment, efficiency, risk and 
uncertainty, communicability, complexity, science status, perceived relative advantage 
and point of origin. Rogers (1983) has been extremely influential in this area and 
through a synthesis of previous studies identified seven attributes of an innovation 
being: relative advantage, image, compatibility, complexity, trial ability, visibility and 
result demonstrability. Authors such as Moore and Benbasat (1996, p 132 – 146) have 
also expanded the relevant innovation characteristics set.  
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Authors who have looked at information technology from the innovation decision 
perspective include Brancheau and Wetherbe (1990) and Rogers (1976), who both 
looked at the adoption of spread sheets focusing on the influence of information sources 
and internal communications within the information technology department. Cale and 
Eriksen (1994) did a longitudinal study on the factors affecting the implementation 
outcome of a main frame software package. Cooper and Zmud (1990) looked at 
adoption of material requirement planning from an organisational level and Hoffer and 
Alexander (1992) examined database machinery adoption and implementation including 
the implications for the management of information technology. Nilakanta and Scamell 
(1990) also focused on the process of diffusion of innovation in the context of database 
system development, including the extent to which information sources and 
communication channels facilitate the diffusion of data base design, how the influences 
of sources and communication channels influence diffusion channels and the rate of 
diffusion throughout the process.  Parthasarathy et al (1998) examined post-adoption 
behaviour in the context of online services. Tornatzky and Klein (1982) examined 
factors considered to be determinants of information technology adoption. Karahanna et 
al (1999) make the point that “innovation theory is silent concerning how this attitude is 
formed and how it leads to the eventual adoption or rejection decision” (p. 185). This is, 
in fact, why current research decided to focus on acceptance theory. 
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3.2.1 Acceptance theory 
 
One well established stream of research in the acceptance area followed the work of 
Triandis (1980) who believed that much of the work in psychology was “experiencing 
centrifugal forces of fragmentation” (p. 195). Triandis presents a theoretical framework 
focused on the “relationship of attitudes, values and other acquired behavioral 
dispositions” (p. 195). He does this by providing “centripetal forces” (p. 195) which 
include history, culture, ecology, personality and social factors. Triandis’s model (1991) 
does not “propose a causal link between the cognitive component of attitudes with the 
effective component” instead “affect and perceived consequences are viewed as 
independent (but related) factors that influence behavior indirectly through intentions” 
(Thompson et al 1991, p. 68).  
 
Thompson et al (1991) used a conceptual model “which builds upon Triandis’s theory 
of behavior” to examine the “influence of prior experience on the utilization of personal 
computers” (p. 167). Thompson et al (1991) with the support of senior executives in 
various organisations selected and surveyed a specific business unit with a total of 325 
completed surveys representing a response rate of 80%. The results suggested that 
“experience influenced utilization directly and that indirect influences were present but 
less pronounced” (Thompson et al 1991, p. 67) and indicated further “that moderating 
influence of experience on the relations between five of the six antecedent constructs 
and utilization was generally quite strong” (p.67).  
 
Barki and Hartwick (1994) looked at user participation and considered their 
participation which provided a useful starting point for deciphering the precise nature of 
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the relationship among user participation, involvement, and attitude during systems 
implementation. 
 
Also recognising the potential of the computer in business applications, Davis et al 
(1989) explored user acceptance of computer technology in business. He argued that 
researchers required a better understanding of why people accept or reject computers. 
Davis reviewed social psychology as a potential theoretical foundation for research on 
the determinants of user behaviour. Davis settled on Fishbein and Ajzen’s (1975) and 
Ajzen and Fishbein’s (1980) Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) model as it was “an 
especially well-researched intention model that has proven successful in predicting and 
explaining behavior across a wide variety of domains” Davis et al (1989, p. 983). 
 
Davis’ (1989) contribution became very important as a major stream in examining 
information technology. Adams et al (1992), for example, had the intention to:  
 
“replicate previous work by Fred Davis on the subject of perceived usefulness, ease of 
use, and usage of information technology. The two studies focus on evaluating the 
psychometric properties of the ease of use and usefulness scales, while examining the 
relationship between ease of use, usefulness, and system usage” (p. 1). 
 
Given the support this approach has in the literature both in information technology 
acceptance and social psychology and the greater conceptual contribution it was decided 




3.2.2 A Mix of Diffusion theory and Acceptance theory 
 
In the context of information technology, authors such as Agarwal and Prasad (1997), 
Chin et al (1995), Karahanna et al (1999) and Moore and Benbasat (1996) have used a 
mixture of both diffusion theory and acceptance theory. Agarwal and Prasad (1997) 
consider diffusion theory as well as acceptance theory in the context of their study of the 
innovation of the World Wide Web. They examine eight user perceptions which include 
a mix of both traditional innovation and acceptance literature constructs. For example, 
they use the ease of use construct from the technology acceptance literature which they 
argue to be similar to the definition in Rogers (1983): “notion of complexity and 
encapsulates the degree to which a potential adopter views usage of the target system to 
be relatively free of effort” (p. 61). In doing so they do not use the diffusion theory 
construct. They also use the relative advantage construct from diffusion theory agreeing 
with the Moore and Benbasat (1991) claim that it is similar to the notion of usefulness 
in the technology acceptance model and by direct inference that it takes its place, 
removing the need for the technology acceptance label. 
 
Chin and Gopal in their 1995 article entitled “Adoption intention in GSS: Relative 
importance of beliefs” (p.42) argue the case for combining adoption theory and 
acceptance theory. Al-Hajri (2005) uses a mixture of theories when he examined 





“the perceptions that tend to affect Internet technology adoption in the banking industry, 
namely:  
 Perceived relative advantage  
 Perceived organisational performance (not previously investigated) 
 Perceived ease of use  
 Perceived organizational/customer relationship (not previously investigated)” (Al-
Hajri 2005, p.ii) 
 
Karahanna et al (1999) also combines “innovation theory and attitude theory” (p. 183) 
as can be seen by the three “theoretical contributions” (p. 184) where they credited their 
research as being the first to “examine the different influences of a comprehensive set of 
innovative attributes on both adoption and usage behaviors” (p. 184). “A theoretical 
rationale is provided for differences across adoption and usage based on theories of 
attitude formation (p. 184)” and “a distinction is made between adoption and user 
behaviors (p. 184)”. 
 
The research of Karahanna et al (1999) which mixes adoption and acceptance theory is 
instructive from a number of perspectives. First, when they used acceptance theory they 
included in their research a subjective norm from Fishbein and Ajzen’s (1975) and 
Ajzen and Fishbein’s (1980) work. The subjective norm was removed from Davis’ 
Technology Acceptance Model which was also based on Fishbein and Ajzen’s (1975) 
and Ajzen and Fishbein’s (1980) Theory of Reasoned Action. Second, Karahanna et al 
(1999) is representative of the view in literature, for example, Triandis (1980) which 
distinguish between pre-adoption and post-adoption. They state “from a conceptual 
standpoint, few empirical studies have made a distinction between individual’s pre-
adoption and post-adoption beliefs and attitudes” (Karahanna 1999, p.183). This “mark” 
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research takes the opportunity to examine the pre-adoption decision in isolation from 
any adoption decision as the monetary system described in this research is not currently 
operational. Most researchers which have empirically examined information technology 
using acceptance theory with precepts from the Theory of Reasoned Action and Theory 
of Planned Behaviour, such as Christensen (1987), Davis (1993), Davis et al (1994), 
Mathieson (1991), and Pavri (1988) have examined the acceptance after the adoption 
has taken place.  Davis (1989) developed and validated new scales for two specific 
variables, perceived usefulness and perceived ease of use, which are hypothesized to be 
fundamental determinants of user acceptance. Davis et al (1989) addressed the ability to 
predict people’s computer acceptance from a measure of their intentions in terms of 
their attitude, subjective norms, perceived usefulness, perceived ease of use, and related 
variables. Taylor and Todd (1995) on the other hand compared the Technology 
Acceptance Model and two variants of the Theory of Planned Behaviour to explain 
information acceptance behaviour.  
 
The current research prepares for post-adoption research completely separate from pre-
adoption, acknowledging the point made by Tornatzky and Klein (1982) that the factors 
that led to adoption may be vastly different to those factors that affect the continued 
usage. This prepares to close a gap in literature which Karahanna et al (1999) states 
“remains an unanswered question in information systems research” (p. 195) in a way not 
previously undertaken. Post-adoption research is referred to in the further research 
section of the thesis.  
 
Unlike the approach taken by authors such as Agarwal and Prasad (1997), Karahanna et 
al (1999) and Moore and Benbasat (1996), it is believed a conceptually sounder 
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approach would be to focus on acceptance theory alone without mixing it with diffusion 
theory. 
 
3.3 Theory of Reasoned Action 
 
Fishbein and Ajzen’s (1975) Theory of Reasoned Action shows beliefs and evaluations 
and normative beliefs and motivation to comply lead to attitude towards behaviour and 
subjective norm, respectively. The attitude towards behaviour and subjective norm both 
lead to the behavioural intention which is used to predict actual behaviour. Chart 3.1 
Outlines the Theory of Reasoned Action. 
 











Behavioural intention as represented in the penultimate box measures the strengths of a 
person’s intention to perform a specified behaviour, which, in turn, gives an indication 
of the likelihood for the person actually to undertake the specified behaviour which is 

















Reasoned Action model by both the person’s attitude towards behaviour and a person’s 
subjective norm.  
 
Attitude towards behaviour is defined as an individual’s positive or negative feelings 
(evaluation effect) about performing the target behaviour. The attitude towards 
behaviour is a result of the person’s salient beliefs about the consequences of 
performing the behaviour multiplied by the evaluation of those consequences. Beliefs 
are defined as the individual’s subjective probability that performing the target 
behaviour will result in the consequence. Therefore, the attitude towards behaviour is a 
summation of the belief multiplied by the evaluation.  
 
Subjective norm refers to “the person’s perception that most people who are important 
to him think he should or should not perform the behaviour in question” (Fishbein and 
Ajzen 1975, p.302). A person’s subjective norm is determined by the person’s 
normative beliefs multiplied by the person’s motivation to comply with the normative 
beliefs. These beliefs can be influenced strongly by people including friends or a peer 
group, family, co-worker, church congregation members, community leaders and even 
celebrities (http://www.fw.msu.edu/outreachextension/thetheoryofreasonedaction.htm, 
accessed on 15th December 2006).  
 
 107 
3.4 Theory of Planned Behaviour 
 
In an attempt to improve the Theory of Reasoned Action’s ability to predict, Ajzen 
(1991) subsequently considered the difficulties of predicting behaviour of people who 
have incomplete volitional control. Volitional control occurs “if the person can decide at 
will to perform or not perform the behavior” (p. 182). A model was developed called the 
Theory of Planned Behaviour using the precepts of the Theory of Reasoned Action with 
the addition of the perceived behavioural control label to assist in the prediction of 
intentions and actions where there is incomplete volitional control.  
 
Ajzen (1991) states “a central factor in the Theory of Planned Behavior is the 
individual’s intention to perform a given behavior” (p. 181).  Ajzen goes on to explain 
that “as a general rule, the stronger the intention to engage in behavior, the more likely 
should be its performance” (p. 181). Ajzen (1991) continues and explains that “a 
behavioural intention can find expression in behavior only if the behavior in question is 
under volitional control” (p. 182). Ajzen (1991) acknowledges that volitional control 
would depend on non-motivational factors such as “availability of requisite 
















In explaining perceived behavioural control, Ajzen (1991) explains that a person may 
believe in general that their outcomes are determined by their own behaviour (internal 
locus of control), yet at the same time may have low perceived behavioural control. For 
example, a person may believe that their chances of becoming an airline pilot are very 
slim (low perceived behavioural control). 
 
When talking of volitional control, Ajzen (1991 p.182) states that some behaviours “in 
fact, meet this requirement quite well”. In the context of this research, consideration 
needs to be given to whether the behaviour examined falls within the requirement of 
being within the respondent’s volitional control. It is thus to be assumed that the 
respondents and potential adopters are not required to pay for the right, are not denied 
the requisite opportunities to adopt and it appears the decision would be within their 

















Taylor and Todd (1995) compared the Technology Acceptance Model and two variants 
of the Theory of Planned Behaviour to explain information acceptance behaviour. 
“Weighted least squares estimation revealed that all three models performed well in 
terms of fit and were roughly equivalent in terms of their ability to explain behavior” 
(Taylor and Todd 1995, p.2).  
 
3.5 Technology Acceptance Model 
 
The models developed by Fishbein and Ajzen (1975), Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) and 
Ajzen (1991) do not specify the beliefs that are operative for a particular behaviour, 
which requires the researcher to identify the salient beliefs regarding the behaviour 
under investigation which, in the current research, is information technology. In 
examining the literature surrounding the work of Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) and Ajzen 
and Fishbein (1980) in the context of information technology, the importance of Davis’ 
(1989, 1993) Technology Acceptance Model was revealed. By way of illustration Taylor 
and Todd (1995, p. 145) state that “from this stream of research the Technology 
Acceptance Model has emerged as a powerful and parsimonious way to represent the 
antecedents of system use through beliefs”.  
 
For these reasons, Davis’ (1989, 1993) Technology Acceptance Model has been chosen 
from the acceptance literature to be used as a basis for examining the acceptance 
decision of a monetary system using implantable chips. There is strong support in the 
literature for this approach including Ferguson (1997) who considered the effects of 
microcomputers on the work of professional accountants. Ferguson developed a model 
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based on Davis’ 1989 Technology Acceptance Model including “the interrelationships 
between perceptions, anxieties, attitudes, and microcomputer use and work outcomes of 
professional accountants” (Ferguson 1997, p. 41). The current study also examines 
accountants’ views as they are informed about financial issues which are important in 
the adoption decision of a monetary system based on implantable chips. Ferguson 
(1995) applied Davis’ Technology Acceptance Model directly in his study on the 
differential effects of human-computer interfaces on accountants using microcomputers 
where he looked at the perceived usefulness of microcomputers and perceived ease of 
use of microcomputers in relation to computer anxiety and the effect it has on the 
attitude to using microcomputers. Ferguson (1997) tested the premier accounting firms 
at the time with a sample of 157 representing accountants within the firms. He found 
that job satisfaction of professional accountants is directly affected by their “attitude 
towards using microcomputer” (Ferguson 1997, p. 41).  Other support for the model 
includes those authors such as Adams, Nelson and Todd (1992), Mathieson (1991), 
Hendrickson, Massey, and Cronan (1993) who have replicated the Technology 
Acceptance Model. 
 
Davis (1989) adapted the Theory of Reasoned Action model to tailor a model 
specifically for user acceptance of information systems, which he called the Technology 
Acceptance Model (TAM).  
 
Davis posits that two particular beliefs are of primary importance for technology 
acceptance behaviour. These are the perceived usefulness of the computer technology 
for the intended tasks and the perceived ease of use of the technology. These two 
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beliefs, therefore, in accordance to the Technology Acceptance Model are the specified 
determinants of attitudes towards using the technology (as can be seen in Chart 3.3). 
 
Chart 3.3   Technology Acceptance Model (Davis 1989) 
 
. 
The Theory of Reasoned Action asserts that any other factors that influence behaviour 
do so only indirectly by influencing attitude towards behaviour and the subjective norm. 
Davis (1989) uses this theoretical contribution from Ajzen and Fishbein (1975) to apply 
to technology acceptance decisions by including external variables, which contribute to 
the attitude towards behaviour, which, of course, is broken into perceived usefulness 
and perceived ease of use. Given the direct application of the general theory this would 
appear to be reasonable, although the Technology Acceptance Model does not include 
the subjective norm as recommended but rather it is removed from the model 
completely, the explanation given is set out below: 
 
“as Fishbein and Ajzen acknowledge, this is one of the least understood aspects of the 
Theory of Reasoned Action. It is difficult to disentangle direct effects of subjective norms on 




















The newly developed model takes a different view to Davis (1989) and includes the 
subjective norm taking the view that Davis’ (1989) argument is not sufficient to exclude 
the subjective norm.  
 
3.6 Modified Technology Acceptance Model 
 
The Modified Technology Acceptance Model returns to the precepts of the Theory of 
Reasoned Action (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975; Ajzen and Fishbein 1980) and uses the 
subjective norm component from that theory before making use of the Technology 
Acceptance Model (perceived ease of use and perceived usefulness) in an application of 
the theory designed to apply to the issue of society’s acceptance of a verification mark. 
When the accounting community considers its acceptance of a verification mark as part 
of the technology of the described monetary exchange system, it is considered that 
Fishbein and Ajzen’s (1975) subjective norm will be an important explanatory factor on 
behavioural intention. The internal implications of a permanent mark on their body may, 
for instance, bring about similar subjective norm issues surrounding the use of tattoos 
even if the mark will be invisible. The decision whether to have a tattoo may be 
expected to be impacted by the beliefs of a person’s family members, friends or perhaps 
communities. The mark may be aligned to issues such as privacy, control and perhaps 
even religious issues. It could be agued that Davis’ (1989) focus on technology 
acceptance in an organisational context has less call for an exploration of normative 
beliefs from the Theory of Reasoned Action model than this current study. 
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Davis’s (1989) two salient beliefs deal with the benefits of the adoption of technology 
captured in the label of perceived usefulness and the cost in terms of the time expended 
to receive the perceived benefits, that being the perceived ease of use label. It is argued 
that the possible risks involved in adoption of technology should also be considered. In 
Davis’s (1989) study, employees’ acceptance was being tested and their interests in risks 
may well be restricted as the employer would carry the potential risks such as the 
financial risk of the adoption. 
 
In dealing with technology acceptance, the literature has evidenced the importance of 
considering various risk factors in electronic transactions. For instance, Ho and Ng 
(1994, p.26) studied the risks and perceptions of electronic payment systems such as 
EFTPOS and the credit card, as compared to cash. Spence et al (1970) and Festervand et 
al (1986) both found non-store buying using technology is perceived to be “more risky” 
than retail store buying due, in part, to an inability to inspect products and the lack of 
personal contact. Another example is Van den Poel et al (1999) who investigated the 
effectiveness of the World Wide Web as a channel of distribution by, in part, 
considering the risk perspective and evaluating “risk relievers” (p. 254). Roselius (1971) 
examined purchase behaviour and the consequence of “the risk of suffering some type 
of loss” (p. 56). Chaudhuri (1998) studied “perceived risk” (p. 158) in relation to 
product classes.  
 
Further, Wang et al (2003) examined the determinants of user acceptance of Internet 
technology in the Taiwanese banking industry from an analysis of 123 phone interviews. 
They argued that the two TAM fundamental perceptions (perceived ease of use and 
usefulness) may not fully explain the user’s behaviour; therefore, they included another 
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construct, perceived credibility. Wang et al (2003) noted this construct expresses 
security and privacy concerns. The authors suggested that it is important to focus on 
providing valuable function and trustworthy protection of security and privacy of the 
banking services on the Internet. Their findings also indicated that the formation of 
these perceptions could be managed through proper training and promotion rather than 
focusing on redesigning Internet banking technology.  
 
The acknowledgment in the literature of risk influences in technology acceptance 
decisions has been accepted and has been found to be relevant in this research, 
especially given the potential importance and permanency of the “mark” decision. A 
perceived risk label was introduced into this current research on technology acceptance. 
 
The Modified Technology Acceptance Model, as shown in Chart 3.4, is developed and 
used in this research as the theory base. The model includes four relevant variables that 
would affect a person’s attitude and form their subjective norm: perceived ease of use, 
perceived usefulness, perceived risks, and normative beliefs and motivation to comply. 
The behavioural intention resulted from the attitude towards accepting a verification 





Chart 3.4 Modified Technology Acceptance Model 
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Chapter Four: Description of the variables  
 
This chapter provides descriptions for the four variables: Perceived Ease of Use, 
Perceived Usefulness, Perceived Risk, Normative beliefs and motivation to comply. 
Research question and hypotheses were then formed and discussed.  
 
4.1 Perceived ease of use 
 
The perception of ease of use was adopted as part of the contributions made by the 
Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) in its application of the Theory of Reasoned 
Action (TRA). Davis defined perceived ease of use as "the degree to which a person 
believes that using a particular system would be free from effort" (Davis 1989, p. 320) 
 
Both TRA and TAM have strong behavioural elements that assume someone will be 
free to act without limitation when they form an intention to act. However, Bagozzi et al 
(1992) acknowledged that there are constraints such as limited ability which will limit 
the freedom to act, for instance, time constraints, environmental or organisational limits, 
or unconscious habits (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Technology_acceptance_ model, 
accessed 2nd January 2007). 
 
In its original application, that being a decision to accept a Windows environment over a 
DOS environment, the ease of use would have been important, as it was a major 
determinant in deciding how one might complete a job function in the most efficient 
way. The ease of use of the application is a major part of the cost in this style of 
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application as it equates with the expenditure of time on an on-going basis. In the 
verification mark application it is again considered important because it is felt that 
people want to feel that they can use the technology and will not be held up or 
embarrassed by the system. When trials of a cashless card were run in Sweden 
(Holmstrom et al, 2001) delays occurred when using the cards frustrating both vendors 
and shoppers alike. This problem was a major reason for the rejection of the system.  
 
The proposed mark would require that you merely have to offer your mark for scanning 
once it had been implanted. The target of the research is Australian professionally 
affiliated accountants who are believed to be competent in financial matters and could 
easily conceptualise what is required of them. It is expected that accountants might 
perceive that a verification mark would be easy to use which would have a direct 
positive effect on the accountants’ attitude towards accepting a verification mark. 
 
4.2 Perceived usefulness  
 
This was defined by Davis (1989, p. 320) as "the degree to which a person believes that 
using a particular system would enhance his or her job performance". Lin (2005) 
developed and tested a unified model that integrated constructs including attitudes, 
behaviour, and social influence. Her findings indicated that perceived usefulness was “a 
significant factor for predicting intentions” (p. 37).  
 
“In TAM, perceived ease of use has a positive impact on perceived usefulness, which 
has a direct impact on attitude toward usage. Further, intention to use is determined by 
attitude toward usage and by perceived usefulness” (Rotchanakitumnuai 2005, p.2). 
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Accountants may well believe that a verification mark would make accounting for 
transactions easier as it would create an electronic record of each transaction. The record 
may well be able to be accessed via a personal computer and used as the basis of 
financial management and taxation returns. A verification mark may have other 
advantages such as reducing the burden of having to carry a credit or identity card if it 
held information such as driver’s licence details, medical information and contact 
details. 
 
4.3 Perceived risks 
 
Risks have not been contemplated fully in technology acceptance research using Davis’ 
(1993) Technology Acceptance Model; possibly because risk may have been perceived 
as less problematic in dealing with issues contemplated by Davis such as a change from 
a DOS environment to a Windows environment in the context of a business. The 
personal nature of this current research makes risks of greater consequence to the 
decision maker and the permanent nature also increases the need for a risk analysis as 
the decision is not easily reversible and so the consequences and time frame are longer. 
The lack of risk consideration is addressed in the model adapted for this research. The 




4.3.1 Potential for social control 
 
A category of concern may well be the lack of control individuals have once they have a 
verification mark, given its permanent nature. People may perceive that once they accept 
the technology they will have to accept changes to the system and the uses made of the 
information. Information can more easily be gathered and used for purposes outside the 
individual’s control. This control may have a dehumanising effect on people. Do we 
want to live in a society so controlled? Whilst a less controlled system allows inequities 
due to cheats and skimming, at least liberty is maintained. Consideration should be 
made about a sophisticated system that would affect liberty and should not be used just 
because it is available.  
 
With such a sophisticated identification system also come potential hazards. According 
to Foucault’s argument in Rabinow (1982), the state tries to control society. The Sex 
Offenders Monitoring Act allows the electronic monitoring of sex offenders. On 16 
August 2006 Dowsley reported that the notorious “Brian Keith Jones dubbed Mr Baldy, 
was arrested by prison officers after an electronic tag he wears warned them he was 
walking the streets of Ararat after 7pm” (p.1). There are examples where the 
government has considered using chips to control behaviour. For example, Haberfield 
(2004 p. 5) notes that some “poker machine players will have to register for a smart card 
under a bold new plan to curb problem gambling”.  The cards could impose time limits 
on the gamblers. 
 
The more sophisticated the numbering system and collection of information, the more 
one can be controlled. The numbering system potentially allows physical controls. An 
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example might be an alarm system, which may be triggered by a chip when entering an 
illegal area. Financial controls may also be enforced such as the prohibition against 
spending money on illegal items or limits enforced on addicted gamblers. Apart from 
legal controls, moral control could also be exercised, for instance, tracing and entering 
into places like brothels. Perhaps, this could be seen as a positive outcome but it also 
could be perceived as controlling and a threat to personal liberty. 
 
Kolberg (Crain 1985, p. 121) describes in his stages of moral development theory that a 
person may need to act outside “conventional” morals to arrive at a “post conventional” 
ethic whereby one may have to break the law in order to achieve a moral end. Nelson 
Mandela spent many years in jail having broken the law of the land because of his 
stance on apartheid issues (Mandela 1955-59). 
 
4.3.2 Privacy  
 
Strongly linked with social control is the concept of privacy. The very recording, 
potential to know or knowing, is sufficient to affect privacy. Perspectives can be 
changed because of information known about a person even if the knowledge is 
independent of social control. Integral to a cashless exchange is a centrally linked record 
of the exchange whether the recordings are kept by the government or businesses like 
banks. Consider the record-keeping involved in a financial exchange that involves a 
financial institution like a bank or credit union. Records are kept for various reasons 
including to validate the fact that the exchange has taken place and for dispute 
resolution. However, the perception may also arise that the verification mark would 
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decrease the amount of privacy accountant’s have in their private and business financial 
affairs. 
 
Opportunity International Australia Limited, for instance, uses bank account and credit 
card details to process transactions (http://www.opportunity.org.au/home.asp?pageid 
=1279F63F6C612F99, accessed on 21st December 2006). SGE Credit Union 
communications gather information about their customers relating to other products or 
services that the Credit Union or their preferred suppliers provided 
(http://www.sgefs.com.au/privacy.html, accessed on 21st December 2006).  
 
Opportunity International Australia Limited documents that:  
 
“contact information such as: name; address; phone numbers and email addresses are 
used to process receipts and to keep you abreast of any issues or developments we 
may think you have an interest in” (http://www.opportunity.org.au/home.asp? 
pageid=1279F63F6C612F99, accessed on 21st December 2006).  
 
Surprisingly it indicates: 
 
“Sometimes we collect some more personal information about you such as what church 
you attend; your age; your professional profile, date of birth etc. This information is used 
so we can notify you of any developments within Opportunity that may be of specific 
interest to you. For instance if you were involved in international banking, and the 
President of the World Bank were to speak at a function we were hosting, then we 
would contact you as a person with a specific interest” (http://www.opportunity.org.au/ 
home.asp?pageid=1279F63F6C612F99, accessed on 21st December 2006).  
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This collection of highly sensitive information including the “church you attend” 
(http://www.opportunity.org.au/home.asp?pageid=1279F63F6C612F99, accessed on 
21st December 2006) is justified on the basis of marketing the credit unions affiliated 
events which seems a poor reason to store such information. This information easily 
relates to the previous paragraph on social control. 
 
Integral to a cashless exchange is a centrally linked record of the exchange. Consider the 
record keeping involved in a credit card statement. Records are kept to validate the fact 
that the exchange has taken place; it is necessary in dispute resolution, for account 
keeping amongst other worthy reasons. The taxation system is working towards a fuller 
reporting system making use of computer records. A perception may arise that a 
monetary system using a verification mark would decrease the amount of privacy 
accountant’s have in their private financial affairs. 
  
4.3.3 Abuse  
   
Information collected as part of a cashless monetary system which, over time, would 
accumulate to an informative picture of a person’s spending history could be abused 
either by an authority, or, by a person gaining unauthorised access, for instance, hackers. 
The increased convenience and speed of cashless mediums of exchange present 
challenges to a control system. If such a system is implemented the accessibility of 
records and the purpose of accessing the records may be a constant concern for some. 
Concerns may include the fear that records may be sold as a form of revenue generation. 
Issues such as the recent sale of credit card records to retailers without the direct 
permission of the cardholders together with the helplessness of the individuals to change 
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the situation is small evidence of a far worse potential for abuse. In 2005, the Australian 
Broadcasting Corporation alleged that “employees of a Gurgaon-base call centre are 
illegally selling personal information of thousands of Australians for as little as 10 
Australian dollars (Rs335) per person” (http://asiamedia.ucla.edu/article.asp?parentid= 
28294, accessed on 6th February 2007).  
 
There also may be positive perceptions about the ability of the verification mark to 
reduce various risks. Examples could include the reduction of the risk of someone 
finding out personal credit card details and using the numbers to perpetrate a fraud, or, 
the elimination of the risk of physically losing a credit, debit or smart card. 
 
4.3.4 System corruption 
 
Implantable chip technology related to a monetary system will be highly dependent on 
technology and there may be a perception that the system would be vulnerable to 
corruption.    
 
4.3.5 Other risks 
 
A monetary system based on implantable chip technology may invoke many other fears. 
There may be a perception that a verification mark could affect a person’s health or 
create safety issues given that it would be implanted.   
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4.4 Normative beliefs and motivation to comply  
 
An important part of the Modified Technology Acceptance Model is the subjective 
norm; an essential element transported from the original Theory of Reasoned Action. 
Those important to the individual are deemed to be an important explanatory factor on 
the intention to behave in a certain way. Who may be important to an individual will 
vary from person to person. Family members may be an important influence. Perhaps a 
parent’s view is influential or perhaps it is the view of a spouse or a child. Organised 
groups are also renowned as powerful influences in individual’s intentions to behave in 
a certain way. Perhaps it is the influence of the sports club or culture; perhaps it is the 
beneficent societies such as Rotary. Religious groups are perhaps the most renowned 
influences. As an example specifically related to the issue, the New International 
Version Holy Bible (1979, p. 313) in Revelation Chapter 14 verses 9-11 states that: 
 
“If anyone worships the beast and his image and receives his mark on the forehead or 
on the hand, he, too, will drink of the wine of God’s fury, which has been poured full 
strength into the cup of wrath”.  
 
Many Christians are convinced this relates to an organised numbering system, which is 
referred to in this thesis. The strength of this statement creates enormous pressure 
despite personal beliefs of usefulness, ease of use and risks not to partake of the system. 
 
The permanent nature of a verification mark distinguishes this research from other 
focuses of technology acceptance research which consequently lends itself to a greater 
examination of normative beliefs. As the issue involves personal rather than just a 
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business focus and the implications extend beyond the work place then it is suggested a 
greater focus of influence will come from personal rather than business sources. Family 
members, religious and community groups may be the source of such influence. The 
acceptance by work colleagues of the extension of technology may have a less dramatic 
influence on an accountant’s preparedness to accept the verification mark than the 
support of a spouse or parent.  
 
4.5 Research questions  
 
The research question studied is: What level of acceptance would professional 
accountants have in adopting a cashless monetary system using an implantable chip 
technology and supported by global positioning satellite and a large computer system? 
 
This research investigates the preconceptions of professional accountants of the 
acceptance of a possible monetary system based on personal verification using an 
implantable chip, global positioning satellites and a large computer system. The relevant 
parts of the transactional trail would be available to individuals, businesses and 
regulators and is designed to embrace a greater internal control over the monetary 
system to eliminate fraud whilst allowing a completely real time exchange system. A 
modified Technology Acceptance Model specially developed is used for this purpose.  
 
The Modified Technology Acceptance Model used for this research is based on Fishbein 
and Azjen’s (1975) Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) and Davis’ (1989) Technological 
Acceptance Model (TAM). An examination of the external factors required by the TRA 
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model as they relate to the use of technology applied by the TAM’s used in addition to 
Fishbein and Azjen’s (1975) Theory of Reasoned Action’s subjective norm and a risk 
component. The research asks the relevance of these variables of the Modified 
Technology Acceptance Model in terms of testing the acceptance of the introduction or 
implementation of an implantable microchip as part of a greater system to record all 
financial transactions. This leads to four discrete elements which contribute to 
acceptance decision and behaviour, including perceived ease of use, perceived 




4.6.1 Statement of introduction  
 
The hypotheses follow the order of the elements in Chart 3.4. Hypothesis 1 deals with 
the perception of ease of use of the verification mark. Hypothesis 2 deals with the 
perceived usefulness of the verification mark. Hypothesis 3 deals with perceived risks of 
using the verification mark. Finally, Hypothesis 4 deals with a subjective norm influence 
on the decision to adopt a verification mark.  
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4.6.2 Hypotheses  
 
The following are the null hypotheses: 
 
H1 The perception that a verification mark would be easy to use would not have a          
direct positive effect on an accountant’s attitude towards accepting a verification 
mark. 
H2 Perceived usefulness of a verification mark does not have a direct positive effect on 
an accountant’s attitude towards accepting a verification mark. 
H3 Perceived risks of a verification mark do not have an inverse effect on an 
accountant’s attitude towards accepting a verification mark.  
H4 The perception of a subjective norm will not have a direct positive effect on an 
accountant’s attitude towards accepting a verification mark. 
 
The decision to implant a chip to facilitate a cashless monetary system is expected to 
solicit strong reactions because of its invasive nature and significance of the decision. It 
is predicted that there will be a high number of respondents that will disagree with 
adopting the mark with a strong representation of respondents strongly disagreeing with 
its adoption. A proportion would be expected to be uncertain with less expected to agree 
to adopt the technology and very few strongly adopting it. 
 
The emotional issues of risk dealing with privacy and control embraced in the model 
lead to the expectation of strongly disagree and disagree. The uncertain and agreed 
labels are expected to be more difficult for the model to predict.  
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Chapter Five: Methodology and questionnaire design 
5.1 Survey 
 
The development of technology has accelerated in the recent years. Perhaps because of 
the speed of the developments there is a lack of research into the acceptance of the 
technology by the financially literate. The theoretical underpinnings of this research 
designed to develop the testable hypotheses lead to the collection of a representative 
sample. Roberts (1999) observed that the survey method “proposes the pattern among 
the variables of interest” (p. 55).  
 
There is minimal research into the acceptance of the technology that could facilitate a 
cashless monetary system by the financially literate. This lack of research drove the 
research method towards a broad-based questionnaire style, reaching greater numbers 
than would be possible in interviews, focus groups or case studies given the restriction 
of time and money. Chongruksut (2002) acknowledged that the mailed questionnaire 
survey is the most appropriate to gather a large sample of a population at low cost which 
is relevant to the current study. This style of survey has been pursued even though De 
Vaus (2002, p. 123) warned that the response rates are “typically lower than telephone 
or personal interviews”. 
 
The knowledge sought in this research is more general in nature than might be sought by 
a smaller group of specialists in the area. With the expectation that many people in 
society will be lead by the views of the reputedly financially literate, the group this 
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research aims to survey are from those that represent the financially literate, rather than 
experts in the specific field of technology.   
 
5.1.1 Source selection  
 
Professional accountants from Australia were seen as appropriate to survey, as they 
would be perceived as qualified to answer questions which relate to financial issues 
involved in a verification system. Surveying informed individuals will undoubtedly add 
to the knowledge in this area. If the adoption of the technology is then considered to be 
an appropriate course of action then convincing people of the technology’s worthiness 
becomes important for an authority and once again informed peoples views will hold 
weight. Further, should the technology adoption progress, pre-consideration of people’s 
views should reduce adoption difficulties and make diffusion easier.  
 
The research is designed to focus on accountants with professional qualifications. The 
criterion used for the financially literate in this research was that the accountants were to 
be full members of an Australian professional body or its equivalent, with a degree 
qualification or its equivalent. Certified Practising Accountants and Chartered 
Accountants were selected as the target population in this research. Accountants from 
the National Institute of Accountants did not necessarily fulfill the degree requirement 
and publicly available information did not allow the study to distinguish between those 
who had this qualification and those who did not. For this reason, the National Institute 
of Accountants was not included. According to the Federal Rules of Evidence 1971, the 
judicial standards for survey research indicate that “the population should include all 
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relevant respondents and exclude inappropriate, acknowledgeable, or unconcerned 
respondents” (Van der Stede et al 2005). 
  
The target population was 135,000 (as identified in Table 5.2). Whilst Morgan (1990) 
documents that a sample of 200 to 300 respondents achieves face validity in this 
context, 523 of the target population were selected as the representative sample, as it 
was considered to be “substantively significant” (Sapsford 1999, p.93) and “intuitively 
justifiable” (Morgan 1990 p.63). The long process of selecting databases, appropriate 
sampling method and the sample is explained in the remaining section of 5.1.   
 
5.1.1.1 Selection of database 
 
In gaining an understanding of the relevant accountant populations, two options were 
available. Using Australian Bureau of Statistics information or accounting body 
information. It was decided to use the professional body’s information as the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics information did not specifically address accountants and 
information could only be inferred. Definitional issues arose as well, given that an 
accountant is not a legal term and specific criteria had been applied to the research.  
 
The Melbourne Big and Telstra directory databases were therefore not selected as they 
do not distinguish between professionally qualified accountants and unqualified 
accountants, given that accounting is a not a legal term. Application was made to CPA 
Australia and the Institute of Chartered Accountants Australia (ICAA) for permission to 
access their databases. Both rejected the application originally, citing the new privacy 
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legislation as being the obstacle that prevented them from doing so. This database 
included information on all accountants that were their members. 
 
The ICAA did not entertain further discussion on the issue. CPA Australia were 
prepared to consider the application further if application was made to the CPA research 
grant scheme. Sometime later a decision was made that access to the database would not 
be permitted. 
 
Publicly available databases were the remaining option. These databases included only 
accountants that were in public practice which limited the extent of the examination. 
Accountants available on CPA Australia’s and the ICAA publicly available databases 
had the advantage of not only registering full members but it also listed members with 
public practising certificates. This latter group were more likely to be principals and au 
fait with the needs and views of the public than perhaps niche’ groups in the total 
member database which are likely to include other members such as academics or public 
sector accountants.  
 
Given the selection criterion of ‘financially literate’, the use of the CPA Australia’s and 
the ICAA’s publicly available databases was expected to result in a representative 
sample that fitted the research requirements. It was decided to proceed with this option. 
All accountants on the publicly available websites, “Find a CPA” and “Find a CA” met 
the definition of “financially literate” as defined in this research being undertaken.  
 
With the “Find a CPA” database a full list of all accountants could be downloaded from 
which a sample could be drawn. This database did not allow the selection of a particular 
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type of accountant, but, did provide information on the industry in which the 
accountants had experience, for example property services, agriculture or 
manufacturing. With the “Find a CA” option, restrictions existed on the database that 
forced the selection of a state or territory, a postcode and a type of Chartered 
Accountant, for example, a tax accountant. In using the database, ten randomly selected 
accountants are furnished with each request and are selected from members who fit the 
criteria. A second request with the same criteria provides another ten random selections 
if more than 10 members fit the criteria offered.  
 
As indicated, a postcode was needed to be entered to make a selection from the “Find a 
CA” database, the Australian Bureau of Statistics publication “Local government area 
populations for each state and territory” was used to aid selection, the most recent 
publication at the time being the 30th June 2002 edition.  
 
The spread of local government areas was broad, New South Wales had 173 areas, 
Victoria had 78, Queensland had 57, South Australia had 68, Western Australia had 42, 
Tasmania had 29, Northern Territory had 10 and the Australian Capital Territory had 1. 
If a postcode was randomly selected from the various states and territories a local 
government area such as Hammond with an estimated residential population of only 208 
would have the same chance of being selected as a local government area such as the 
Gold Coast with an estimated residential population of 438,473.  
 
To avoid a concentration of smaller localities it was decided that accountants would 
only be drawn from local government areas where the population was at least 50,000. 
The number of local government areas fitting this criterion was as follows, New South 
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Wales 44; Victoria 36: Queensland 17; South Australia 9; Western Australia 12; 
Tasmania 1; Northern Territory 1 and the Australian Capital Territory 1.  
 
5.1.2 Survey numbers selected using CPA Australia and ICA 
demographics 
 
Member demographics were important in order to select proportionately from the two 
accounting bodies chosen. The ICAA’s member numbers were taken from the 2002 
Annual Report, although no break-down information on member categories and 
locations were available. In defining the population for CPA Australia members, the 
demographics from their annual report (2000, p. 2, 3, 9 and 13) were used and 
extrapolated into the then current year, being 2002. This was necessary, as the CPA 
Australia Annual Reports in the later years did not contain member numbers, and only 
limited demographic break-up information was available. There were also no details of 
State and Territory break-downs.  
 
Table 5.1 Total number of members in the Institute of Chartered Accountants and 
CPA Australia 
 
 CPA % increase ICAA 
1997 84,116   
1998 86,881 3.287  
1999 90,208 3.829  
2000 91,882 1.855  An average of 2.99 increase or ≈3%  
2001 94,638*          35,670 
2002 97,477*          5.194 37,523 




The total number of accountants in 2002 in both professional bodies based on 
reconstructed figures was 135,000 (97477 for CPA Australia [72%] and 37523 for 
ICAA [28%]). 
 
An objective of the survey was to establish a representative sample of Accountants 
within Australia and based on membership size in these locations. Details regarding this 
were necessary. As mentioned, membership by region was not supplied in the ICAA’s 
Annual Reports so the CPA Australia, breakdown was used in an encompassing way. 
 
Table 5.2   Membership by regions (from CPA Australia 2000 annual report) 
 
 
                     Total      %  
ACT     2,130    2.3% 
ASIA   16,757  18.2% 
NSW   24,253  26.4% 
NT        351    0.3% 
QLD     9,795  11.0% 
SA     4,117    4.4% 
TAS        988    1.0% 
VIC   24,217  26.3% 
WA     6,833    7.5% 
Other overseas    2,441    2.6% 
Total   91,882              100% 
 
As the research is confined to Australia, the overseas component of the members by 
region was removed from Table 5.2 and Table 5.3 identifies the numbers of members 
that are based in Australia. Initially, the sample was distributed directly in accordance 
with the percentage of members in each State or Territory. The strict adherence to the 
percentage proportions resulted in small sample sizes for Tasmania and the Northern 
Territory. A minimum of fifteen samples for any State or Territory was adopted to solve 
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the problem. This decision, together with rounding issues, resulted in a total sample size 
of 523 (see Table 5.3). 
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(Note: Column 2 is the percentage of members within the states and territories, and 
Column 3 represents the calculation rounded to the nearest whole number. Column 4 is 
the extension of column 3 but with a minimum of 15 per state or territory. Table 5.4 
utilises this breakdown and distributes the distribution between CPA and ICAA.) 
 
Table 5.4 Membership - Australia only 
 
 State or territories ICAA CPA 
 See table 3 28% 72% 
ACT  15 4 11 
NSW 167 47 120 
NT 15 4 11 
QLD 68 19 49 
SA 29 8 21 
TAS 15 4 11 
VIC 167 47 120 
WA 47 13 34 






5.1.3 CPA demographics  
 
In order to gain an appreciation of the demographics of professional accountants in 
Australia the following information pertaining to CPA Australia derived from CPA 
Australia’s Annual Report (2000) are documented. The ICAA Annual Report did not 
contain such details.  
 
Table 5.5  Ratio of women to men in CPA Australia  
 
 
Ratio of women to men 
         %           % 
1990      29.2        70.8 
1991      39.3        60.7 
1992      36.7        63.3 
1993      39.3        60.7 
1994      41.6        58.4 
1995      43.3        56.7 
1996      44.8        55.2 
1997      45.7        54.3 
1998      46.6        53.4 
1999      48.3        51.7 
2000      49.6        50.4 
 
 
Member status    % 
Fellow 12 
CPA 49 
Associate     39 
Total 100 
 
Age demographics    % 
<30 18 




Unknown                                                   1 







Employment profile    % 
Commerce and industry 49 
Retired  8 
Public practice 18 
Public sector 15 
Academia 3 
Not for profit 2 
Other     5 





Years of membership   % 
<5 23 
5-9   25 
10-14                                                              14 
15-19                                                 10               
20-29 14 
30-39 9 
40-49                                                           3  
49+               2 
Total              100 
 
 
5.1.3.1 CPA Australia member selection 
 
Having determined the number of CPAs to be selected, the actual sample was selected 
randomly. As the “Find a CPA” database is arranged alphabetically into states and 
territories then randomness was established via the systematic selection. A dice was 
rolled and the resultant number, two, became the random starting point for the 
systematic selection of the accountants on the database. The dice was rolled again and 
the resultant number, four, became the interval of selection. The selections were made 
from the “Find a CPA” database until the requisite amount of selections from the 
various state or territories was made. According to Diamond (2000, p.237), “probability 
sample increases the representativeness of survey results, thus allowing inferences to be 
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made from the sample to the survey population within a calculable margin of error”, and 
thus minimises the sampling errors and improves the external validity. 
 
5.1.3.2 Institute of Chartered Accountant’s selection 
 
A different selection system was used on the “Find a CA” website which revolved 
around postcode. The degree of sophistication for random selection needed to be 
increased. The random number generator function in Microsoft Office Excel was used to 
randomly select which postcode and the type of accountant (audit, financial planning 
specialist, general accounting, tax, insolvency) that would be used for the selection of 
members in each State and Territory as part of the database requirements. Once the key 
elements were entered into the database, the selections generated (a maximum of ten 
accountants each time) were used.  
 
5.2 Questionnaire design 
 
Whilst it is acknowledged that a structured questionnaire restricts the depth of data 
collection, it is considered justifiable as the research relates specifically to acceptance 
and the questionnaire is used to draw inferences about the population in accordance with 
the rules established by Roberts (1999) in his article ‘In Defence of the Survey Method: 
An illustration from a study of user information satisfaction’.  
 
Colombo’s (2000) advice was taken to expend significant effort on the survey design in 
order to increase the response rate. De Vaus’ (2002, p.123) advice was also relied upon 
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to minimize follow-up procedures. De Vaus advised that surveys need to be easy to 
follow with questions that are self-explanatory for the respondents in order to avoid bias. 
Response rate was increased by sending a second questionnaire as part of the follow up 
process and a comparison between early and late respondents was performed, and 
detailed later in this chapter. 
 
It was decided to couple open-ended questions with the Likert-scale questions which are 
mainly designed to collect quantitative data to be used in the analysis. Creswell (1994), 
Fielding and Fielding (1987) and Gray and Densten (1998) agreed that the confidence in 
the conclusion of research based on questionnaire increases by collecting both 
quantitative and qualitative data. In the use of both open-ended questions and Likert-
scale questions, the closed responses will be complemented with the richness gained 




Bowers (1976) acknowledged the validity of the Likert-scale used to analyse a number 
of “human resource issues including the central role of the work group, participative 
decision making, communication and the linking pin function, supervision and peer 
group loyalty” (Gowland 2000, p.26).  
 
“The utilisation of the Likert-style of questioning is designed so that the researcher can 
measure the same variable and sum the responses to the questions” (Gowland 2000).  
“Research regarding optimum survey designs has suggested scale designs and the 
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number of items used affect the reliability and quantity of responses” (De Lange 2000, 
p.123). 
 
In this questionnaire, three types of measurement scales are used: interval scale, nominal 
scale and mainly ordinal scale. Interval scale and nominal scale are used in collecting 
information about the respondents including age, salary, length of service and gender. 
The majority of the questions are ordinal to measure the respondents’ attitudes towards 
the change of technology in accordance with Neuman (1997) and Zikmund (1991) who 
agreed the use of ordinal scale is appropriate when a measure requires ranking according 
to magnitude. 
 
Likert-scales are widely used and most common in survey research (Neuman 1997). 
Mitchell and Jolley (1988) took the view that a Likert-scale is equivalent to interval data 
in that a subject giving a scale of 5 for strongly agree compared to a subject giving the 
scale of 4 for agree differ by approximately the same amount as a person who gives a 
scale of 1 for strongly disagree compared to a scale of 2 for disagree. The argument 
includes the fact that there is a psychological interval between each consecutive number.  
 
Gowland (2000) states that the use of a scale of five allows respondents to believe they 
were not forced to select an answer that did not represent their true position. A five 
point scale was therefore believed to be sufficient for the purpose of this research. The 
scale still retains the nature of ordinal data which affects the statistical analysis. For 
example, ordinal data should be analysed using a Multinomial Logit regression rather 
than the OLS regression method. This approach was therefore used. A multinomial logit 
model generalizes logit models in which there can be more than two cases. It is a 
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statistical model or econometric model often used for data in which the response is often 
a set of choices as is the case here.  
 
5.2.2 Questionnaire structure  
 
The questions were motivated by literature. The literature contributions and the resultant 
questions are detailed in the following relevant sections of this chapter. The 
questionnaire was divided into distinct sections with a total of 49 questions. Descriptive 
information was gathered about the respondent in section A (Q1-7), these characteristics 
are used in the analysis for section B - E. Responses relating to the model were then 
obtained progressively. Ease of use questions were contained in section B (Q8-14) with 
all questions being closed except for Q14. Questions relating to “usefulness” were 
contained in section C (Q15-19) with Q19 being the only closed question. “Risks” were 
dealt with in section D (Q20-35); the final question in this section was the only open 
question. Questions pertaining to “normative beliefs” were contained in section E (Q36-
42) with Q39 being the only open question. Questions relating to “acceptance” appeared 
in section F (Q43-49) which also contained questions relating to the respondent’s belief 
about the status of existing technology that would allow the mechanics of a monetary 
system revolving around an implantable chip with Q49 being the open question.  
 
5.2.2.1 Test of consistency  
 
The decision was made to use a mailed questionnaire. Summers (1969) notes that 
respondents may be biased and errors can result from the tendency of people to answer a 
question falsely through deliberate misrepresentation or unconscious falsification, 
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referred to as respondent bias. The bias could be intentional or unintentional made by 
the respondent during the survey. The test of consistency helps identify any possible 
intentional falsification while pre-testing helps to prevent unintentional bias.  
 
In this survey, the styles of question were mixed in the questionnaire for the purpose of 
testing consistency. For example, there were three styles of closed questions relating to 
risk as illustrated in Table 5.6. This makes it possible to test for consistency in order to 
further strengthen the internal validity of the survey.  
 
Table 5.6 Questionnaire by style    











Style A: Related to the perception that the 
implantable chip would increase risks in the 
respondent’s life, for instance, the level of 
control exerted on their life by the government. 
35 5.2.6.5 
Style B:  Questions asked about the mitigation 28 5.2.6.3 
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29 5.2.6.3 of risks currently perceived due to having an 
implantable chip, such as the reduction of fraud 






Style C: Questions explored the comfort the 
respondent felt with measures designed to 
protect people from the perceived new risks 
that may arise due to the implanting of a chip. 
Such measures included constitutional, 
legislative or encryption software protection. 
31 5.2.6.3 
 
The relationships among variables were established to facilitate the test of consistency 
of responses. The ease of use, usefulness and subjective norm variables were expected 
to have a direct relationship with the acceptance of the implantable chip technology 
whilst the risk variables were expected to have an inverse relationship. A perception that 
having an implantable chip would increase risks was expected to have an indirect 
relationship with the person’s intention to accept the chip. Finally, the subjective norm 
component was expected to have a direct relationship with acceptance, that is, if those 
that were important to the respondent felt the technology would be easy to use or useful, 
then that would positively affect the respondent’s likelihood to accept the technology. 
Similarly, if those important to the respondent felt the risks resulting from the 
technology were increased and could not be controlled, then this would have an indirect 
effect on the likelihood of the respondent to accept the technology. The test of 
consistency from one question to another provides evidence that support the fact that 




5.2.3 Arrangement of questionnaire structure 
 
Close scrutiny of the model shows that it states that perceived ease of use, perceived 
usefulness and perceived risks all influence the “attitude towards accepting” the 
verification mark (refer to Chart 5.1). The normative beliefs and motivation to comply 
lead to the subjective norm. The “attitude towards accepting” and the subjective norm 
then help to explain the behavioural intention to accept the verification mark.  
 































Perceived ease of 
use 
Attitude toward 






5.2.4 Perceived ease of use 
 
The Perception of Ease of Use came from Davis’ (1989) Technology Acceptance 
Model. 
 
 In applying the concept of ease of use to the adoption of a “verification mark”, 
administration, both from the perspective of gaining the mark and using the mark were 
examined, including the medical implementation procedures. Literature described the 
implanation process as requiring a “local anesthesia, a tiny incision and perhaps a small 
adhesive bandage” ( http://www.lot49.com/2001/12/applied_digital_solutions_intr.html, 
accessed 17 Dec 2000). The process is not expected to be perceived as difficult for the 
accountants surveyed. 
 
The US Department of Transportation in their study of “Driver acceptance of 
Commercial Vehicle Operation (CVO) technology in the motor carrier environment” 
(Golob et al 2001) gave an insight into the administrative procedures likely in the 
adoption of the implantable chip. The article highlighted the importance to consider the 
administrative process in studying technology acceptance. Literature indicated the 
administration process associated with the implantable chip would not be difficult for 
the accountants surveyed. With respect to accessing the mark, literature indicates that 
accountants would find the process relatively easy. Peet (1999) indicated that “human-
computer interaction research continues to ease access to available data”. The ease of 
updating is considered by Phillips, G. (2004) who discussed the use of scanner over 
patients implanted with microchips to gain immediate access of medical information, 
driving the question on this issue. Heng (2004) highlighted authorisation as being one of 
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the important issues in considering a system of cashless medium of exchange which led 
to a question regarding the ease of separating these transactions via levels of 
authorisation. An open question was included in the survey to identify other potential 
factors not considered in the closed survey. This open question facilitates the research 
by providing an opportunity to gather qualitative information 
 
It was expected that the accountant might perceive that a verification mark would be 
easy to use which consequently would have a direct positive effect on the accountants’ 
attitude towards accepting a verification mark. The survey described the implementation 
procedure in the context of ease of use examination. An extract of each question under 
Section B: Ease of use is provided below.  
 
Question 8 deals with the ease of the implanting process, Question 9 deals with the ease 
of the administrative process whilst Question 10 deals with the ease of the accessing the 
“mark”. All of these aspects of the process would be a necessary part of using the 
microchip which may be considered difficult by some people. 
 
The concept of using a scanner linked to a global positioning satellite may be confusing 
to some people especially if it was linked to the purchase and sale of items, therefore, 
Question 11 deals with the ease of the updating the “mark”. Using a phone or computer 
to pay bills may be an expectation for many people therefore Question 12 deals with the 
difficulty of using a scanner to access the implanted chip. People may get confused 
about private and business transactions therefore question 13 deals with the ease of 
separating these transactions via levels of authorisation. Question 14 being the open 
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question was set up to collect the potential factors people presumed that make a “mark” 
difficult to use. 
Extract of questionnaire: Section B: Ease of use 
Your perceptions are being sought for the following questions on a scale from: 
SD = Strongly Disagree  to                                 SA = Strongly Agree 
Please tick the box that best fits with your reaction to each of the following statements. 
A verification mark or “mark” refers to a microchip that is implanted under a persons’ 
skin which is designed to stay there for the life of a person. A hand-held reader can 
access the information on the implanted microchip. 
 
8) If a verification mark consisted of a microchip implanted by an injection under the 
skin similar to a vaccination needle then the physical process of getting a “mark” sounds 
easy. 
          SD                                 SA 
                                              
 
9) If a simple one-page form requiring your details together with appropriate proof of 
your identity was all that was administratively required to receive a “mark” then the 
administrative process of getting a “mark” sounds easy.      
          SD                                 SA 
                                              
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10) If when a small scanner is waved over the “mark” information was accessible on the 
scanner screen via keyboard functions, it seems this would make it easy to retrieve 
information for example a monetary balance. (Consider in this answer and from now on 
that a password needs to be entered to access the “mark”). 
          SD                                 SA 
                                              
 
11) If the “mark” was used to update monetary records instantly when receipts and 
payments are made via a scanner, which is linked to a global positioning satellite, then it 
seems easy to buy and sell. 
          SD                                 SA 
                                              
 
12) If the procedure for a receipt or payment over the phone or computer was the same 
as what currently exists except a scanner is installed into the computers or phones to 
access the “mark” rather than keying in a card number then this seems easy. Note: the 
scanner would not distinguishably change the size or performance of the phones or 
computers and could be installed in a mobile phone. 
          SD                                 SA 
                                              
 
13) If companies adopted a policy of authorised “marks” implanted into certain 
personnel then company transactions would be easy to record.             
          SD                                 SA 
                                              
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14) Please identify in order of importance up to four factors that you think might make a 






5.2.5 Perceived usefulness  
 
The perception of usefulness also came from Davis’ (1989) Technology Acceptance 
Model. The verification mark might be useful in both a private and business context. 
The survey examined perceived usefulness as shown in the following extract of each 
question from Section C: Usefulness of the survey. 
 
Ling (2001) indicated that smart cards are being used as a substitute for cash. This 
research considered the potential of the “mark” replacing smart cards and the perceived 
usefulness of it is studied including accounting and taxation purposes. Murray (2002) 
acknowledged the achievement of real-time information update technology through 
Global Positioning Satellite. Question arose to examine the perceived usefulness of this 
advancement. There could be other potential factors not identified in the survey. An 
open question was included to provide an opportunity to gather qualitative information 
regarding the usefulness of the mark. 
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Question 15 deals with the usefulness of the “mark” in the area of accounting, and 
Question 16 deals with the usefulness of the “mark” in assisting the preparation of tax 
return as this would be an important function that affects the usefulness of the “mark”. 
One major advantage of the mark is the real-time update function that facilitates the use 
of the mark to replace other cashless mediums of exchanges which has physical risks. 
Question 17 deals with the usefulness of the “mark” in replacing other mediums of 
exchange in the form of cards, and Question 18 deals with the usefulness of the “mark” 
in providing real-time identification. On the other hand, Question 19 was set up as an 
open question to collect the potential issues people presumed that make a “mark” useful. 
 
 
Extract of questionnaire: Section C: Usefulness of the survey: 
Your perceptions are being sought for the following questions on a scale from: 
SD = Strongly Disagree  to                                 SA = Strongly Agree 
Please tick the box that best fits with your reaction to each of the following statements. 
 
15) If financial information stored via the “mark” could be downloaded into packages 
such as word or excel then this would make it useful in accounting for your personal 
transactions. 
          SD                                 SA 
                                              
 
6) A “mark” would be useful in collating information for your taxation return.     
          SD                                 SA 
                                              
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17) A “mark” would be useful in reducing the burden of having to carry a card and or 
losing a card? 
          SD                                 SA 
                                              
 
18) If the person’s nationality, gender, medical and other relevant details were 
accessible on a real time basis via the “mark” and a scanner then this would be useful. 
          SD                                 SA 
                                              
 
19) Please identify up to four issues in order of importance that you think would make 








The technology acceptance model included perceived ease of use and perceived 
usefulness in the context of an organisation adopting a new computer environment. It 
could be argued that the element of risk was seen to have been borne by the organisation 
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rather than the user. A perceived risk element was included in the developed model 
given the context of this permanent and personal issue.  
 
5.2.6.1 Potential for social control 
 
Power asymmetry between the individual and the government, individual and the bank, 
and individual and the private organisation are imperative risks concerned using the 
“mark” (Rabinow, 1982). There could be other potential factors not identified in the 
survey. An open question was included to providing an opportunity to gather qualitative 
information on potential control risks. 
 
The survey examined the potential implications of the “marks” used as social control as 
outlined in the extract of Part 1: Potential for social control. 
 
If information is consolidated in such a substantial way the information may be used by 
powerful organisations such as governments, banks, or other private organisations in a 
way that may control a person’s behaviour. Question 20-23 deals with the perceived 
government’s/bank’s/private organisation’s control risks carried by the “mark” as this 
would be an important factor that some people may perceive to be risky. Question 24 
being the open question was set up to collect the potential control risk factor that people 
maybe concerned about using the mark. 
 
Extract of questionnaire: Part 1: Potential for social control. 
20) A “mark” would increase the control  
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• The government have over my life in that they would be able to track all of my 
receipts and expenditures. 
          SD                                 SA 
                                              
 
21) 
• The government have over my life in that it would be able to track all of my 
affiliations and activities via my receipts and expenditures.  
          SD                                 SA 
                                              
 
22) 
• The banks have over my life. 
          SD                                 SA 




• Other private organizations have over my life.      
          SD                                 SA 
                                              
 
24) List in descending order up to four of your highest concerns relating to control over 








As discussed in the literature review, privacy is one of the major issues arising from the 
use of the “mark” that most people maybe concerned about as a result of increased 
information available to them via the adoption of the “mark”. Question 25-26 deals with 
the mitigation of privacy risks carried by the “mark” through legislation and constitution 
as this would be an important factors that affects people’s risk perception an issue raised 
by Shaw (2005). Question 27 then examines people’s perception or belief in whether the 
companies would act ethically and responsibly in dealing with privacy issues. The 





Extract of questionnaire: Part 2: Privacy. 
 
25) Carefully drafted changes to legislation designed to protect my privacy would 
indeed protect my privacy if the “mark” system were adopted. 
          SD                                 SA 
                                              
 
26) Carefully drafted changes to the constitution designed to protect my privacy would 
indeed protect my privacy if the “mark” system were adopted. 
          SD                                 SA 
                                              
 
27) I perceive companies will deal responsibly with privacy issues that would arise as a 
result of increased information available to them via the adoption of the “mark”. 
          SD                                 SA 
                                              
 
5.2.6.3 Abuse  
 
The survey examines risks which were considered by various authors including Moor 
(2002) who highlighted the importance to counter identity fraud and Barclay (2004) who 
addressed the issue of possible theft that might resulted from using the “mark”. 
Perception on whether the implantable chip would help reduce the fraud or result in 
more fraud may affect the acceptance of the “mark”. 
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 The survey also considers the significance of what Van den Poel et al (1999) refers to 
as “risk relievers” (p. 254) and Roselius (1971) refers to as “risk reduction methods” (p. 
56). Neiger (2002) examined the technology protection available against the abuse, 
raising the question of perception on technology controls protection.   
 
Question 28 deals with the perceived risks of information abuse by companies as the 
potential risk of abuse resulting from increased information or power brought about by 
the “mark” is another important aspect of the risks. Question 29-30 considers risk of 
abuse in term of fraud and theft as this would be an important issue that affects the 
acceptance of the “mark”. Question 31 deals with technology control that helps prevent 
abuse as this would be an important issue that affects the perceived abuse risk of the 
“mark”. The following is an extract of Part 3: Abuse of survey. 
 
Extract of questionnaire: Part 3: Abuse of survey. 
28) I perceive companies will not abuse increased information or power brought about 
by the “mark”.    
          SD                                 SA 
                                              
 
29) If a “mark” eventually eliminated the need for cash, cheques, credit cards and any 
other form of money outside barter then I perceive this would reduce the likelihood of  
• fraud.               
          SD                                 SA 




• theft.              
          SD                                 SA 
                                              
 
 
31) I perceive technology controls such as encryption software are capable of protecting 
me from abuse if the “mark” was adopted.   
          SD                                 SA 
                                              
 
5.2.6.4 System corruption  
 
The survey examines system corruption risks which were considered by various authors 
including Wenske (2003) who looked at risks in an online environment. The seriousness 
of a system collapse or virus could substantially affect the risk perception and thus the 
acceptance of the “mark”. Question 32-33 deals with the perceived effects of a system 
corruption to be temporary/permanent. The following is an extract of Part 4: System 
corruption from survey. 
 
Extract of questionnaire: Part 4: System corruption from survey. 
 
32) I perceive a system collapse or virus 
• could temporarily affect the official record of my financial position. 
          SD                                 SA 
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                                              
 
33) 
• could permanently affect the official record of my financial position. 
          SD                                 SA 
                                              
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5.2.6.5 Other risks 
 
Other risks have been considered informed by literature. Barclay (2004) addressed the 
issue of a potential foreign body reaction due to the implanting of a chip which was 
predicted to be less than 2 %. Lane (2003) also raised a concern about the long-term 
health effects of such devices transmitting signals from inside a person’s body. The 
survey examines other risks in a closed question relating to health and provides the 
opportunity for respondents to contribute generally about other risks in an open 
question. The following is an extract of Part 5: Other risks from the survey. 
 
Many people maybe concerned about the health and safety issue caused by chips 
implanted into the human body. Question 34 deals with the perceived risks in term of 
health and safety issues as this would be an important issue that affects the acceptance 
of the “mark”. Question 35 was set up as the open question to collect potential risk 
factors of using the mark that are not considered in the closed questions. 
 
Extract of questionnaire: Part 5: Other risks from the survey 
 
34) I perceive a “mark” could affect my health or create a safety issue given that it 
would be implanted in my wrist or forehead. 
          SD                                 SA 
                                              
 
35) Identify up to four other risks that you would associate with a “mark”. List in 






5.2.7 Normative beliefs and motivation to comply  
 
The survey explored the normative beliefs of the respondents. Michael et al (2005) 
indicated that religious advocates are concerned about the use of the information 
gathered and the functionality of the technology. A question (36) was asked to identify 
the affects influences of a religious nature has on the acceptance decision. Barclay 
(2004) discussed the community’s resistance against the technology, driving the 
question about the affect the community’s perception had on the acceptance decision 
resulting in Question 37. Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) included family members as one of 
the important groups who have influence over one’s attitude. Respondee’s perceptions 
about wether family members’ attitudes towards the “mark” would be influential was 
asked (38). These questions were asked as representative of the most influential groups 
on a person’s beliefs and behaviour. Question 39 being the open question was set up to 
identify the four most perceived influential groups of people. Question 40-42 
investigates the perception of those influential groups on a “mark” becoming easy to use 
(Q40), useful (Q41), and risky (Q42). The following is an extract of Part E: Normative 
beliefs from the survey. 
 
Extract of questionnaire: Part E: Normative beliefs 
 
Your perceptions are being sought for the following questions on a scale from: 
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SD = Strongly Disagree  to                                 SA = Strongly Agree 
Please tick the box that best fits with your reaction to each of the following statements. 
36) A “mark” offends my religious beliefs.  
          SD                                 SA 
                                              
 
37) A “mark” conflicts with the views of my most influential community group. 
          SD                                 SA 




38) A “mark” conflicts with the views of my family. 
          SD                                 SA 
                                              
 
39) Identify four people or groups that you hold as important in your life in terms of the 
influence their opinions have on you, for example (religious institution, spouse, parents, 







40) The person, people or groups that I hold as important to me would perceive that a 
“mark” was 
• easy to use. 
          SD                                 SA 
                                              
41) 
• useful.             
          SD                                 SA 
                                              
42) 
• risky.                 
          SD                                 SA 
                                              
5.2.8 Pre-testing  
 
Roberts (1999 p.73) stated that “criticisms of the survey method relating to the quality 
of data can be countered by the careful development of the instruments and 
questionnaires, by appropriate administration techniques”. To this end the survey has 
been developed to collect data that provide both reliable and valid measures of the 
constructs. Whilst tests of consistency are used to identify the intentional falsification, 
pre-testing is done to minimize the bias resulted from unintentional mistake such as 
misunderstanding of the terms used in questionnaire. 
 
A pre-testing was undertaken on 32 experienced and qualified professionals from three 
vocational groups (Young 2004). Eleven professionally qualified accountants were 
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selected, along with ten professionals from the information technology industry, who 
had the required experience and qualifications, and finally, eleven professionals with 
legal qualifications and work experience in the legal area. The professionals filled in all 
parts of the questionnaire with no evidence or communication of difficulty, which 
confirmed the effectiveness of the questionnaire and provided confidence on validity 
and overall survey quality.  
 
The test of consistency of the questionnaire was analysed in the pre-test responses. For 
example, responses from the Likert style questions were tested to determine that 
Strongly Agreed labels and Strongly Disagree labels that communicated the same issue 
were filled in consistently by the respondents. The pre-testing supported the 
relationships established in the test of consistency and no inconsistencies were found.  
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5.3 Administration of the survey 
 
The details of each accountant selected were transferred piece by piece into a Microsoft 
Office Excel file after attempts to download the data proved futile. A mail merge 
labelled the envelopes and an introductory letter, complete with appropriate protocol, 
the survey and a reply paid envelope were sent by post to all selected participants. 
 
5.3.1 Survey response rate 
 
The 523 surveys were sent on 1 December 2003. One Victorian practice was 
subsequently found to have closed leaving a total population of 522. There were 101 
responses, a percentage of 19.35%. A second survey was sent on 23 February 2004 with 
an additional 66 replies a percentage of 12.65% accumulating to 167 replies, a 
percentage of 32%. Four of the replies were invalid and were removed as they ticked 
box 4 for question one, about professional affiliation, which meant they were not CPAs 
or CAs which was part of the requirements of the survey. 22 responses were not used in 
this part of the analysis as they failed to complete the closed part of the questionnaire. 
The open part of the questions was contributed to by these participants. This left 141 
complete responses a percentage of 27%. If a participant did not fill in one or more 
closed question they were removed from the analysis in order to provide a very strict 
interpretation. A less rigorous approach could have led to a higher response rate. 15 
participants had dual affiliations. Non responses bias was considered by modelling the 
early response and the late responses and comparing them with the model that included 
all of the responses. The detailed analysis has been included later in this research.  
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Table 5.7 Responses break down 
Professional Body State/territory First Response Second response Total response 
ICAA NSW 12 –1=11        
(2 CPA and 
ICAA) 
7-3= 4 19-4=15 
ICAA Tasmania 0 0 0 
ICAA Northern Territory 1 0 1 
ICAA South Australia 3 1 4 
ICAA ACT 2 
(2 CPA and 
ICAA) 
0 2 
ICAA WA 2-1=1 
(2 CPA and 
ICAA) 
1 3-1=2 
ICAA Queensland 10-1=9 
(3 CPA and 
ICAA) 
2 12-1=11 
ICAA Victoria 6 –2 = 4 
(1 CPA and 
ICAA) 
6 12-2=10 
CPA Australia NSW 25-2=23 
(4 CPA and 
ICAA) 
11-2=9 36-4=32 
CPA Australia Tasmania 0 3-1=2 3-1=2 
CPA Australia Northern Territory 3 1 4 
CPA Australia South Australia 2 3 5 
CPA Australia ACT 1 2 3 
CPA Australia WA 1 4 5 
CPA Australia Queensland 11-2=9 7-1=6 18-3=15 
CPA Australia Victoria 
 
22-3=19  




(1 with no position 
detail) 
  101-12=89 66-10=56 167-22=145 
Non professionals    4 
    141 




Statistical Package for Social Sciences version 14.0 (SPSS) was used to analyse the 
data. No response was found to have been in conflict with the communication of another 
response relating to the same issue. Other evidence also supported the fact that the 
survey was done in good faith, for instance, many took the time to fill in the open 
questions and the majority completed the survey in totality. 
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Chapter Six: Reporting and analysis of responses 
 
The responses from the forty nine questions asked in the questionnaire were analysed 
and the outcomes are reported in this chapter. This chapter reported the analysis of the 
responses with the acceptance of the “mark”, followed by the descriptive results. The 
responses were then analysed based on each of the four independent variables. 
Subsequently, the availability of technology was discussed and an analysis was 
undertaken on the validity of the research. Further, early and late response bias was 
examined and the hypotheses were tested. Finally, the chapter tested the technology 
acceptance model and examined the responses of open questions. Some charts, tables 
and graphs were provided in this chapter along with the analysis, not all of them are 
included in the content. Reference to Appendices is sometimes necessary. 
 
6.1 Acceptance of the “mark”  
 
The Graph 6.1  reflects that the dependent variable (acceptance of the mark if it “was a 
major means of transacting”) was strongly accepted by 1% of the valid responses, 
accepted by 11% of the valid responses, rejected by 16% of the of the valid responses 
and strongly rejected by 49% of the valid responses. The number of valid responses was 
141 (n = 141), the mean was 2 with a standard deviation of 1.14. 
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Graph 6.1 Acceptance if “mark” was a major means of transacting 
 


















6.1.1   Acceptance of the “mark” if it was compulsory 
 
Table 6.1 details the perception of the respondents regarding the acceptance of the 
“mark” if it was compulsory. 
 
Table 6.1 The percentage of acceptance if it was compulsory  
 
Acceptance if it was compulsory 
% 
Percent 
Strongly Reject   68.1 
Reject   12.1 
Neutral   11.3 
Accept     6.4 




6.1.2    Acceptance of the “mark” by groups 
 
The perception of the respondents regarding the acceptance of the “mark” by groups 
who were important to them (refer to Appendix 1.41), was that no respondents 
perceived that groups who were important to them would strongly accept the “mark”. 
48% of the respondents perceived that the groups who are important to them would 
strongly reject the “mark”, 5% of the respondents perceived that the groups who were 
important to them would accept the “mark’ and 0% of the respondents perceived that the 
groups who were important to them would strongly accept the “mark”. The result is in 
line with findings in 6.1 and 6.1.1. 
 
6.2 Descriptive results 
 
6.2.1 Professional membership and gender of respondents 
 
Of the valid respondents (refer to Appendix 1.1) , 27% were members of the ICAA, 
62% were members of CPA Australia and 11% were members of both bodies. 
Reconstructed member number details extracted from the CPA annual report (2000) and 
reported earlier in this research showed a ratio of 28% being members of the ICAA and 
72% being members of CPA Australia. The similarity between the membership 
proportions of the respondees and the actual proportions of ICAA members to CPA 
members was to be expected as surveys were sent out in proportion to membership 
demographic. The number of respondents holding joint membership was surprising 
(around 11 %) and mainly came from the members initially identified as CPA members. 
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18.2% of the respondents were female which differs from the member demographics 
documented earlier in this research showing CPA members had a ratio of 49% females 
to 51% male in 2000. It was also noted earlier that the ICAA did not report this style of 
member detail. There were a greater number of males who were CPA members who 
responded to the survey. In preliminary tests to establish the importance of the various 
variables, a multinomial logit was run with “acceptance if the mark was a major means 
of transacting” as the dependent variable, with independent variables which included  
the elements of the model along with gender, age, profession, years in the profession, 
salary, position and field of employment. The only dependent variables that were 
significant when the multinomial logit was run were the elements of the model and this 
confirms the ‘models’ contribution. All of the other variables including gender were not 
significant. Therefore while there are some differences between the gender in the sample 
and the population, the difference does not affect the analysis because the gender 
variable is not significant.  
 
6.2.2 Age of respondents 
 
The following graph (Graph 6.2) is a reflection of the fact that 5% of the respondents 
were aged between 20 and 29, 18% were aged between 30 and 39, 31% were aged 
between 40 and 49, 36% were aged between 50 and 59 and 10% were aged above 60. 
This description shows that the respondents were weighted towards the 40 to 59 age 
groups. The number of valid responses was 141; the mean was 3.3 with a standard 
deviation of 1.03 implying that most responses came from experienced people. Member 
demographics reported earlier showed 18% of CPA Australia members were less than 
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30 years of age, 30% were between 30 and 39, 23% were between 40 and 49, 16% were 
between 50 and 59, 12% were over 60 years of age and 1% of member ages were 
unknown. Greater proportions of the respondents were aged from 50 to 59 years 
compared to the member demographics, arguably because of the survey focus on 
accounting practice owners. Younger members were less represented in the survey and it 
is argued that this is for the same reason. 
 











Aged between 20 and 29 to Over 60
Percentage
Aged between 20 and 29
Aged between 30 and 39
Aged between 40 and 49




6.2.3 Job position of respondents 
 
66% of the respondents were partners, 5% were managers, 6% were seniors, 22% were 
assistants and 1% were in the “other” category. It can be seen the respondents were 
weighted towards being in more senior roles. 
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6.2.4 Salary of respondents 
 








Over $100,000 42 
Total 100 
 
It can be seen in Table 6.2, that the majority of the respondents were in the higher salary 
range. A person that receives a high salary often has proven themselves as having worth 
in their field of endeavour in this case financial services. That the majority of 
respondents to the survey had high salary could provide evidence that their input is 
valuable to research. One indicator of value is that the public are prepared to pay a high 
price for their input which has translated into a high salary for the professional. 
 
6.2.5 Field of work of respondents 
 
Table 6.3 shows the field of work undertaken by the respondents. 
 
Table 6.3 Field of work of the respondents 
 
 
Field of work 
% 
Percent 
Auditing  18 
External reporting    2 
Public sector    7 
Finance    1 
Information management and technology    1 
Small business  37 
Strategic business management    6 
Superannuation    7 
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Taxation insolvency and reconstruction  14 
Financial planning    1 
Other    6 
Total 100 
 
It can be seen that the respondents have a wide variety of expertise within the 
accounting fields amongst them. 
 
6.2.6  Numbers of years in the profession of the respondents 
 
4% of the respondents had 5 or less years in the profession, 13% of the respondents had 
6 to 10 years in the profession, 83% of the respondents had over 10 years in the 
profession. It can be seen that the contributions were weighted to more experienced 
accountants. 
 
6.2.7  Descriptive information summary 
 
The demographic information discussed in section 6.2.6 has shown that a large 
proportion of the respondents were experienced seniors and people who are likely to be 
decision and policy makers. The sample population fulfils the financial literacy test 
established in this research and is validated by the representativeness of the responses.   
 
6.3 Ease of use 
 
The respondents’ contributions relating to ease of use are reflected below, first, as a 
whole (Graph 6.3) and second in Table 6.4 as individual components. 
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Graph 6.3 The respondent’s contributions regarding ease of use  


















The graph shows a mean and skewness weighted towards the easy to use label. This is 
supported by Table 6.4. 
 
Table 6.4 Ease questions’ characteristics 
 













Ease 0.607 0.422 1.43838863 -0.739 0.212 -3.48585 
 
 
Overall, the responses to the “ease of use” questions were weighted towards the easy 
end as shown in Table 6.4. The negative skewness represents a weighting towards the 
easy side of responses (higher scores). There is some positive kurtosis in the ease of use 
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data indicating a more peaked distribution near the mean than normal data. This 
indicates responses tended to be around the indeterminate to easy label. The peak was 
pronounced at the easy label.  
 
6.3.1 Ease of physical registration of the “mark” 
 
The following bar graph (Graph 6.4)  is a reflection of the fact that the perception of the 
respondents regarding the ease of the physical registration process were that 8% 
perceived it was very hard, 4% perceived it was hard, 37% perceived it was easy and 
28% perceived the process was very easy. The number of valid responses was 141, the 
mean was 3.7 with a standard deviation of 1.15. It can be seen that the majority of the 
respondents felt that the physical side of registering the “mark” is either easy or very 
easy. 
 
Graph 6.4 Ease of physically registering the “mark” 























6.3.2 Ease of administratively registering the “mark” 
 
Table 6.5 Easy administration registration percentage  
 
 
Easy administration registration 
% 
Percent 




Very Easy 26 
Total 100 
 
It can be seen in Table 6.5 that the majority of the respondents (46% and 26%) felt that 
the administration side of registering the “mark” is either easy or very easy. 
 
6.3.3 Ease of access to information using the “mark” 
 
The perceptions of the respondents regarding the ease of access to information using the 
“mark” (refer to Appendix 1.10) were that 5% perceived it was very hard, 4% perceived 
it was hard, 48% perceived it was easy and 21% perceived the process was very easy to 
access information using the “mark”.  
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6.3.4 Ease of using the “mark” to buy and sell 
 
The perception of the respondents regarding the ease of using the “mark” to buy and sell 
(refer to Appendix 1.11) was that 8% perceived the process was very hard, 9% 
perceived the process was hard, 36% perceived the process was easy and 18%  
perceived the process was very easy. 
 
6.3.5 Ease of using the “mark” for payment over the phone or 
computer 
 
The following bar graph (Graph 6.5) is a reflection that 6% of respondents, perceived 
making payments using the “mark” over the phone or on the computer was very hard, 
8% perceived it would be hard, 38% perceived it was easy and 19% of the respondents 
perceived it would be very easy. The number of valid responses was 141, mean was 3.6 
with a standard deviation of 1.06. 
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Graph 6.5 Ease of using the “mark” for payments over the phone or computer 
Ease of using the “mark” for payments over the phone 


















6.3.6 Ease of using the “mark” to create company records  
 
The perceptions of the respondents regarding the ease of using the “mark” to create 
company records (refer to Appendix 1.13) were that 9% perceived it would be very 
hard, 12% perceived it would be hard, 40% perceived it would be easy and 14% felt it 




The issues stated relating to the usefulness of the “mark” are reflected below first as a 
whole in Graph 6.6 and Table 6.6 then as individual components. 
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Graph 6.6 Usefulness of using “mark” – whole  













Std. Dev. = 4.04305
N = 135
 
The graph shows a mean and skewness weighted towards the useful label. This is 
supported by Table 6.6. 
 
Table 6.6 Usefulness questions’ characteristics  
 
 













Useful -0.721 0.42 -1.7166667 -0.502 0.212 -2.36792 
 
Overall, the responses to the “usefulness” questions were weighted towards the useful 
end as shown in Table 6.6. The negative skewness represents a weighting towards the 
useful side of responses (high scores). There is some negative kurtosis in the usefulness 
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data indicating a flatter distribution near the mean than normal data. This indicates 
responses tended to be around the indeterminate to useful label.  
 
 
6.4.1 Usefulness of packages using the information created by the 
“mark”   
 
Graph 6.7 reflects the perception of the respondents regarding the perceived usefulness 
of packages using the information created by the “mark”. The results were that 7% of 
the respondents perceived that the packages would be useless, 16% perceived they 
would not be useful, 32% perceived that would be useful and 17% of the respondents 
perceived that the packages would be very useful. The number of valid responses was 
141, mean was 3.4 with a standard deviation of 1.15. 
 
Graph 6.7 Usefulness of packages using the information created by the “mark” 
Usefulness of packages using the information 




















6.4.2 Usefulness of taxation information created by the “mark”   
 
Table 6.7 details the perception of the respondents regarding the usefulness of taxation 
information created by the “mark”. The majority of respondents (28%) perceived the use 
of the “mark” would provide useful taxation information and 29% of respondents took a 
neutral position.  
 
Table 6.7 The percentage of useful taxation information  
 
 
Useful taxation information 
% 
Percent 
Useless   12 
Not Useful  16 
Neutral  29 
Useful  28 
Very Useful  15 
Total 100 
 
6.4.3 Usefulness of not needing cards because of the “mark”   
 
The perception of the respondents regarding the usefulness of not needing cards because 
of the “mark” (refer to Appendix 1.16) were that 10%  of the respondents perceived it 
would be useless, 9% perceived it would not be useful, 30% perceived it would be 
useful and 31% perceived it would be very useful. 
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6.4.4 Usefulness of not having to carry medical and other information 
because of the “mark”   
 
Having an implantable chip has the potential to store other information including 
medical information.  The perception of the respondents regarding the usefulness of not 
having to carry medical and other information on the “mark” (refer to Appendix 1.17) 
were that 9% of the respondents perceived that it would be useless, 9% perceived it 
would not be useful, 37% perceived it would be useful and 24% perceived it would be 
very useful. 
 
6.5 Risk of the “mark” 
 
The contributions relating to the risks of the “mark” are reflected below, first as a whole 






Graph 6.8 Risk questions’ characteristics 
 












Std. Dev. = 8.65972
N = 135
 
Graph 6.8 shows a mean and skewness weighted towards the risky label. This is 
supported by Table 6.7. 
 
Table 6.8 Risk questions’ characteristics 
 
The characteristics for the risk questions are identified below. 
 













Risk -0.435 0.428 -1.0163551 -0.39 0.216 -1.80556 
 
Overall, the responses to the “risk” questions were weighted towards the risky end as 
shown in Table 6.8. The negative skewness represents a weighting towards the risky 
side of responses (higher scores). There is some negative kurtosis in the risky data 
indicating a flatter distribution near the mean than normal data. Responses tended to be 
around the indeterminate to risky and very risky labels.    
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6.5.1 Risk of social control due to the “mark”   
 
Graph 6.9 reflects the perception of the respondents regarding the perceived risk of 
social control due to the “mark”. The results showed that 1% of the respondent felt that 
social control would highly decrease, 5% felt it would decrease, 23% felt it would 
increase and 65% felt it would highly increase. The number of valid responses was 141, 
the scale mean was 4.5 with a standard deviation of 0.91. 
 
Graph 6.9 Risk of social control due to the “mark” 


















6.5.2 Risk of government control due to the “mark”   
 
Table 6.9 details the perception of the respondents regarding the risk of government 
control via affiliations due to the “mark”. The results showed that 1% of the respondent 
perceived the risk would highly decrease, 5% perceived it would decrease, 18% felt it 
would increase and 67% felt it would highly increase. 
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Table 6.9 Risk of government control due to the “mark”   
 
 
Risk of government social control via affiliations due 
to the “mark” 
% 
Percent 
Highly decreased  1 
Decreased  5 
Neutral 9 
Increased 18 
Highly increased  67 
Total 100 
 
6.5.3 Risk of bank control due to the “mark”   
 
The perception of the respondents regarding the risk of bank control due to the “mark” 
(refer to Appendix 1.20) were that 2% of the respondents felt bank control would be 
highly decreased, 9% of the respondents felt bank control would be decreased, 24% felt 
bank control would be increased and 54% felt bank control would be highly increased. 
 
6.5.4 Risk of private organisation control due to the “mark”   
 
Table 6.10 details the perception of the respondents regarding the risk of private 
organisation control due to the “mark”. The results showed that 3% of the respondent 
felt that the risk would highly decrease, 8% felt it would decrease, 21% felt it would 











Table 6.10 Risk of private organisation control due to the “mark”   
 
 
Risk of private organisation control 
% 
Percent 
Highly decreased  3 
Decreased  8 
Neutral 13 
Increased 21 
Highly increased  55 
Total 100 
 
6.5.5 Legislative protection against risks that may occur because of 
the “mark”  
 
Graph 6.10 reflects the perception of the respondents regarding the perceived amount of 
risk protection that legislation would afford against any risks that would be caused by 
having the implanted chip. The results showed that 21% of respondents perceived risk 
protection would be highly decreased, 4% of the respondents perceived it would be 
decreased, 21% of the respondents perceived it would be increased and 40% perceived 
risk protection would be highly increased. The number of valid responses was 141, the 










Graph 6.10 Risk protection afforded by legislation from affects of the “mark” 





















6.5.6 Constitutional protection against risks that may occur because 
of the “mark”  
 
The perception of the respondents regarding the risk protection the constitution would 
afford against any risks that occurred due to the implanting of the chip (refer to 
Appendix 1.23) were that 14% of the respondents felt risk protection would be highly 
decreased, 6% felt risk protection would be decreased, 21% felt risk protection would be 




6.5.7 Risk of privacy loss due to companies receiving additional 
information because of the “mark”   
 
Table 6.11 details the perception of the respondents regarding the risk of lost privacy 
due to companies receiving additional information because of the “mark”. The results 
showed that 3% of the respondent felt that the risk of privacy from companies would 
highly decrease, 8% felt it would decrease, 23% felt it would increase and 54% felt it 
would highly increase. 
 
Table 6.11 The percentage of risk of privacy from companies  
 
 
Risk of privacy from companies 
% 
Percent 
Highly decreased    3 
Decreased    8 
Neutral 12 
Increased 23 
Highly increased  54 
Total 100 
 
6.5.8 Risk of abuse from companies due to the “mark”  
 
The perception of the respondents regarding the risk of abuse from companies due to the 
“mark” (refer to Appendix 1.25) were that 4% of the respondents perceived that the risk 
of abuse would be highly decreased, 6% of the respondents felt risk of abuse would be 
decreased, 29% felt the risk of abuse would be increased and 54% felt the risks would 
be highly increased. 
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6.5.9 Risk of fraud reduced due to having the “mark”  
 
Graph 6.11 below identifies the perception of the respondents regarding the risk of fraud 
being reduced by having the implanted chip. The results showed that 4% of respondents 
perceived the risk of fraud would be highly increased, 18% of the respondents perceived 
the risk of fraud would be increased, 27% of the respondents perceived the risk of fraud 
would be reduced and 31% perceived the risk of fraud would be highly reduced. The 
number of valid responses was 141, the mean was 3.6 with a standard deviation of 1.22. 
 
Graph 6.11 Risk of fraud reduced because of the “mark” 
























6.5.10 Risk of theft reduced because of the “mark”  
 
The perception of the respondents regarding the risk of theft reduction because of the 
“mark” (refer to Appendix 1.27) were that 7% of the respondents perceived that theft 
would be highly increased, 16% of respondents felt theft would be increased, 23% 
perceived theft would be reduced and 31% of the respondents perceived theft would be 
highly reduced. 
 
6.5.11 Risk of the “mark” reduced because of software encryption 
 
The perception of the respondents regarding whether risks of having the “mark” would 
be reduced by software encryption (refer to Appendix 1.28) were that 1% of respondents 
felt the risks would be highly increased, 11% felt the risks would be increased, 26% of 
the respondents would be reduced and 43% of the respondents felt it would be highly 
reduced. 
 
6.5.12 Risk of temporary corruption because of the “mark”   
 
Table 6.12 details the perception of the respondents regarding the risks of temporary 








Risks of temporary corruption % Percent 
Very low     5     
Low     4 
Neutral     6 
High   40 
Very High   45 
Total 100 
 
6.5.13 Risk of permanent corruption because of the “mark” 
 
The perceptions of the respondents regarding the risk of permanent corruption of the 
information gathered by the “mark’ were that 5% of the respondents felt strongly that 
the risk of permanent corruption was very low with a “mark”, 5% of respondents felt 
that the risk was low, 25% of the respondents felt that the risk was high and 40% of the 
respondents felt that the risk was very high. 
 
6.5.14 Risk of health issues because of the “mark” 
 
The perceptions of the respondents regarding the risk of health issues (refer to Appendix 
1.31) were that 6% of respondents felt that it was very unlikely the “mark” would 
adversely affect health, 16% of the respondents felt it was unlikely that the “mark” 
would adversely affect health, 23% of respondents felt it was likely that the “mark” 




6.6 Subjective norm 
 
The views expressed relating to the subjective norm relating to the “mark” are reflected 
below; first as a whole in Graph 6.12 and Table 6.12 then as individual components. 
 
Graph 6.12 Subjective Norm Frequency  













Std. Dev. = 4.53965
N = 135
 
Graph 6.12 shows a mean and skewness weighted towards a lack of support from those 
important to the respondents. This is supported by Table 6.12. 
 
Table 6.13 Subjective norm questions’ characteristics 
 
 










Statistic or  
Standard 
error 












Overall, the responses to the subjective norm questions were weighted towards the lack 
of support end as shown in table 6.13. The positive skewness represents a weighting 
towards the lack of support side of responses (high scores). There is some negative 
kurtosis in the subjective norm data indicating a flatter distribution near the mean than 
normal data. Responses tended to be away from the strongly support label.   
 
6.6.1 Perception regarding the risk of the “mark” offending 
respondents’ religious beliefs 
 
Graph 6.13 details the perception of the respondents regarding the risk of offending their 
religious beliefs. 13% of respondents very strongly believed the “mark” did not offend 
their religious beliefs, 7% believed the “mark” did not offend their religious beliefs, 
21% strongly believed the “mark” did offend their religious beliefs and 32% very 
strongly believed the “mark” did offend their religious beliefs. The number of valid 
responses was 141, the mean was 3.5 with a standard deviation of 1.35. 
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Graph 6.13 Risk that “mark” offends religious beliefs 
 



















6.6.2 Risk of the “mark” offending community groups 
 
Table 6.14 details the perception of the respondents regarding the risks of offending 
community groups. The results showed that 17% of the respondents felt it is not risky 
that the “mark” would offend community groups, 11% felt it is not very risky, 22% felt 
it is risky and 16% felt it is very risky. 
 
Table 6.14 The percentage for risks of offending community groups  
 
 
Risks of offending community groups 
% 
Percent 
Not risky 17 
Not Very Risky 11 
Neutral 34 
Risky 22 
Very Risky 16 




6.6.3 Perception regarding the risk of the “mark” offending 
respondents’ family views 
 
Graph 6.14 details the perception of the respondents regarding the risk of offending their 
family views. 31% very strongly believed the “mark” did not offend their family views, 
7% strongly believed the “mark” did not offend their family views, 18% strongly 
believed the “mark” did offend their family views and 14% very strongly believed the 
“mark” offended their family views. The number of valid responses was 141, the mean 
was 2.8 with a standard deviation of 1.41. 
 
Graph 6.14 Risks of “mark” offending family views 



















6.7 Availability of technology 
 
Questions were asked to determine whether the respondents believed the technology 
detailed in the survey was currently available. The questions were asked in several 
stages and are referred to in the following paragraphs. 
 
6.7.1 Availability of the implantable chip (mark) technology 
 
Questions were asked to determine whether the respondents believed the implantable 
chip technology detailed in the survey were currently available. Graph 6.15 details the 
perception of the respondents. The results showed 19% of the respondents very strongly 
believed the implantable chip technology was not available, 21% of the respondents 
strongly believed the implantable chip technology was not available, 21% strongly 
believed the implantable chip technology was available and 13% very strongly believed 
the implantable chip technology was available. The number of valid responses was 141; 
the mean was 2.9 with a standard deviation of 1.30. 
























6.7.2 Availability of technology surrounding the “mark” 
 
Table 6.15 details the perception of the respondents regarding whether the technology 
surrounding the implantable chip (mark) allowing a cashless monetary system is 
available. The results showed that 12% of the respondent perceived that the other 
technology would not be available, 14% perceived it would not be very available, 34% 
perceived it would be available and 17% perceived it would be very available. 
 
Table 6.15 The percent of the other technology is available  
The other technology is available 
% 
Percent 
Not Available 12 
Not Very Available 14 
Neutral 23 
Available 34 




6.7.3 Availability of combined technology  
 
The perception of the respondents regarding whether the combined “mark” technology 
(refer to Appendix 1.40) was available were that 12% very strongly believed the 
technology was not available, 22% strongly believed the technology was not available, 
22% strongly believed the technology was available and 14% strongly believed the 




6.8 Validity of research 
 
The survey questionnaire using a 5-point Likert scale was designed to solicit views on 
the various elements of the model. How well these questions that were grouped together 
and actually load as a factor, is important to determine whether it is reasonable to add 
the questions into one variable. 
 
6.8.1 Cronbach’s alpha 
 
To test reliability, Cronbach’s alpha was used, which is “a measure of internal reliability 
used in the evaluation of Likert scales” (de Vaus 2002 p.358). The results are displayed 
in Table 6.16. This Table shows that perceived ease of use had six items (Questions 8, 
9, 10, 11, 12, 13) loaded as a factor with an alpha of 0.9140, which is well above the 
deemed acceptability rating of 0.7 (de Vaus 2002 p.184). Perceived usefulness had four 
items (Questions 15, 16, 17, 18) loaded as a factor with an alpha of 0.8670, which is 
well above the deemed acceptability rating. Perceived risk had fourteen items 
(Questions 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34) loaded as a factor with 
an alpha of 0.8151which is well above the deemed acceptability. Perceived subjective 
norm had five (Questions 36, 37, 38, 42, 46) loaded as a factor with an alpha of 0.8058 
which is well above the deemed acceptability rating. 
 
 199 
Table 6.16 Cronbach’s alpha for respondents’ contribution  
 Elements Items Alpha 
Perceived ease of use Six (Questions 8, 9, 10, 11, 
12, 13) 
0.9140 
Perceived usefulness Four (Questions 15, 16, 17, 
18) 
0.8670 
Perceived risk Fourteen (Questions 20, 21, 
22, 23, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 
30, 31, 32, 33, 34.) 
0.8151 




The results showed support for using the grouped questions as a scale variable with all 
elements of the model achieving an alpha well above the deemed acceptability rating of 




It is also important to determine whether multi-colinearity exists, that is, if the 
explanatory variables are related to one another. If they are, then the factors can be 
confused making it impossible to get their independent effect on the dependent variable. 
The results are displayed in Table 6.17. 
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Table 6.17 Tolerance and VIF 
Constant Tolerance VIF 
EASE .498 2.008 
RISK .669 1.494 
SNI .695 1.439 
USE .481 2.078 
 
It can be seen that the “Tolerance” for each element of the model is greater than 0.1 
showing that there is not a high degree of interrelationship between the factors 
supporting the importance of each group for the prediction of acceptance (Systat 1999 p. 
380). The VIF statistic also shows that there is not a high degree of interrelationship 
between the factors supporting the importance of each group for the prediction of 
acceptance differently as it is less than 10. The VIF is the inverse of the tolerance. 
 
6.8.3 Factor analysis 
A factor analysis was undertaken to check if the items loaded on to the same variables 
as the model. A rotated component matrix was used as the relationships of the 
acceptance decision can be more clearly seen. The results are displayed in Table 6.18 




 Rotated Component Matrix(a) 
 
  Component 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8 Easy physical registration 
.658            
9 Easy administration registration 
.806             
10 Easy access 
.848             
11 East to buy and sell 
.869             
12 Easy payment over phone or 
computer .844             
13 Easy company records 
.821             
16 Useful taxation information .640       -.401     
15 Useful packages 
.766             
17 Useful not having cards 
.648            
18 Useful having medical 
information .635             
20 Risk of social control 
  .873           
21 Risk of government control   .877           
22 Risk of bank control 
  .831           
23 Risk of private organization 
control   .848           
25 Risk protection from legislation 
          .910   
26 Risk protection from the 
constitution           .874   
27 Risk of privacy from companies 
       .739     
28 Risk of abuse from companies 
        .764     
29 Risk of fraud reduced 
      .911       
30 Risk of theft reduced 
      .930       
31 Risks reduced by software 
encryption       .461 .474     
32 Risks of temporary corruption 
            .837 
33 Risks of permanent corruption 
          .629 
34 Risks of health issues 
    -.510         
36 Risks of offending religious 
groups     .785         
37 Risks of offending community 
groups     .800         
38 Risks of conflicting with family 
views     .804         
42 Groups find it useful 
    .559         
46 Acceptance by groups 
    .485   -.410     
 
(Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a  Rotation converged in 7 iterations.) 
 
The Rotated Component Matrix had a high loading for all of the perceived ease of use 
and perceived usefulness questions and loaded them on one factor. The modified 
Technology Acceptance Model had these separated in consideration of the contributions 
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of Davis’ (1989) Technology Acceptance Model. Davis’ (1989) model had perceived 
ease of use and perceived usefulness as two separate labels. All subjective norm 
questions clustered and had high loadings, which showed them up as a factor supporting 
its inclusion in the modified model.  
 
This result supports the introduction of risk as an element of the modified Technology 
Acceptance Model. The rotated component matrix had two risk factors. More 
specifically, the styles of potential risks showed up as a factor as did the risk mitigation 
questions. The model copes with the two risk factors by offsetting the perceived risks 
with the perception of mitigated risks. For example, if respondent felt privacy was at 
risk with the mark and that legislation could reduce the risk, then this was represented as 
a lower risk than had legislation not been seen as a means of mitigating the risk. 
 
6.8.4 Scree plot 
 
The Scree plot Graph 6.16 using Eigen values shows the incremental contributions that 
the factors are making to the explanation of the dependent variable. It is clear that the 
first four factors make valuable contributions after which the graph levels off. The first 
four factors are: 
1. Ease of use and usefulness (7.2) 
2. Risk of control (5.8) 
3. Subjective norms (2.1) 





















6.9 Multinomial Logits 
 
The Multinominal logit model was used, as the dependent variable was determined 
using a survey with a five point Likert scale. The restriction of opportunity to 
differentiate responses with the five-point scale meant the data fundamentally retained 
the nature of ordinal data.  
 
6.9.1 Multinominal logit modelling testing for late response bias 
 
Early respondees were considered to be those who responded to the first survey. Late 
responses were those that responded to the second mail out of the survey. The late 
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responses were received between March and May. The first responses were coded as 
zero in SPSS to reflect time period 0 and the late responses were coded as 1 or time 
period 1. The results displayed in Table 6.19 show that there is an indication of some 
differences between early and late responders.  
 
Table 6.19 
 Descriptive Statistics (a) 
 







Early USE 83 4.00 20.00 14.4699 3.76873 
  EASE 83 4.00 20.00 14.5301 3.46529 
  RISK 83 28.00 70.00 54.8554 8.73196 
  SNI 83 5.00 23.00 13.2530 4.59279 
  Valid N (list 
wise) 83         
Late USE 58 4.00 20.00 12.7414 4.40717 
  EASE 58 4.00 20.00 13.6207 4.12024 
  RISK 58 38.00 70.00 56.4483 8.92497 
  SNI 58 5.00 21.00 12.7931 4.49076 
  Valid N (list 
wise) 58         
 
 
6.9.2 Early response  
 
As there were indications of response bias as seen in Table 6.19, the Multinomial Logit 
model was estimated for the early and late responses separately. The model using only 
early responses is significant, as seen in Table 6.20.  
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Table 6.20             
 





Likelihood Chi-Square df Sig. 
Intercept Only 122.946       
Final 61.206 61.740 12 .000 
 
 
We can see in Table 6.21, that Perception of Subjective Norm (SNI) and Perception of 
Usefulness (USE) are both significant in explaining the dependent variable at the 95% 
confidence level (significances of 0.000 and 0.000 respectively). Perception of risk 
(RISK), and Perception of Ease of Use (EASE) were not proven to be significant for 










Reduced Model Chi-Square Df Sig. 
Intercept 74.390 13.183 3 .004 
EASE 67.499 6.293 3 .098 
RISK 63.392 2.186 3 .535 
SNI 90.505 29.298 3 .000 
USE 88.589 27.382 3 .000 
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6.9.3 Late response  
 
As can be seen in Table 6.22, the model using the late responses was also seen as 










Likelihood Chi-Square df Sig. 
Intercept Only 223.173       
Final 139.618 83.555 16 .000 
 
 
We can see from Table 6.23 that Perception of Risk (Risk) and Perception of Subjective 
Norm (SNI) at a 95% confidence level both are significant in explaining the dependent 
variable for late respondees (observed significances of 0.000 and 0.003 respectively). 
Perception of Usefulness (Usefulness) and Perception of Ease of Use (Ease) have not 









Reduced Model Chi-Square Df Sig. 
Intercept 143.796 4.179 4 .382 
EASE 140.054 .436 4 .979 
RISK 164.354 24.736 4 .000 
SNI 155.558 15.940 4 .003 




As has been demonstrated above the model was significant for both early and late 
respondees when tested individually. Both early and late respondees data will now be 
analysed as a whole for hypotheses testing.  
 
6.10 Hypotheses testing   
 
As an introduction to hypotheses testing, Table 6.24 shows that 65% of the sample 
either strongly disagreed or disagreed that they would accept the “mark”, 13% either 




Acceptance if it was a major means of transacting 
 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 1.00 69 40.6 48.9 48.9 
  2.00 22 12.9 15.6 64.5 
  3.00 32 18.8 22.7 87.2 
  4.00 16 9.4 11.3 98.6 
  5.00 2 1.2 1.4 100.0 
  Total 141 82.9 100.0   
Missing System 29 17.1     
Total 170 100.0     
 
Table 6.25 shows that the model is very significant (P= 0.000) in explaining the 
dependent variable, being the acceptance of the “mark” if it was a major means of 











Model Fitting Information 
 
Model -2 Log Likelihood Chi-Square Df Sig. 
Intercept 
Only 361.935       
Final 240.693 121.242 16 .000 
 
 
The 0.335 for McFadden rho (R squared) (refer to Table 6.26) has confirmed that the 
model has contributed to the explanation of the dependent variable. Systat (1999) p. 569 












We can see in Table 6.27 that perception of risk (risk), perception of subjective norm 
(SNI) and perception of usefulness (usefulness) are all significant in explaining the 
dependent variable at the 95% confidence level for all responses, with P value of 0.000, 
0.000 and 0.002. The perception of ease of use (ease) has not proved to be significant 





Likelihood Ratio Tests 
 
Effect 
-2 Log Likelihood of 
Reduced Model Chi-Square Df Sig. 
Intercept 245.868 5.175 4 .270 
EASE 242.511 1.818 4 .769 
RISK 261.703 21.010 4 .000 
SNI 274.070 33.377 4 .000 
USE 257.271 16.578 4 .002 
 
 
6.10.1 Response timing consideration 
 
In consideration of the differences between all of the responses, late and early responses, 
it was seen that the perceived ease of use variables differences were not significant at 
the 0.01 level for any of the response groupings. The perception of usefulness was 
significant for all responses, early responses and for late responders at the 0.01 level 
with the exception of the perception of usefulness of “not having cards” and for “having 
medical information” for late responders. The difference here was not seen as 
fundamental for the credibility of the research given the main theme of the research is a 
monetary system based on the “mark” rather than the convenience factors of the two 
elements where there were differences. 
 
From the information above it can be seen that the perceived risk variable was 
significant for all responses and for late responders but not for early responses at the 
0.01 level. The Perception of Subjective Norm variable was significant at the 0.01 level 
for each group of responders. Overall the differences were not seen to have affected the 
credibility of the research and the full data will be used to consider the hypotheses used. 
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6.10.2 Hypotheses testing 
 
In testing the Hypotheses:  
 
H1 Perceived usefulness of a verification mark does not have a direct positive effect on 
an accountant’s attitude towards accepting a verification mark. 
 
 The hypothesis is rejected (p= 0.002). Perceived usefulness was seen as important 
in the acceptance decision, supporting its inclusion into the technology acceptance 
model from Davis’ technology acceptance model (1989).  
 
H2 Perceived risks of a verification mark does not have an inverse effect on an 
accountant’s attitude towards accepting a verification mark.  
  
The hypothesis is rejected (p= 0.000). Perceived risk was seen as important in the 
acceptance decision (supporting the contribution to the model developed by the 
author).  
  
H3 The perception that a verification mark would be easy to use would not have a direct 
positive effect on an accountant’s attitude towards accepting a verification mark. 
 
 The hypothesis is supported (p= 0.769). Perceived ease of use was not seen as 
important in the acceptance decision supporting the null hypothesis. This result 
questions the contributions of the Davis’ (1989) acceptance model. Consideration is 
made as to whether the permanent and personal nature of the verification mark 
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would detract from the ease of use contribution’s importance. In a circumstance of a 
more perfunctory nature the risk factor would be expected to be lower whilst the 
ease of use factor would be expected to take on significance. It is considered that 
the ease of use factor should be retained in the model until these theories have been 
tested.   
 
H4 The perception of a subjective norm will not have a direct positive effect on an 
accountant’s attitude towards accepting a verification mark. 
  
The hypothesis is rejected (p= 0.000). Perceived subjective norm was seen as 
important in the acceptance decision which rejects the null hypothesis (0.000). This 
shows the subjective norms’ importance in the acceptance decision and supports the 
contribution to the model by the author to re-establish it from the Theory of 





Table 6.28 illustrated the model prediction (refer to section 4.7) as compared to the 
actual observation of the survey. The measures of 1 to 5 represented the likert scale 
degree from strongly disagree to strongly agree. As shown in the Table, the model 
successfully predicted 63 strongly disagree decisions out of 69 decisions, which is about 
91% of the responses. It did not predict the “strongly agree to accept” responses. The 
model correctly predicted 50% of the “agree to accept” responses and 69% of the 








  1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 Percent Correct 
1.00 63 2 4 0 0 91.3% 
2.00 11 0 11 0 0   0.0% 
3.00 8 0 22 2 0 68.8% 
4.00 1 0 7 8 0 50.0% 
5.00 0 0 1 1 0   0.0% 
Overall 
Percentage 58.9% 1.4% 31.9% 7.8% .0% 66.0% 
 
 
6.12   Technology Acceptance Model  
 
The responses from the survey were also used to analyse the Technology Acceptance 
Model developed by Davis (1989). Two independent variables of perceived usefulness 
and perceived ease of use were used along with the same dependent variable being the 
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acceptance of the “mark” if it was a major means of conducting transactions were via 
the “mark”. Table 6.29 shows that the technology acceptance model had a significance 
of 0.327 in explaining the dependent variable (being the acceptance of the “mark” if it 
was a major means of conducting transactions via the “mark”). This is compared with 
the modified Technology Acceptance Model (0.000) giving validation to the 




Model Fitting Information 
 
Model -2 Log Likelihood Chi-Square Df Sig. 
Intercept 
Only 266.389       
Final 139.986 126.404 120 .327 
 
 
The .349 for McFadden rho (R squared) has confirmed that the model has contributed to 













Likelihood Ratio Tests 
 
Effect 
-2 Log Likelihood of 
Reduced Model Chi-Square Df Sig. 
Intercept 139.986(a) .000 0 . 
EASE 911.922(b) 771.936 60 .000 
USE 216.806(c) 76.820 60 .071 
 
According to the above tables, we can see that Perception of Ease of Use (Ease) is 
significant in explaining the dependent variable at the 95% confidence level for all 
responses (P= 0.000). The Perception of Usefulness (Use) has not proven to be 
significant (p=  0.071).  
 
6.13 Subjective norm – open questions 
 
In an open question relating to the subjective norm, the respondents were asked to 
“identify four people or groups that you hold as important in your life in terms of the 
influence their opinions have on you”. This question sought respondents’ views of the 
important influences in their opinion forming process.  Each respondent was asked to 
list the people that influenced them in the relevant decisions in descending order of 
importance. A list of the identified influences and their frequency of being listed, 
regardless of ranking, is provided below. Appendix 2.1 shows the influences cited as the 
most important influence, Appendix 2.2 shows the influences cited as the second most 
important influence, Appendix 2.3 shows the influences cited as the third most 
important influence, Appendix 2.4 shows the influences cited as the fourth most 
important influence. It should be noted that the professional bodies failed to be ranked 
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as the most important source, by any respondent, and only on two occasions were seen 
as the second most important source and on one occasion the fourth most important 
influence. In total, only 1% of professional accountants referred to the professional body 
as an influencing factor. 
 
Table 6.32 All influences cited 
Influence Number of 
Citations 
Influence Number of 
Citations 
Spouse 62 Clients 2 
Children 37 Mentors 2 
Friends 36 Discussion groups 1 
Family 28 Artists 1 
Parents 27 Government 1 
Religious institution 20 World 1 
Colleagues 18 Academics 1 
Community 10 Extended Family 1 
Work 7 Elders 1 





4 Parents-in-law 1 
Professional Body 3 Community heads 1 
Sibling 3 Financial 1 
Peers 3   
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Employer 2 Moral Standards 1 
Clients 2 Public figures 1 
Mentors 2 Legal 1 
 
To confirm the impression from Table 6.32 the subjective norm was used as the 
dependent variable and each of the potential influences was used as an explanatory 
variable (ranking from zero for not represented to one when it was mentioned as the 
fourth most important influence through to four when it was mentioned as the most 
important influence). The regression R-squared was 0.403.  The professional bodies 
variable was not significant in determining the subjective norm dependent variable (t = -
1.024, p = 0.311). The only significant contribution, at the 95% confidence level, was 
that of “clients” (t = 2.088, p = 0.043). The next most important covariates, significant 
at the 10% level, were religion (t = -1.979, p = 0.054), public figures (t = 1.685, p = 
0.099) and friends (t = -1.710, p = 0.094). 
 
6.14 Perceived ease of use – open questions 
 
The descriptive results in the ease of use section showed a weighting towards 
respondents perceiving that the various parts of using the system was easy. There were 
fewer respondents that perceived that the system was difficult or very difficult. The 
results of the open question highlighted that there was some uncertainty about the 




In an open question relating to factors making the "mark" difficult to use, the 
respondents were asked to “identify in order of importance up to four factors that they 
thought might make a “mark” difficult to use”. This question sought their unprompted 
view of the ease of using the “mark”.  Each respondent was asked to list the factors in 
order of difficulty and these responses were grouped. Technology issues were the most 
cited (89), attitudinal rejection was next with 51 citations, authority issues was next 
(32), followed by misuse issues (31), privacy issues (25), health issues (17), human 
issues (14), security issues (10) and, finally, cost issues (7). Tables containing the details 
of the responses have been listed in Appendices 3.1 to 3.9.  
 
To confirm the impression from the above information, a regression model was 
estimated with ease of use as the dependent variable and each of the ease labels as 
explanatory variables (ranking from zero for not represented to one when it was 
mentioned as the fourth easiest through to four when it was mentioned as the easiest). 
The regression R-squared was 0.143. There were only two significant contributions for 
usefulness, at the 95% confidence level. The label “privacy” (t = -2.837, p = 0.005) 
indicating that the larger the concern respondents had about privacy the less easy they 
determined the “mark” to be. The inference here is that they see the “mark” as adversely 
affecting the ease of their life as it would make their life less private. The other 
significant variable was the label “technology” (t = 2.272, p = 0.025) indicating that 
significant numbers of respondents felt that the “technology” made the process easier. 
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6.14.1 Technology issues  
 
The eighty-nine technology issues accounted for 32% of the “difficulty” concerns of the 
respondents. Of those who responded on technology issues, 52% listed the issue as the 
most important and 33% listed it as the second most important. A general distrust of the 
technology was expressed along with distrust of various parts of the technology, 
specifically, the reader, programming, equipment and “mark”. There was also a distrust 
of the technology under conditions such as high volume, remote locations, various 
weather conditions or wear and tear. The fact that the technology was to be imbedded 
was also cause for concern. For instance there was a concern that there may be “changes 
due to bodily functions”. Respondents were also concerned with how changes of 
personal details would be handled and how various roles of a person and entities would 
be dealt with. Another major issue raised was concern over the duplication of the 
“mark”.  How the system is maintained and verified was also raised in this difficulty 
section. 
 
6.14.2 Attitudinal rejection issues  
 
The fifty-one attitudinal rejection issues accounted for 18% of the concerns of the 
respondents. Of those who responded on the attitudinal rejection issue, 71% listed the 
issue as the most important. Many respondents expressed the view that they or the 
community simply would not accept this style of technology without offering a reason. 
Others offered ethical concerns such as violations of “the human body”, independence, 
freedom, dignity, age concerns and other “civil rights” issues.  
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6.14.3 Authority issues  
 
The thirty-two authority issues accounted for 11% of the concerns of the respondents. 
Respondents contemplated contributions to the source of their concerns were 
“authorities”, “government” and “big brother”. Their concerns included “abuse”, 
“suspicion”, “loss of individuality”, “control”, “fear of unauthorised unofficial 
monitoring” and “integrity”. 
 
6.14.4 Misuse issues 
 
The thirty-one misuse issues accounted for 11% of the concerns of the respondents.  
Respondents contemplated fraud, misuse and corruption in the system from various 
perspectives including the accumulation phase, for instance, duplication of the mark, 
electronic transfer of funds, misuse of the system from a monetary perspective and 
information misuse including “information theft” and resultant control issues. 
“Kidnapping” was also mentioned. 
 
6.14.5 Privacy issues  
 
The twenty-five privacy issues accounted for 9% of the concerns of the respondents. 
Respondents contemplated the “invasion of privacy” from “privacy restrictions”, “issues 
of confidentiality” to “fear of embarrassment- you are over the limit”. 
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6.14.6 Health issues  
 
The seventeen health issues accounted for 6% of the concerns of the respondents. 
Respondents contemplated a whole range of health concerns from the process including 
“fear of disease or illness due to implants”, the invasiveness of the procedure, “illness 
factors”, allergies, “increased violence re increased information availability’ right up to 
“death”. 
 
6.14.7 Human issues  
 
The fourteen human issues accounted for 5% of the concerns of the respondents. 
Examples of the issues contemplated were “incompetence”, “human error” and “duress 
in use of mark”. 
 
6.14.8 Security issues  
 
The ten security issues accounted for 4% of the concerns of the respondents. 
Respondents contemplated a range of “concerns about security”, including the “ability 
to remove or tamper with marks”. 
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6.14.9 Cost issues  
 
The seven cost issues accounted for 3% of the concerns of the respondents. Respondents 
contemplated the “cost of implementation”. The qualitative comments (refer to 
Appendix 3.9) include: cost of scanning, cost of implementation, cost of equipment for 
business, expensive hardware, business acceptance (eg rollout times and cost), 
administration, and cost.  
 
6.15 Perceived usefulness – open questions  
 
In an open question relating to factors making the "mark" useful, the respondents were 
asked to “identify up to four issues in order of importance that they thought would make 
the verification mark useful in a private context”. This question sought their unprompted 
view on the usefulness of using the “mark”.  Medical issues were the most cited (30), 
identity issues were next with 26 citations, security issues next (19), followed by 
recording issues (16), access issues (14) ease issues (12), problems (8), privacy issues 
(7), protest issues (6), fraud issues (5) and taxation issues (4). Tables containing the 
details of the responses have been listed in Appendices 4.1 to 4.11.  
 
To confirm the impression of the above information, a regression with usefulness used 
as the dependent variable, and, each of the uses used as explanatory variables was 
estimated. Ranking from zero for not represented to one when it was mentioned as the 
fourth most important use, through to four when it was mentioned as the most important 
use. The regression R-squared was 0.205. There were only two significant contributions 
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for usefulness, at the 95% confidence level. The label “privacy” (t = -2.850, p = 0.005) 
indicating that the larger the concern respondents had about privacy the less useful they 
determined the “mark” to be. The inference here is that they see the “mark” as adversely 
affecting their privacy. The other significant variable was the label “easy” (t = 2.250, p = 
0.026) indicating that significant numbers of respondents felt that the “mark” made the 
purchasing process easier which was considered useful. 
 
6.15.1 Medical issues 
 
Medical issues accounted for 20% of the respondents’ perceived usefulness of having a 
“mark”. Respondents noted that “personal information” such as “medical records” 
would be “readily available”. Respondents suggested this would be helpful if a person 
suffered “dementia” or for various “medical emergencies”. One respondent noted that 
“one would want to be safe in releasing one’s medical information”. 
 
6.15.2 Identity issues 
 
Identity issues accounted for 18% of the respondents’ perceived usefulness of having a 
“mark”. Respondents suggested the type of information that should be included in the 
identification such as “name, date of birth, gender, address, age, DNA”, “nationality”, 
“medical and other”. The use of the identification was at the “airport”, “locating a 




6.15.3 Security issues 
 
Security issues accounted for 13% of the respondents’ perceived usefulness of having a 
“mark”. The following is a representation of respondents’ suggestions of the “marks” 
security usefulness: “preventing” a “terrorist's attack”, “illegal access to your records”, 
“individual personal security”, “financial information” and the risk of card/data loss”. 
One contributed that the “mark” would be useful at entertainment venues such as “at 
sports or theatre” implying that knowing the identity of people at entertainment venues 
would reduce the security threat. 
 
6.15.4 Recording issues  
 
Recording issues accounted for 11% of the respondents’ perceived usefulness of having 
a “mark”. Of those who responded on security issues 71% listed the issue as most 
important. The following is a representation of respondents’ suggestions of the “marks” 
recording usefulness; “planning”, “managing financial” information and “consolidation 
of personal information”. 
 
6.15.5 Access issues 
 
Access issues accounted for 10% of the respondents’ perceived usefulness of having a 
“mark”. The following is a representation of respondents’ suggestions of the “marks” 
access usefulness. Respondents described an “ability to access” the “mark” as useful and 
noted that they would “always have the information with them”. They mentioned there 
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would be “no necessity to carry credit cards” and access would be available in a “remote 
location”. 
 
6.15.6 Ease issues  
 
Ease issues accounted for 8% of the respondents’ perceived usefulness of having a 
“mark”. There were 12 responses. The “ease of use” was mentioned including the “ease 
of performance of everyday functions”, the fact that “banking transactions could be 
easier”, that “paying bills/shopping would be easier” and that there would be “no need 
for cash or cards”. The characteristics of the “mark” were also seen to be useful 
including its speed, size and weight. 
 
6.15.7 Problems  
 
In response to the respondents’ perceived usefulness of having a “mark”, 5% of the 
contributions were problems of the system. The following is a representation of items 
mentioned, the “mark could be copied”, the “mark could be stolen”, the mark would 
“still require proof ID”. One respondent wrote “scanners do not yet have a good record 
of accuracy, I don’t think it would as it would still be subject to major computer flaws 
so could produce dangerously wrong information. In my 11 years in practice I have seen 
several examples of bank errors. The fact is the banks do not reconcile their transactions 
so giving more power to their unreliable data is madness”. 
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6.15.8 Privacy issues  
 
Privacy issues accounted for 5% of the respondents’ perceived usefulness of having a 
“mark”. “Invasion of privacy” and “confidentiality” were a representation of feedback 
provided. 
 
6.15.9 Protest issues  
 
Some respondents used the perceived usefulness of having a “mark” question to protest 
about the mark. For instance “I am completely against the use of anything of this 
nature”, “all bad”, “none- better solution without the risks are available” and “unable to 
comment because I morally object to a "Mark". Protest issues accounted for 4% of the 
references on perceived usefulness of having a “mark”. 
 
6.15.10 Fraud issues   
 
Fraud issues accounted for 3% of the respondents’ perceived usefulness of having a 
“mark”.  “Fraud” and “less chance of fraud” were representative of the contributions. 
 
6.15.11 Taxation issues   
 
Taxation issues such as “control of tax receipts and payment” and “record keeping for 




6.16 Perceived risk (control) – open questions  
 
In an open question relating to factors making the "mark" risky to use, the respondents 
were asked to “List in descending order up to four of your highest concerns relating to 
risks that a "mark" may bring”. This question sought their unprompted view of how 
risky using the “mark” would be.  Each respondent was asked to list the factors in order 
of how risky using the “mark” would be and these responses were grouped from the 
largest groups to the smallest groups, regardless of ranking. Privacy issues were the 
most cited (87), control issues was next with 66 citations, misuse issues was next (42), 
followed by marketing issues (9), rights issues (7), physical safety issues (5) and finally 
management issues (4). Tables containing the details of the responses have been listed 
in Appendices 5.1 to 5.7. 
 
To confirm the impression of the above information a regression model was undertaken, 
control was used as the dependent variable and each of the classified control risks were 
used as explanatory variables (ranking from zero for not represented to one when it was 
mentioned as the fourth most risky control issue, through to four when it was mentioned 
as the most important control risk) in a regression model. The regression R-squared was 
0.054 with none of the contributions being significant. 
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6.16.1 Privacy issues 
 
Privacy issues accounted for 40% of the respondents’ “concerns relating to control over 
your life that a "mark" may bring.  Of those who responded on privacy in their 
contribution on control risk, 75% listed the issue as most important, 18% listed it as 
second most important and 7% listed as third most important. The following is a 
representation of respondents’ suggestions of the “marks” control, privacy issues; 
“invasion of privacy”, “secrecy” and “confidentiality”. More specifically concerns 
included the fact that “people can be traced when not necessary” or "watching". “Access 
to information” was also a concern; for instance, “information on Mark becoming 
publicly available”, “sale of personal details to various organisations”, “hasslement by 
hackers”, “invasion of personal information by government & other bodies”. It was also 
commented that there was “insufficient privacy legislation”. 
 
6.16.2 Control issues 
 
Control issues accounted for 30% of the respondents’ “concerns relating to control over 
your life that a "mark" may bring”, of those who responded on control issues with 69% 
listing the issue as most important, 27% listed it as second most important and 4% listed 
it as third most important.  The following comments represent respondents’ concerns 
such as a “lack of freedom” relating to the “marks” control issues. Respondents were 
concerned that the mark would result in authorities, “controlling my life”, and more 
specifically “government control”, “big brother watching real time judgments” the 
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“financial organisations may control my life” and the control “other private 
organisations have over my life”. 
 
6.16.3 Misuse issues  
 
Misuse issues accounted for 19% of the respondents’ “concerns relating to control over 
your life that a "mark" may bring”. Those who responded on misuse in their contribution 
on control were spread with respect to the importance of the issue with 53% listing the 
issue as highly important, 39% listing it as second most important and 8% listing as 
third most important. The following is a representation of respondents’ suggestions of 
the “marks” control, misuse issues. Respondents mentioned “monitoring by undesirable 
persons”, “misuse of information by government and corporate sectors” and a concern 
that “any reader can download more data than authorised”. Other concerns included a 
“lack of security”, “misuse of information”, “fraud”, “identity theft” and “money theft”. 
 
6.16.4 Marketing issues   
 
Marketing issues accounted for 4% of the respondents’ “concerns relating to control 
over your life that a "mark" may bring”. The following is a representation of 
respondents’ suggestions of the “marks” control, marketing issues. Respondents noted a 
“potential for marketers to "suffocate society with their products” with “marketing/ 
advertising targeted at me”. 
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6.16.5 Rights issues   
 
Rights issues accounted for 3% of the respondents’ “concerns relating to control over 
your life that a "mark" may bring”. The following is a representation of respondents’ 
suggestions of the “marks” control, rights issues. Respondents said that people “should 
be able to have the right to refuse the mark”, “biblical prophecy”, that the mark was “too 
invasive” and generally that it is “all bad”.  
 
6.16.6 Physical safety issues   
 
Physical safety issues accounted for 2% of the respondents’ “concerns relating to control 
over your life that a "mark" may bring”. The following is a representation of 
respondents’ suggestions of the “marks” control, physical safety issues. Respondents 
stated an “invasion of your body”, “safety (robbery of limb/mark)” and “fear of 
disease/illness due to implants”. 
 
6.16.7 Management issues 
 
Management issues accounted for 2% of the ‘respondents’ “concerns relating to control 
over your life that a "mark" may bring”. The following is a representation of 
respondents’ suggestions of the “marks” control, management issues. Respondents 
represented “need for updating of information regularly” others were concerned that it 
would be “probably too costly to administer” others noted that it would “require 
imputing of codes or authorisation for parties to use the “mark””. 
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6.17 Perceived risks (other) – open questions   
 
In an open question relating to risks, the respondents were asked to “identify up to four 
other risks that you would associate with a "mark".  This question sought their 
unprompted view of the risks of using the “mark”.  The responses (142) were grouped 
from the largest groups to the smallest groups, regardless of ranking. Misuse issues were 
the most cited (32), control issues was next with 30 citations, health issues was next 
(28), followed by technology issues (24), privacy issues (22) and finally identity issues 
(6). Tables containing the details of the responses have been listed in Appendices 6.1 to 
6.6. 
 
To confirm the impression of the above information, risk was used as the dependent 
variable and each of the classified risks was used as an explanatory variable (ranking 
from zero for not represented to one when it was mentioned as the fourth risky, through 
to four when it was mentioned as the most risky) in a regression model. The regression 
R-squared was 0.042 with none of the contributions being significant. 
 
6.17.1 Misuse issues 
 
Misuse issues accounted for 23% of the respondents’ “other risks” associated with the 
"mark"”. Of those who responded on the misuse issue, 70% listed the issue as the most 
important. The following is a representation of comments; “fraud”, “blackmail”, “theft”, 
“abuse”, “black market and manipulation”. “Breach of security” was also noted as a 
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concern with comments such as “too easy for people to access information” and “private 
co's using info”. Various forms of discrimination were cited including “racial”, 
“political” and “financial”. 
 
6.17.2 Control issues  
 
Control issues accounted for 21% of the respondents’ “other risks” associated with a 
"mark". Of those who responded on the control issue, 82% listed the issue as the most 
important. The representations were that it would “place ultimate power in some hands” 
or it would result in “government control”, “control of personal activities” and “control 
of personal beliefs, attitudes, etc”. Respondents were concerned with a “loss of 
individual freedom and anonymity”, one noted it was “one step closer to de-
humanisation”, another that “a person's history would be too easily available and 
potentially deny a person benefit of changed ways”. One respondent mentioned it would 
“create classes of people- outcast” and another that “I'm not ready to become a robot 
yet”. Other strong reactions were that “a mark would screw up my life” and that “I 
would refuse to have one. What are you going to do with people like me?” 
 
6.17.3 Health issues  
 
“Health” issues accounted for 20% of the respondents’ “other risks” associated with the 
"mark". The following is a representation of claims;  “external interference with body 
function by electronic means”, “changes by biological/physiological actions”, “fear of 
disease/illness due to implants” and “damage through accidents/injury”. Other 
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contributions included that “a thief can amputate the mark and force you to give them 
your password” or “physical abuse and theft of "Mark" and transfer to thief”. On that 
theme, respondents included “kidnapping and or possible extortion”, “personal safety in 
public” that a person may “steal the person not the card”, that it may result in “self-
mutilation if people seek to rid themselves of the mark” right up to “people killing to 
obtain record via the mark”. 
 
6.17.4 Technology issues   
 
Technology issues accounted for 17% of the respondents’ “other risks” associated with a 
"mark". Respondents expressed concern about an “over reliance on technology”, one 
stated “I would have real concern at the possibility of mass data corruption”, another 
was concerned about “system failure - loss of control of use of mark” and still another 
was concerned about “accidental damage - vehicle or sport accident”. Respondents were 
concerned about how to handle a “change of technology” and the need for a “future 
upgrade of equipment in body” with a “need for replacement/detection of malfunction”. 
Respondents mentioned that “software is vulnerable to attack” noting that “it’s possible 
that the mark would be attacked by the virus” and that it would be possible to “lose 
track on when individual transactions take place (i.e., walking past a scanner)”. 
 
6.17.5 Privacy issues 
 
“Privacy issues” or what one respondent referred to as “surveillance issues” accounted 
for 15% of the respondents’ “other risks” associated with a "mark". Those who 
responded on privacy in their contribution on risk were spread with respect to the 
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importance of the issue with 26% listing the issue as highly important, 48% listing it as 
second most important and 26% listing as third most important. Respondents were 
concerned about “accessibility” or a “(perceived) lack of control on information”. One 
respondent was concerned about “information being accumulated and accessed by 3rd 
parties”. Examples of third party concerns given by the respondents included, 
“government”, “private co's”, “family or friends”. One respondent noted that “a person's 
history would be too easily available and potentially deny person benefit of changed 
ways- human element of judging by the way a person is today may be ignored - history 
would rule supreme”. Another said that it would be an “unnecessary intrusion into a 
persons life” whilst another stated that the result would be the “tracking of less-than-
honest / moral transaction such as a brothel visit, strip club etc” which “would be 
tagged”.  
 
6.17.6 Identity issues   
 
Identity issues accounted for 4% of the respondents’ “other risks” associated with a 
"mark". Concerns were expressed about an “identity change” perhaps due to a “physical 
assault for removal and takeover of identity” or by “getting someone else’s mark by 
mistake”. 
 
6.18 Factors affecting acceptance – open questions 
 
An open question asked respondents about the issues “that would make you accept or 
reject the "mark"?”. The responses (208) were grouped from the largest group to the 
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smallest group, regardless of ranking. Control issues were the most cited (53), privacy 
issues was next with 46 citations, technology issues was next (21), followed by misuse 
(20), health issues (13), belief issues (10), just no (9), securities issues (8), humanity 
issues (6), logic issues (5), convenience issues (5), uniqueness issues (4), benefits issues 
(3), equity issues (2), spouse issues (2) and finally an  existence issue (1). Tables 
containing the details of the responses have been listed in Appendices 7.1 to 7.16.  
 
To confirm the impression from the above information, “acceptance if it was 
compulsory” was used as the dependent variable and each of the acceptance labels were 
used as explanatory variables (ranking from zero for not represented to one when it was 
mentioned as the fourth importance reason for acceptance through to four when it was 
mentioned as the most importance reason for acceptance) in a regression model. The 
regression R-squared was 0.161. There were three significant contributions for 
acceptance, at the 95% confidence level. The label “health” was the most significant (t = 
-2.505, p = 0.014) indicating that the chip was seen as adversely affecting a recipient’s 
health. “Security” (t = 2.361, p = 0.020) indicates that respondents felt that security was 
important in the acceptance decision. The last significant covariate was the label “just 
no” (t = -1.942, p = 0.054) indicating that some respondents would reject the “mark” 
outright because of its nature. 
 
6.18.1 Control issues   
 
Control issues accounted for 26% of the respondents contributions as to what would 
make them accept or reject the "mark". Those who responded on control issues were 
spread with respect to the importance of the issue with 55% listing the issue as most 
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important, 36% listing it as second most important and 9% listing it as third most 
important.  The following are a representation of respondent’s contributions. One 
respondent contributed that “beauty, strength” and “joy come from uniqueness not 
control and conformity”, another that it was “morally unacceptable to be able to monitor 
people”, still another felt that “I am losing my freedom”.  One respondent felt that 
“personal views” “might be databased for someone to form an opinion on my personal 
traits views and perhaps habits”. The government was another common issue here with 
a concern of “overregulation by government” and a warning to “never trust 
governments”. One respondent went as far as stating that “when society sinks to the 
level of bureaucratic power I would rather be dead than accept the mark”. Big brother 
was another term used with one respondent contributing that the “big brother syndrome 
is already too invasive in our lives”. The “lack of consent” was another theme with, for 
example, the contribution that “choice is compromised” and the issue of whether the 
mark is “voluntary or compulsory” or the “ability to terminate”. Other issues included 
the "marks accessibility”, and a concern regarding “unforseen uses”. 
 
6.18.2 Privacy issues  
 
“Privacy issues” or “confidentiality” issues accounted for 22% of the respondents’ 
contributions as to what would make them accept or reject the "mark". Of those who 
responded on privacy, 71% listed the issue as highly important, 22% listed it as second 
most important and 7% listed it as third most important. The following are a 
representation of respondent’s contributions. One respondent contributed that “humans 
require privacy of their lives and a choice of what they discuss to whom”, some referred 
to the issue as an “invasion of privacy”. One respondent contributed “privacy!!! Why 
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should the government/business know everything I do?” One response was to “reject- 
complete history possible”. From the last contribution it is understood that the 
respondee is concerned that the “mark” would trace all financial transactions which 
would create a full financial history which would not be acceptable in the mind of the 
respondee. 
 
6.18.3 Technology issues   
  
Technology issues accounted for 10% of the issues stated as to what would make them 
accept or reject the "mark". The following are a representation of respondents’ 
contributions. One respondent contributed that there was an “inherent distrust of such 
technology”. “Reliability” was an issue at many of the stages of the process from 
“failure of technology creating "duplication of people's record” to “system failure”, to 
“problems associated with getting your self "logged" on”, to “computer hackers and 
viruses” right up to “update capacity”. Some simply felt it was “impossible” or that “it 
would not work!!!!!!” 
 
6.18.4 Misuse issues   
 
Misuse issues accounted for 10% of the views expressed as to what would make them 
accept or reject the "mark". “Fraud”, “integrity of users”, “issues of abuse” and “abuses 
by third parties” were raised.  Trust was an issue with a “lack of trust in private 
industry” with warnings to “never trust big business” or “banks”. One respondent 
commented and observed that there was a “lack of business ethics” with risks of 
“incorrect use of data by both government and corporate entities” with “continued 
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intrusion in form of mass marketing and government data”. It was also noted that 
“legislation has not stopped video and cd fraud” inferring that fraud resulting from the 
mark could also not be stopped. 
 
6.18.5 Health issues   
 
“Health” issues or “health concerns” accounted for 6% of the items mentioned as to 
what would make them accept or reject the "mark". Various elements of health were a 
concern including “health concerns”, “life long implant considerations” and even a 
concern that there is “no guarantee killer drug not implanted to be triggered if certain 
age reached medical condition diagnosed or wrong political party chosen”. 
 
6.18.6 Belief issues   
 
“Belief” issues accounted for 5% of the feedback provided as to what would make them 
accept or reject the "mark". Respondents felt the mark was “immoral” with one 
respondent questioning the validity of the research asking “has the ethics chairperson 
approved of making the questionnaire?”. Respondents noted that it is a “complete 
reversal of all laws of human nature” another noted it is “against my beliefs”. “Religious 
beliefs” were noted with “religious convictions (:the Beast syndrome)” and a reference 
to the New Testament  
“Then I saw another beast… it causes all, both small and great both rich and poor both 
free and slave, to be marked on the right hand or the forehead, so that no one can buy 
or sell unless he has the mark, that is the name of the beast or the number of its name. 
This calls for wisdom: let him who has understanding reckon the number of the beast, 
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for it is human number, its number is 666” (Holy Bible, New International Version, 
Revelation 13:11, 16:13. 
 
6.18.7 Just no   
 
Statements that the mark would not be accepted without other support accounted for 4% 
of the comments as to what would make them accept or reject the "mark". The 
following are a representation of respondents’ contributions. “Just no thank you”, “I 
would never accept it only an arsehole would” and “none would make me accept the 
mark”, one respondent contributed “death or the mark ------I choose death”.  
 
6.18.8 Security issues   
 
“Security” issues accounted for 4% of the items stated as to what would make them 
accept or reject the "mark". The following are a representation of respondents’ 
contributions. One respondent stated that there were “advantages over other methods of 
transacting, e.g., “security”, another was concerned about the “security of downloaded 
information” and another about the “personal security of finances”. 
 
6.18.9 Humanity issues  
 
Humanity issues accounted for 3% of the claims as to what would make them accept or 
reject the "mark". The following are a representation of respondents’ contributions. One 
respondent expressed that “we have gone far enough without further degrading 
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humanity”, another that “society/humanity not advanced enough yet” and still another 
that “we are too anxious to revolutionise age old customs unnecessarily”. 
 
6.18.10 Logic issues   
 
“Logic” issues accounted for 2% of the respondents’ contributions as to what would 
make them accept or reject the "mark". The following are a representation of 
respondents’ feedback. One respondent stated that the “burden of use outweighs any 
perceived benefit” and another that “such test without wholesale adoption and 
implementation it will not be readily accepted”. 
 
6.18.11 Convenience issues   
 
Convenience issues accounted for 2% of the issues stated as to what would make them 
accept or reject the "mark". The following are a representation of respondents’ 
viewpoints. One respondent contributed that there were “advantages over other methods 
of transacting” and another contributed that “we should be bar-coded (or marked) at 
birth to get rid of TFN, ABN, medicare card” with “health insurance cards, AMEX, 
Diners M/Card B/Card etc…etc…” as another contribution. One respondent simply 






6.18.12 Uniqueness issues   
 
“Uniqueness” issues accounted for 2% of the views expressed as to what would make 
them accept or reject the "mark". The following are a representation of respondents’ 
comments. One respondent said that the mark “destroys one's uniqueness as a human 
being”, with another feeling there would be a “loss of individuality” whilst another felt 
there would be a “loss of individual freedom and anonymity”. One respondent 
contributed “accept - ID benefits”. 
 
6.18.13 Benefits issues   
 
Benefit issues accounted for 1% of the items mentioned as to what would make them 
accept or reject the "mark". The following are a representation of respondents’ 
contributions. One respondent contributed “accept- general usage business” another 
“wide acceptance- would only use it if it could be used instead of other c/cards”. 
 
6.18.14 Equity issues   
 
Equity issues accounted for 1% of the feedback provided as to what would make them 
accept or reject the "mark". The respondents’ contributions included “more equitable tax 






6.18.15 Spouse issues   
 
Spouse issues accounted for 1% of the comments as to what would make them accept or 
reject the "mark". Respondent’s contributions included “spouse views/influence” and 
“spouse would hate the idea!”. 
 
6.18.16 Existence issues   
 
One respondent (0.5% of items) referring to the “mark” contributed that “this is putting 
our very existence in jeopardy”. Whilst it is not clear what in particular the respondee is 
referring to it could be theorised that the “mark” could create a fatal health issue. 
 242 




This research has extended investigation into a completely cashless monetary system 
making use of implantable chip technology, global positioning satellites and large 
computer systems. As the monetary system described in this research is original it had 
not been previously examined in totality. Therefore the literature review was extensive 
in order to consider each element of the system. The literature revealed that there has 
been a trend towards an increased use of cashless mediums of exchange along with 
more sophisticated methods of identifications. The research traced the rapid 
advancement of the technology required in the system. Evidence was provided that the 
system described could be currently implemented. The cashless medium of exchange 
connected with methods of identification have brought with them associated benefits 
and risks. It was deemed appropriate to research the possible cashless monetary system 
with personal implantation especially given the significance of the impacts it may have 
on individuals, the community and the accounting profession. 
 
Literature has revealed that accountants, both from a traditional and critical perspective 
would be concerned about the effects of the technology discussed on the collection and 
manipulation of data and the effect it would have on the extension of information both 
financial and other. Professional accountants were surveyed regarding their views on a 
cashless monetary system revolving around the use of implantable chip technology and 
their responses were noteworthy. The group surveyed were representative of 
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experienced professional accountants. This group are respected for their knowledge in 
financial and strategic matters and are seen as influential on the public about such 
matters.  Data was not collected for other industry groups or the community in general 
and therefore the findings are not representative of their opinions. Although the views of 
the accountants are not representative of the publics views they do serve as an indicator 
especially as the public may take into consideration the views of accountants as they 
may be seen as informed in this area. It could be argued that accountants, being more 
financially literate are more advanced in their understanding of the workings of the 
described monetary system as their vocation requires an understanding of the financial 
areas involved and an understanding of technology. It may be that the general public on 
such matters might be more conservative but could be induced with an education 
campaign to move towards the more informed accountants' position.  
 
7.2 Acceptance level 
 
Literature revealed the potential use that could be made of the implantable chip 
technology incorporated as part of a monetary system to solve many of the problems 
society and governments are facing including national security, identity fraud and 
money laundering. The fact that 12.7% of respondents either strongly agreed or agreed 
that they would accept the mark is evidence the system has support even though the 
majority surveyed did not support the system. Whilst the results of the research do not 
represent the community’s views the results are instructive about their views. The 
research identified a concern about the risks of the monetary system including risks of 
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social control, privacy and abuse. Long-term health effects are also of concern to 
accountants and perhaps the community.  
 
Surprisingly the acceptance level of the monetary system using the implantable chip was 
lower (9% strongly agreed or agreed) if the technology was to be compulsorily 
implemented. Perhaps this is a reaction in a democratic society to being enforced to 
adopt a new system despite the merits it may have.  
 
This research compliments the interest displayed by the Australian government in 
implantable identity devices as part of the solution to identity fraud and the challenges 
to national security. Elements of the system described are under current consideration 
for adoption including the implantable chip by the Australian Law Reform Commission. 
This research gives an insight into issues that may impact the community in the near 





In researching acceptance, the Modified Technology Acceptance Model has contributed 
to the literature as demonstrated by the fact that the model was significant (0.000) in 
explaining the dependent variable, being the acceptance of the “mark” if a major means 
of conducting transactions were via the “mark”. The model had contributed to the 
explanation of the dependent variable, confirmed by McFadden rho (R squared) of 
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0.335. The Technology Acceptance Model developed by Davis (1989), on the other 
hand, had a significance of 0.327.  
 
The research focused on four hypotheses, dealing with the perception of ease of use of 
the verification mark (H1), the perceived usefulness of the verification mark (H2), the 
perceived risks of using the verification mark (H3), subjective norm influence on the 
decision to adopt a verification mark (H4), and their individual effects on an 
accountant’s attitude towards accepting a verification mark. Perception of risk, 
subjective norm and perception of usefulness were all proved to be significant in 
explaining the dependent variable at the 95% confidence level for all responses, with 
0.000, 0.000 and 0.002, respectively. The perception of ease of use was not proved to be 
significant (p = 0.769). The findings have important implications for the development 
and modification of acceptance models in general and specifically for technology 
acceptance models. 
 
7.4 Response bias 
 
The differences between late and early responses was examined and it was seen that the 
perceived ease of use variables differences were not significant at the 0.01 level for any 
of the response groupings. It was found that with respect to the perception of usefulness 
at the 0.01 level, two elements were not significant, those being “not having cards” and 
“having medical information”. The difference here was not seen as fundamental for the 
credibility of the research given the main theme of the research is a monetary system 
based on the “mark” rather than the convenience factors of the two elements where there 
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were differences. The perceived risk variable was not significant for early responders. 
The Perception of Subjective Norm variable was significant at the 0.01 level for each 
group of responders. Overall, the credibility of the research were not seen to be affected 
by the differences and the full data will be used to consider the hypotheses used. 
 
7.5 Open questions 
 
When the contributions established in open questions as the independent variables were 
used to regress subjective norm as the dependent variable, the only significant 
contribution, at the 95% confidence level was “clients” (t = 2.088, p = 0.043). Religion 
(t = -1.979, p = 0.054), public figures (t = 1.685, p = 0.099) and friends (t = -1.710, p = 
0.094) were significant at the 10% level. The professional bodies variable was 
insignificant in determining the subjective norm dependent variable (t = -1.024, p = 
0.311). It is unsatisfactory that only three professional accountants from the survey 
would turn to the professional bodies for this level of guidance. The professional bodies 
should perhaps be more open in their attitude to developing issues addressing this 
situation.  
 
With a R-squared of 0.054, the dependent variable of perceived risk and the eleven 
independent variables had no significant contributions, compared to the dependent 
variable of perceived ease of use and its nine dependent labels with a R-squared of 
0.143. There were only two significant contributions for ease of use, at the 95% 
confidence level being “privacy” (t = -2.837, p = 0.005) and “technology” (t = 2.272, p 
= 0.025). With a R-squared of 0.205, the dependent variable of perceived usefulness and 
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the eleven dependent variables had two significant contributions for usefulness, at the 
95% confidence level being “privacy” (t = -2.850, p = 0.005) and “easy” (t = 2.250, p = 
0.026).  
 
7.6 Research Contributions 
National security is currently a governmental research priority and the Australian 
government has recently allocated significant levels of funding in the latest federal 
budget to promote the interface between research, technology and national security 
(Australian National Security 2007). This research is of vital interest to the Australian 
government as it grapples with such matters. The Australian Law Reform Commission 
(ALRC) has raised the issue of implantable chips or RFID as an identity device in 
ALRC Issues Paper 31: Review of Privacy. The Commission is following up the issues 
by soliciting responses from its members about the use of implantable chips as an 
identity device. Professor Margaret Jackson of RMIT University, School of Accounting 
and Law, a member of ALRC, solicited the author’s advice via email on the 26 March 
2007 on the area and used the response as part of her submission on the issue. This 
research provides timely information and contributes to the discussion currently 
occurring and aimed at reforming Australian law.  
 
The system would provide complete and continual real time records for individuals, 
businesses and regulators and the research showed it was evident that both traditional 
accounting researchers and critical theorists have reason to consider the diffusion of this 
verification technology. Benefits and hazards should be weighed from a social 
perspective including its impact on privacy, possibility of abuse or system corruption 
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and social control which intrigued Foucault who likened it to Bentham’s concept of a 
Panopticon (Rabinow 1982). Terrorist attacks have made many regulators and 
communities extremely vigilant culminating in security elevation. Many in the 
community have voiced their preparedness to forego personal rights for the ability to 
trace criminals to enhance safety. Perhaps enforcing visitors to Australia to accept an 
implanted chip may be seen as a necessary security measure. In a community with 
democratic rights held so strongly the security net may need to be consequentially 
widened to satisfy the needs of equity. Eventually the measures may embrace residents 




This research has demonstrated that technology has advanced sufficiently to enable a 
completely cashless monetary system. It is recommended that a continual research focus 
be applied to this area to allow a continuing understanding of the systems that are 
developing and the effects they would have on individuals, society and the profession. 
There is room in this discipline for a diverse study of the issues including traditional 
accounting research and critical perspectives. Various accounting disciplines could 
benefit from ongoing research and could analyse the affects the system would have on 
continuous reporting, auditing and management systems. 
 
It is recommended that the modified Technology Acceptance Model be used for a broad 
range of technology acceptance research given the usefulness of the model for this 
research supported by the statistical analysis. 
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The modified Technology Acceptance Model shows that influences are important in the 
acceptance decision and yet only three professional accountants from the survey turned 
to the professional bodies, which is not significant to the subjective norm influence. It is 
recommended that the professional bodies embrace this style of emerging research so 
that members gain confidence in turning to them for direction in emerging areas. It is 
recommended that the professional bodies embrace a role as a leader in emerging 
financial issues. 
 
7.8 Further research 
 
Karahanna et al 1999, p. 184 state “from a conceptual standpoint, few empirical studies 
have made a distinction between individual’s pre adoption and post adoption beliefs and 
attitudes.” This current research examined the pre adoption decision in isolation from 
any adoption decision providing the opportunity to compare this research with adoption 
and post adoption behaviour and a comparison of results if the system or a similar 
system is adopted in the future.  
 
In the survey instrument, the word “mark” was used (rather than chip or another 
acronym). This might have raised negative connotations and associations (including 
religious) associated with the term. Perhaps acceptance would have been greater had 
different terminology been used. It is suggested the survey instrument could used again 
on a similar audience with an alternative term that may raises less negative feelings. 
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While this research considers professional accountants as one of the major groups 
having essential influence over the views of society, other professional groups such as 
computer or information technology experts and lawyers may hold similar influence. 
Further research could seek the views of other groups and the public as a whole to 
extend the applicability of the findings. 
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Appendix 1 Descriptive statistics from closed questions. 
 




































1.4 Years in the profession of the respondents 
 



































1.7 Field of work of the respondents 
 




External reporting 1.4 
Public sector 7.1 
Finance .7 
Information management and technology 1.4 
Small business 36.9 
Strategic business management 6.4 
superannuation 7.1 
Taxation insolvency and reconstruction 14.2 




1.8 Perception of the respondents regarding the ease of the physical registration process  
 
Ease of the physical registration process 
% 
Percent 




Very Easy 28.4 
Total 100.0 
 
1.9 Perception of the respondents regarding the ease of the administration of registering of the 
“mark” 
 
Easy administration registration 
% 
Percent 



















Very Easy 21.3 
Total 100.0 
 
1.11 Perception of the respondents regarding the ease of using the “mark” to buy and sell 
 
Ease to buy and sell 
% 
Percent 




Very Easy 17.7 
Total 100.0 
 
1.12 Perception of the respondents regarding the ease of using the “mark” for payments over the 
phone or on the computer 
 
Easy payment over phone or computer 
% 
Percent 




Very Easy 19.1 
Total 100.0 
 
1.13 Perception of the respondents regarding the ease of using the “mark” to create company 
records 
 
Easy company records 
% 
Percent 













1.14 Perception of the respondents regarding the usefulness of packages using the information 





Useless  7.1 
Not Useful 15.6 
Neutral 27.7 
Useful 32.6 
Very Useful 17.0 
Total 100.0 
 
1.15 Perception of the respondents regarding the usefulness of taxation information created by the 
“mark” 
 
Useful taxation information 
% 
Percent 
Useless  12.1 
Not Useful 15.6 
Neutral 29.1 
Useful 27.7 
Very Useful 15.6 
Total 100.0 
 
1.16 Perception of the respondents regarding the usefulness of not needing cards because of the 
“mark” 
 
Useful not having cards 
% 
Percent 
Useless  9.9 
Not Useful 9.2 
Neutral 20.6 
Useful 29.8 
Very Useful 30.5 
Total 100.0 
 
1.17 Perception of the respondents regarding the usefulness of having medical and other 
information on the “mark” 
 
Useful having medical information 
% 
Percent 
Useless  9.2 
Not Useful 8.5 
Neutral 21.3 
Useful 36.9 









1.18 Perception of the respondents regarding the risk of government social control due to the 
“mark” 
 
Risk of government social control due to the “mark” 
% 
Percent 
Highly decreased  1.4 
Decreased  5.0 
Neutral 5.7 
Increased 22.7 
Highly increased  65.2 
Total 100.0 
 
1.19 Perception of the respondents regarding the risk of government control via affiliations due to 
the “mark” 
 
Risk of government social control via affiliations due to the “mark” 
% 
Percent 
Highly decreased  1.4 
Decreased  5.0 
Neutral 8.5 
Increased 18.4 
Highly increased  66.7 
Total 100.0 
 
1.20 Perception of the respondents regarding the risk of bank control due to the “mark” 
 
Risk of bank control  
% 
Percent 
Highly decreased  2.1 
Decreased  9.2 
Neutral 10.7 
Increased 24.1 
Highly increased  53.9 
Total 100.0 
 
1.21 Perception of respondents regarding the risk of private organisation control due to the 
“mark” 
 
Risk of private organisation control 
% 
Percent 
Highly decreased  2.8 
Decreased  7.8 
Neutral 13.5 
Increased 21.3 












1.22 Perception of the respondents regarding the risk protection regarding the “mark” afforded by 
legislation 
 
Risk protection from legislation 
% 
Percent 
Highly decreased  20.6 
Decreased  3.5 
Neutral 14.9 
Increased 21.3 
Highly increased  39.7 
Total 100.0 
 
1.23 Perception of the respondents regarding the risk protection provided by constitution 
regarding the “mark”  
 
Risk protection from the constitution 
% 
Percent 
Highly decreased  14.2 
Decreased  6.4 
Neutral 15.6 
Increased 21.3 
Highly increased  42.6 
Total 100.0 
 
1.24 Perception of the respondents regarding the risk of lost privacy due to companies receiving 
additional information because of the “mark” 
 
Risk of privacy from companies 
% 
Percent 
Highly decreased  2.8 
Decreased  7.8 
Neutral 12.1 
Increased 23.4 
Highly increased  53.9 
Total 100.0 
 
1.25 Perception of respondents regarding the risk of abuse from companies due to the “mark” 
 
Risk of abuse from companies 
% 
Percent 
Highly decreased  3.5 
Decreased  5.7 
Neutral 7.8 
Increased 29.1 













1.26 Perception of respondents regarding the risk of fraud reduced 
 
Risk of fraud reduced 
% 
Percent 




Highly reduced  31.2 
Total 100.0 
 
1.27 Perception of respondents regarding the risk of theft reduced 
 
Risk of theft reduced 
% 
Percent 








1.28 Perception of respondents regarding the risks reduced by software encryption 
 
Risks reduced by software encryption 
% 
Percent 








1.29 Perception of respondents regarding the risks of temporary corruption 
 
 
Risks of temporary corruption 
% 
Percent 

















1.30 Perception of respondents regarding the risks of permanent corruption 
 
Risks of permanent corruption 
% 
Percent 




Very High 39.7 
Total 100.0 
 
1.31 Perception of respondents regarding the risks of health issues 
 
Risks of health issues 
% 
Percent 




Very High 19.9 
Total 100.0 
 
1.32 Perception of respondents regarding the risks of offending religious groups 
 
Risks of offending religious groups 
% 
Percent 




Very High 32.6 
Total 100.0 
 
1.33 Perception of respondents regarding the risks of offending community groups 
 
Risks of offending community groups 
% 
Percent 










1.34 Perception of respondents regarding the risks of conflicting with family views 
 
Risks of conflicting with family views 
% 
Percent 




Very High 13.5 
Total 100.0 
 
1.35 Respondents perceptions regarding whether groups find using the “mark” easy to use 
 
Groups find it easy to use  
% 
Percent 




Very Easy 10.6 
Total 100.0 
 
1.36 Respondents perceptions regarding whether groups find the “mark” useful 
 
Groups find it useful 
% 
Percent 
Useless  15.6 
Not Useful 18.4 
Neutral 38.3 
Useful 23.4 
Very Useful 4.3 
Total 100.0 
 
1.37 Respondents perceptions regarding whether groups find the “mark” risky 
 
Groups find it useful 
% 
Percent 
Not risky 48.2 
Not Very Risky 24.8 
Neutral 18.4 
Risky 7.1 





1.38 Perception of respondents regarding whether the “mark” technology is available 
 
The mark technology is available 
% 
Percent 
Not Available 19.1 
Not Very Available 21.3 
Neutral 26.2 
Available 20.6 
Very Available 12.8 
Not Available 100.0 
 
1.39 Perception of respondents regarding whether the technology surrounding the “mark” is 
available 
 
The other technology is available 
% 
Percent 
Not Available 12.1 
Not Very Available 13.5 
Neutral 23.4 
Available 34.0 
Very Available 17.0 
Not Available 100.0 
 
1.40 Perception of respondents regarding whether the combined “mark” technology is available 
 
The combined technology is available 
% 
Percent 
Not Available 12.1 
Not Very Available 22.0 
Neutral 29.8 
Available 22.0 
Very Available 14.2 
Not Available 100.0 
 
1.41 Perception of respondents regarding the acceptance of the “mark” by groups 
 
Acceptance by groups 
% 
Percent 









1.42 Perception of respondents regarding the acceptance if the “mark” was a major means of 
transacting 
 
Acceptance if it was a major means of transacting 
% 
Percent 




Highly Accept 1.4 
Total 100.0 
 
1.43 Perception of respondents regarding the acceptance of the “mark” if it was compulsory 
 
Acceptance if it was compulsory 
% 
Percent 








Appendix 2 Influences cited as most important influence 
 
Appendix 2.1 Most important influence (subjective norm – open question) 
Influence Number of 
citations 
Influence Number of 
citations 
Spouse 43 Community 2 
Family 14 Mentors 1 
Religious institution 9 Discussion groups 1 
Children 5 Artists 1 
Self 5 Government 1 
Parents 4 Colleagues 1 
 
Appendix 2.2 Influences cited as the second most important influence 
Influence Number of 
citations 
Influence Number of 
citations 
Children 19 Friends 7 
Spouse 13 Religious institution 4 
Parents 11 Professional Body 2 
Colleagues 10 Sibling 1 
Family 9 Community 1 
 
Appendix 2.3 Influences cited as the third most important influence 
Influence Number of 
citations 
Influence Number of 
citations 
Friends 11 Mentors 1 
Parents 11 Extended Family 1 
Children 8 Parents-in-law 1 
Work 7 Mentors 1 
Family 5 Clients 1 
Spouse 4 Community heads 1 
Colleagues 4 Elders 1 
Community 3 Industry 
Organisation 
1 
Sibling 2 Academics 1 
Religious institution 2   
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Appendix 2.4 Influences cited as the fourth most important influence 
Influence Number of 
citations 
Influence Number of 
citations 
Friends 18 Spouse 2 
Children 5 Parents 1 
Religious institution 5 Professional Body 1 
Community 4 Public figures 1 
Colleagues 3 Legal 1 
Peers 3 World 1 
Employer 2 Moral Standards 1 




Appendix 3 Perceived ease of use (open question)  
 
Appendix 3.1 Technology issues 
 
Technology issues Technology 
issues 
Technology issues Technology issues 




Inherent distrust of 
such technology 
 

















Down time would 
render the mark 
inoperable for the 
duration. Credit 
cards however can 
be used manually 







Faulty Worry re errors Trust of the system Ability to alter 
Malfunction of the 
Mark, Equipment 
(External) 
Damage to "Mark" 
 
Damage, wear (after 

























Reading in INFO 
to Using Computer 







Access to readers in 
remote area 
 
Could be deleted 
by magnetic force 
 







Access to vouching 
point 
 
















Subject to tampering 
 
The scanner has an 
identification specific 
to each chip 








of mark or 
reprogramming. 
 
Marks- Moving or 




location of the mark Differing 
Thickness of the 
skin 
 




lack of access to 
technology 
 
The mark may be unable 
to be used for International 
transactions due to the 
difference of technology 
capacity for each country 
Electronic Devices 
/Data can be 
duplicated 
 
Ability to copy the 
Mark 
Potential to copy 
 
Transferring of chip 
"person to another" 
Duplication 
 
One would want to 
be certain that in 
releasing 
information to an 
appropriate user 
they could not 
access other 
information eg 
here's my credit card 
no but I don’t want 
you to know my 
account balance & 
you would want to 
release certain info 























Change in other 
personal Details 
 
Death of a personnel 




extract the mark 
from employees- 







needs a reader 
 
Extracting the mark 









More than one job 
 





controlled by one or 
more people. 





Proof of payment 
without hard copy 
 
Would it be 100% Past mistakes are Comes in eg genetic   Is this a Life time 
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happens when the 
next wave of 
technology I would 
not like to be 
going around 
saddled with a 
horse cart? 
Comes in eg genetic   
version. I would not 
like to be going 
around saddled with 
a horse cart. 
















Refusal by people 
 
Need for 100% 
population to carry 
one 
 
All Factors , I am 
completely against 
the use of 
anything of this 
nature 
Personal opposition 
to the concept 
 




to implant mark 
 
Don’t believe we 
should have 
implants 










Public acceptance General Public 
acceptance 
Objection by person 
 
Move over Ned 
Kelly. I will be 
joining you 






Who wants to 











themselves to be 
marked 
People would trust 









implant or Scanner 
access 
Buyers and sellers 
using cash 
 
Getting the implant 





Individual to be 
implanted 


















Anti civil rights 
 




















Weather the mark 





The fact that its 




Depends where its 
implanted 
 
Violation of the 
human body 
 
The fact that its 






Appendix 3.3 Authority issues 
 




Geographical Areas of 
Authority of Aus + 
cfn2 






Authority level for 
marked personal 
Who would police the 










Suspicion about its 





There is to much 
"Control" already 
 
Who Controls the 
information on the 
marks 
 
Big Brother is 
watching and research 
on this types seems to 
be a complete waste 
of public money 
Who Controls the 
information on the 
marks 
 
Suspicion about its 






Suspicion about its 





Big Brother Issue 
 
Fear of Big Brother 
-Being used for 
Unauthorised 
Official monitoring  
People feel too 
controlled 
 







Integrity of system 
 
People would trust 
the integrity of the 
system 
 
Agents could have 
difficulty 
 
Need to identify 
who the individual 
was acting for:- 
 
Purchasing on 
Behalf of someone 
else i.e. The 




















Appendix 3.4 Misuse issues 
 
Misuse issues Misuse issues Misuse issues Misuse issues 
May open a whole 




Fraudulent use of a 
scanner by 3rd 
parties 
Fear of fraud 
 
The capacity for 
electronic theft of 
identity & money is 
enormous. Who 








Mark being used 
for purposes not 
authorised 
 

































duplication of a 
Mark 
Electronic Devices 







of work "Auschwitz" 
tag 
Who Controls the 








or use someone 
else mark 
 




Appendix 3.5 Privacy issues 
 














Invasion of Privacy 
 
Invasion of privacy 















People want to 
retain their privacy 
this is an evasion of 
that 
Invasion of privacy 
 
Privacy issues 












of a person privacy 
 










being in monitoring 
password 
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Appendix 3.6 Health issues 
 
Health issues Health issues Health issues Health issues 
Death  
 
Health hazards from 









It's an invasive 
procedure 
 
Injuries to Area 
 





Fear of disease / 



















X-rays    
 
Appendix 3.7 Human issues 
 
















Market acceptance & 
ability to Use 
 
Pain on Insertion 






Resistance to the 
injection 
 
Physical location of 




Fear of unknown to 




Appendix 3.8 Security issues 
 

















Ability to remove 







Appendix 3.9 Cost issues 
 
Cost issues Cost issues  Cost issues  Cost issues  












acceptance - Eg 











Appendix 4 Perceived usefulness (open question) 
 
Appendix 4.1 Medical issues 
 
Medical issues Medical issues Medical issues Medical issues 
Form Of Identity 
Check- When 
unconscious, Etc - 
For Medical 
Emergencies Lost 
or Disoriented etc 
Hidden Sickness 














need for Pathology 
Medical & 
Licensing  history 
 














& New Location 
Medical 
Information 
Ability for medical 
personnel to access 
& Determine 
possible ailment 







IF I suffered from 




history on the spot 
 



































One would want to 
be safe that in  
releasing ones 




Appendix 4.2 Identity issues 
 
Identity issues Identity issues Identity issues Identity issues 
Proof of Identity 
 
Ability to identify 




different ID for 
Different purposes 
 










Could Be Useful In 
situation Where I.D 
Required 








Note Question 18 "If 
the person's 
Nationality, Gender, 
Medical and Other 
relevant details were 
accessible on a real 
time basis via the 
"Mark" and a 
scanner then this 








Locating a Missing 
person 
 
Ease of locating 
people who are 
missing 
Tracking Missing 












be available about 
the person even if 















A persons prior 
employment/ 
Criminal history 




Appendix 4.3 Security issues 
 
Security issues Security issues Security issues Security issues 
Security 
 




details, then would 







A "Mark would be 
useful for the 
customs security 
system to  
 
You cannot Cheat 
 
Illegal access to 
your Records 
 
Cross Check- To 
use a, Say ticket at 
sports or theatre 
which is "Marked" 





Security access to 
home/office/car 
 
Security at Home - 
They are who they 
say they are 
 
Unauthorised 
Access to Info 
 
One would want to 
be certain that in 
releasing 
information to an 
appropriate user 
they could not 
access other 
information eg 
here's my credit 
card no but I don’t 
want you to know 
my account 
balance & you 
would want to 
release certain info 
to your employee 
(Vice Versa) 





















































elimination of lost 






Reduces impact of 
Forgetfulness 
 
Data available to 
professional 
 
It’s OK to collect 
the info its 
interpretation of the 
information (this is 
issue now) For 
agents. 
 
Appendix 4.5 Access issues 
 
Access issues Access issues Access issues Access issues 
Access Ability to Access 
 
Instant access to 
data 







Convenience of use 
 
Can’t lose it? 
 
Wouldn't be able to 
loose it 
 




NO Necessity to 
carry Credit Cards 
 
Transfer of person 
data for self 
download eg When 
travelling 
Travel Remote Location   
 
Appendix 4.6 Ease issues 
 
Ease issues Ease issues Ease issues Ease issues 
Ease of use 
 
Ease Of Use 
 
Ease of performance 
of everyday function 






/shopping would be 
easier 






Transformation Speed Size Weight 
 
 292 
Appendix 4.7 Problems 
 
Problems Problems Problems Problems 
Mark Could be 
copied 
 
Mark could be 
stolen 
 
Still require proof 
ID 
 
Scanners do not yet 








I don’t think it 
would as it would 
still be subject to 
major computer 
flaws so could 
produce 
dangerously wrong 
information. In my 
11 years in practice 
I have seen several 
examples of Bank 
errors. The fact is 
the banks do not 
reconcile their 
transactions so 
giving more power 
to their unreliable 
data is madness 
 
Appendix 4.8 Privacy issues 
 
Privacy issues Privacy issues Privacy issues Privacy issues 
Privacy Matters Privacy Matters Confidentiality Privacy 
Privacy 
 
Invasion of Privacy 
 
Can only think of the 
potential for disaster 





Appendix 4.9 Protest issues 
 
Protest issues Protest issues Protest issues Protest issues 
All Factors, I am 
Completely against 
the use of anything 




solution without the 
risks are available 
 
I cannot think of 
any Private use that 
I find Acceptable 
 
Unable to comment 
because I morally 
object to a "Mark" 
If the country was 
ruled by a dictator it 




Appendix 4.10 Fraud issues 
 
Fraud issues Fraud issues Fraud issues Fraud issues 
Fraud 
 




Less Chance of 
Fraud 
Corruption    
 
Appendix 4.11 Taxation issues 
 
Control of tax 








transaction info for 
Income Tax- if the 
relevant Authority 
Accepts and Audits 





Appendix 5 Perceived risk (control – open question)  
 
Appendix 5.1 Privacy issues 
 
Privacy issues Privacy issues Privacy issues Privacy issues 
Invasion of Privacy 
 




The Invasion of a 
persons privacy 
It creates a 
perception of 
invasion of privacy 





Lack of Privacy 
 
Privacy Issue Privacy Eliminated Privacy **** Privacy Eliminated 
Privacy  Privacy  Privacy Right to Privacy 
Secrecy Invasion of Privacy Confidentiality Confidentiality 
Potential for loss of 
Privacy 
Invasion of privacy General Invasion of 
privacy 
Control- No Privacy 
 
Privacy **** No Privacy Invasion Of privacy No Privacy 
Privacy  Privacy Issues Privacy  Privacy**** 












General invasion of 
privacy 
 
People can be traced 
when not necessary 
 
Could partially be 












Third Parties with 
access to code could 
access 
Access of Private 
information /Life 
 
Who will have 
access?? 
 
Who should have 













Sale of personal 
details to various 
organisations 
 
The Personal Loss 
of privacy Again 
with all of the 
personal information 
can you  
imagine all of the 
junk Mail 
Security of personal 
information 
 
Should be able to 
assure that no 
unauthorised person 












Scanner users would 
obtain information 
not 








of my Financial 
Affairs than I do 
Too Personal 
 
Knowledge of all 
my Details 
 
Data is potentially 
too widely available 
 
Irrelevance of 
certain data to 
particular 
recipients of that 
data (Loss of 
privacy) 
Knowledge of all 
my Details 
 
Sale of this private 
information 
 






Viable to receive 
finance/credit 
 




who has access to 
my info 
All bodies that take 
part would have 
access to partial or 
full information 












Access Data via 
records of the 
'Mark 
Invasion of personal 
information by govt 
& Other Bodies 
 
Concisely that 
"Mark" is a invasion 




Appendix 5.2 Control issues 
 
Control issues Control issues Control issues Control issues 
Lack of Freedom 
 
Loss of Freedom 
 
Violation of freedom 
 
Anything that 






Loss of freedom 
 
Lack of Freedom 
 
They Already Do 
 
None of this 
business 
Loss of Individuality 
(Perception Of) 
Personal Liberty I Like my 
Independents 
Loss of me as an 
individual I 
become a thing -A 








Control by others 
Controlling my 
Life 
This is a Control 
Issue 






Control and Access 
to imp in me 
Control Control**** 
 
Abuse of Control 
 
My Life would be 
totally controlled by 
them 
My personal control 
is diminished 
 
There is too much 
"Control" Already 
 
Lack Of Privacy- Control Over who Ability to control Information 
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Who Controls the 
Information? 
 
has Access to the 
Information 
 











government in the 
name of anti 
spamming 
has introduced 
laws that severely 
now limit or 
freedom of speech 
over the Internet 
This also limits our 
sources of 
information to the 
monopolies that 
own the press.  
Look at the 
propaganda they 
have given us over 


















over my life 
 
Government would 
have too much 
Control 
I don’t trust 





or replaces it with 
automation  








should be kept at 
arms length from the 
ability of  
Government & Big 
Business. 
 
Your choices are 
your business & 
should not be 
sacrificed to allow 
govt/big business  








The Big " Brother 
Issue" relating to the 
government 
 
Big Brother issue 
 
Concisely that 
"Mark" is a 
invasion of Privacy 
and Big Brother 
Read a few George To Much BIG Big Brother Plus Used to steal 
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Orwell books we 
don’t need to re-




watching real time 
judgments 
 
your Life (Big 
Brother) 
 












information Eg Life 
Assurance, genetics, 
Banks have even 
greater control over 




Company control of 
marketing  programs 































Appendix 5.3 Misuse issues 
 
























Private sector abuse 
 









Access of Information 
by Non authorised 
Interest 
Access to Data 





Any Reader can 




used by unauthorised 
persons or in an 
unauthorised manner 
Unauthorised Data 
access + Security 
risk 
 




Security Security Security Lack of security 
Security of personal 
information 




Misuse of Data 
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Access to personal 
data that could be 














Targeted by Scam 
Artist 
 
All info recorded 
in the Mark could 
be easily "Stolen" 
Identity theft 
Money theft Money theft   
 
 
Appendix 5.4 Marketing issues 
 
Marketing issues Marketing issues Marketing issues Marketing issues 
Spam style Marketing 
 
The Marketing of 






with their products 
More junk Mail 
 
Marketing/Advertising 
targeted at me 
 









advantage may be 
taken by some 
person 









Appendix 5.5 Rights issues 
 
Rights issues Rights issues Rights issues Rights issues 
Should be able to 
have the right to 
refuse the mark 
Discrimination 




I Don’t want it 
Biblical Prophecy All BAD   
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Invasion of your 
body 
 
Safety (robbery of 
limb/Mark) 
 
Life threatening if 
someone has 
technology & wants 
to abuse a person to 
gain access 
Ability of someone 
to extract the mark 
and to transplant to 
another person 
 
Fear of disease / 
Illness due to 
Implants 
   
 




Management issues Management issues Management 
issues 








of codes or 
authorised for 





Appendix 6 “Other” Risks (open – question)  
 
 
Appendix 6.1 Misuse issues 
 
Misuse issues  Misuse issues   Misuse issues  Misuse issues  
F Blackmail  Fraud Fraud Fraud 
Fraud Fraud Fraud Fraud will be easier 
to commit 
New ways of 
committing fraud 
being discovered 
Fraud, theft- same 






Theft Abuse Abuse Abuse of intended 
use 





People would trust it 
too much. This 
dishonesty 
associated with it 
would be less 
detectable. You can 
buy a machine to 
program sim cards 
from the Post office  
for about $65. Do 
you suggest that 
criminals would not 
remove the implant 
"Marks" 
There's always a 
chance of impostors 
or a thief accessing 
Tampering 
 
Security Breach of security 
 
Private co's using 
info 
 
Far more than just 




Discrimination -  
Racial 
 
Discrimination -  
Financial 
 
Discrimination -  
Political 
 
Too easy for people 
to access 
information 





mail list etc 
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Appendix 6.2 Control issues  
 
Control issues  Control issues  Control issues  Control issues  
Right ability to 
object against Govt 
policy etc could be 
greatly reduced or 
removed even 
though supposed 





would allow a junta 












power in some 
hands 
 
Lack of control of 
individual and God 
Like Abilities given 
to others who are 
probably not as 
competent as the 
individual 
 
Control of personal 
activities 
 
It is a sign of 
society's failure 
Control only leads 
to the need for 
more control. 
Fixing social 
problem is the only 
way 




Less control over 
self 
 
I'm not ready to 
become a robot yet-
despite often feeling 
like one 
Lack of acceptance 






A person's history 




benefit of Changed 
ways- human 
element of judging 
by way person is 
today may 
be ignored - history 
would rule supreme 
Ability to Amend 
 











I want to live my life 
as I see it 
 
Tracking of less-
than-honest / moral 
transaction such as 
a brothel visit, strip 
club etc would be 
tagged 
A mark would 
screw up my life 
 
Loss of Individuality 
 
Loss of Individual 
freedom & 
Anonymity 
Loss of Human 
Independence " 
Marking" Ability 
I would refuse to 
have one what are 
you going to do 
with people like 
me? 
Not allowing it to be 
optional for a person 
 







Create classes of 
people- Outcast 




Appendix 6.3 Health issues 
 
Health issues Health issues Health issues Health issues 











Fear of disease / 
Illness due to 
Implants 
 













else’s mark by 
mistake infection 
by infection 
Movement of chip 





Self Mutilation if 
people seek to rid 
themselves of the 
mark 
Physical assault to 
access 
 
Criminal use by 
force 
 
Possible assault & 
Theft of Mark 
 
Crimes where the 
target is obtaining 
the chip "Mark" 
A thief can 
amputate the mark 
an force to give 
them your 
password  
Physical Abuse & 
theft of "Mark"& 
Transfer to thief 
 
That part of my body 





Steal the person 
not the card 
 
Personal safety in 
public 
 
People killing to 
obtain record via the 
mark 
 
I don’t fancy 
having a chip in my 
head however ,  
However I don’t 
see any real health 
issues 
 
Appendix 6.4 Technology issues 
 
Technology issues Technology issues  Technology issues Technology issues 












Loss of control of 






loss of ability to 
transact due to 
damage to "Mark' 
 
I would have real 
concern at the 
possibility of mass 
data corruption. 
Accidental 
damage- Vehicle or 
sport accident 
Software is 
vulnerable to attack  
 
Lack of Acceptable 
testing over along 
period and large 














Wear + Tear 






Future upgrade of 
equipment in body 




Omission from the 
system thus creating 
the myriad of 
problems associated 
with getting your 
self "Logged" on 
again 
 
People would trust 
it too much. This 
dishonesty 
associated with it 
would be less 
detectable. You can 
buy a machine to 
program sim cards 
from the Post office  
for about $65. Do 
you suggest that 
criminals would not 
remove the implant 
"Marks" 
Lose track on when 
individual 
transaction take 
place (i.e. Walking 
past a scanner) 
Its Possible that the 
"Mark would be 
attacked by the virus 
Incorrect 
information could 




Appendix 6.5 Privacy issues 
 
Privacy issues Privacy issues Privacy issues Privacy issues 
Privacy Privacy Privacy Privacy issues 
surveillance issues 
/ Privacy issues 
 
Privacy issues 









A person's history 




benefit of Changed 
ways- human 
element of judging 
by way person is 
today may 
be ignored - history 
would rule supreme 
Assist undesirable 
people to obtain 












than-honest / moral 
transaction such as a 
brothel visit, strip 










accessed by 3rd 
parties 





Appendix 6.6 Identity issues 
 
Identity issues Identity issues Identity issues Identity issues 
Identity Change 
 
Physical assault for 










else’s mark by 
mistake infection by 
infection being used 
as a guinea-pig for 











Appendix 7 Factors affecting acceptance (open – question) 
 
Appendix 7.1 Control issues 
 
Control issues Control issues Control issues Control issues 






unacceptable to be 
able to monitor 
people 
 
I am loosing my 
Freedom 
 
Reject because lack 
of freedom 
 
Lack of personal 
control over who 
could use the mark 
 
Freedom to choose 
the way I do 
transaction and 
record my life 
Access to ones own 
Data 
 
Lack of Guarantee 






herein could / will 
be databased for 
someone to form an 
opinion on my 
personal traits 
views & perhaps 
habits, assuming as 
answers, I have 
been completely 
honest & non 
calculating in my 




choices eg buying 
patterns where 
individuals strongly 
object to the 
control perceived 
or real, the history, 
especially in 
relation to Income 
& Expenditure, 
could be "muddied" 
by cross buying for 
others etc. 




freedom & personal 
independence 
legislation would be 
ineffective as this 
does not stop theft 
by company 
employees & 
legislation is subject 
to national 
boundaries 




We are already 
stifled by too much 
control. This is a 
contributing factor 
to an unemployable 




don’t you survey 
people with 
initiative and see 
how many of them 
have got up to a bit 
of mischief along 
the really bad 
people will be able 
to overcome the 
mark it will just 
cause no end of 




movement (i.e. GPS 
types trucking 
should not be 
allowed) 
legislative controls / 
Limitation on who 
can Access the 
various types 
of data gathered 
from the 'Mark' 
 




Too much control 






aspects of a person 
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Loss of control of 
own Identity and 
dealings 
Centralisation & 
Control of personal 




Threat to me as an 
individual 
 
Human rights lost 
 
I fear total control 
over my private life 
 
People do  not want 
to become 'things' 






controls at all 
levels are already 
far too high 
Lack of trust in 


















would be rejected 
 
When society sinks 
to the level of 
bureaucratic power 
I would rather be 
dead than accept the 
mark  
Government may 







smacks of Big 
Brother attitude, 
incorrect use of data 
by both government 
& Corporate entities 
continued intrusion 
in form of mass 
marketing & 
Government data … 
The Big " Brother 
Issue" relating to 
the government 
 
Reject - Fear of 
"Big brother" 
Big Brother 
syndrome is already 




Being told it was 
compulsory 






Only one- my ability 
to turn it on and off 
and only have it 
scanned by someone 
I want to have scan 
it when I authorize 














Restricted use of 
"Mark" 
 
Legislation has not 
stopped Video & 
CD Fraud 
 
Wrongful use of 
information which 









None would mark 





Appendix 7.2 Privacy issues 
 
Privacy issues Privacy issues Privacy issues Privacy issues 
Privacy Privacy Privacy Privacy 
Privacy Privacy Privacy Privacy 
Privacy 
 




Loss of privacy 
 
Lack of privacy Risk to privacy Privacy concerns Privacy Issues 






Loss of privacy - 
reject 
Perceived loss of 
privacy 
 




privacy of their lives 
and a choice of what 




The Invasion of a 
persons privacy 
Invasion of Privacy 
 
Invasion of Privacy 
 
Invasion of Privacy 
 
Invasion of Privacy 
 
There are already 
too many instances 
of invasion of 
privacy. 
Australian Taxation 
office, Centre Link 
etc. 











everything I do? 
 
I would be doubtful 
that security 
measures would be 
able to overcome 
Misuse of 
information and 










Issues of Violation 
of Freedoms 
 




freedom & personal 
independence 
legislation would be 
ineffective as this 
does not stop theft 
by company 
employees & 
legislation is subject 
to national 
boundaries 
legislation is subject 
Human beings 
should have some 
freedom of choice 
and the 
ability to be 






Only one- my 
ability to turn it on 
and off and only 
have it scanned by 
someone I want to 
have scan it when I 
authorize that 
person to do so. 
 
 
Scope of use 
 
Perhaps I 'm just to 
old but I would 
rather the concept of 
a technology which 
while improving  
identification 
separates the person 
& the information 







currently has eg 
The proven hacking 
into ABN 
Registers, the 
proven misuse of 




on CRAA records 
etc 
Individual not the 




History possible  
  
 
Appendix 7.3 Technology issues 
 
Technology issues Technology issues  Technology issues Technology issues 
Inherent distrust of 
such technology 
Omission from the 
system thus 
creating the myriad 
of problems 
associated 
with getting your 












Stability of records- 
If corrupted what 
are the 
consequences , how 
difficult to restore 
System failure System corruption 
 
Risk in operation of 
use 
 
Omission from the 
system thus 
creating the myriad 
of problems 
associated 
with getting your 
self "Logged" on 
again 
Integrity of Access 
 
Computer hackers & 
viruses are prevalent 
now and cause great 
stress & loss of $'s + 













 possibility one for 
transactions one for 
centre link one for 
police.  
Not trust worthy or 
system need to be 




required for every 
transaction 
 
Whilst the chip 
being implanted 
appears relatively 
easy the likelihood 
is that system to 






beliefs will be lost. 
** Impossible 
 
It would not 
work!!!!!! 
   
 
Appendix 7.4 Misuse issues 
 
Misuse issues Misuse issues Misuse issues Misuse issues 
I would not accept 
it until I knew the 
reasons for it and 
was confident that 
it could not be 
abused. 
Unfortunately I do 
not think this sort 
of technology can 
be assured any type 
of type of guarantee 
that it will be used 
in a positive, 
legitimate way. 





invasion of privacy 
 
Issues of Abuse 
 






Ability to external 
parties obtaining 
unauthorised access 
is a worry 
Integrity of users 
 
Abuses by third 
parties 
 
Whilst I trust 95% 
of the population 
there is always an 
element of the 
population that 
cannot be trusted  
and the temptation 
to abuse this 
Compulsory use- 
Smacks of Big 
Brother attitude, 
Incorrect use of 
data by  




technology for their 
own benefits would 
be too great 
 
in form of 
mass marketing & 




Lack of Business 
Ethics 
 
Never trust Big 
Business 
 
Lack of trust in 
private industry- 
reject 
I cannot think of 
any Private user 
that I find 
Acceptable 
the Banks have 
over my life 
other private 
organization have 
over my life 
Abuse / Misuse 
Never trust Banks 
 




freedom & personal 
independence 
legislation would be 
ineffective as this 
does not stop theft 
by company 
employees & 
legislation is subject 
to national 
boundaries 
legislation is subject 
to national 
boundaries. 
Legislation has not 




Appendix 7.5 Health issues 
 
Health issues Health issues Health issues Health issues 
health & wellbeing Health Health Health 
Health Risks Health concerns Health Concerns Unhealthy 










No guarantee killer 
drug not implanted 
to be triggered if 
certain age reached 
medical condition 
diagnosed or wrong 
political party 
chosen. 
   
 
 311 
Appendix 7.6 Belief issues 
 
Belief issues Belief issues Belief issues Belief issues 






No other reasons 
religious 
convictions (:the 
Beast syndrome)  
Additional notes 
attached ( Ref the 
New testament ) 
Revelation 13:11, 
16:13 
“Then I saw 
another beast… it 
causes all, both 
small and great 
both rich and poor 
both free and slave, 
to me marked on 
the right hand or 
the forehead, so 
that no one can buy 
or sell unless he has 
the mark, that is the 
name of the beast 
or the number of its 
name. This  calls 
for wisdom: let him 
who has 
understanding 
reckon the number 
of the beast, for it is 
human number, its 



















Appendix 7.7 Just no 
 
Just no Just no Just no Just no 
Death or the Mark 
------I choose 
Death 
I would never accept 
it only an arsehole 
would. 
Nothing Could 
Make me accept 
such a mark 
I wouldn't accept 
the "Mark" 
 
Accept none **** 
 
None would make 
me accept the mark 
 
Just No thank you 
 
I would strongly 
oppose the 
introduction of a 
mark and even 
change the party  
I vote for. I have 
never voted for a 
different party. 
This single issue 
would decide my 
decision 
Don’t like the idea 
of a implant 
   
 
 
Appendix 7.8 Security issues 
 
Security issues Security issues Security issues Security issue 






other methods of 
transacting 
Eg : Security 
Personal security of 
finances 
 




Appendix 7.9 Humanity issues 
 
Humanity issues Humanity issues Humanity issues Humanity issues 






argument for the 
concept required 





enough yet- reject 
 
we are too anxious 




Let’s use the 
technology to 
inform the life style 
of others. 
Unnecessary 






Appendix 7.10 Logic issues 
 







Burden of use 
outweighs any 
perceived benefit 
Such test without 
wholesale adoption 
& implementation it 
will not be readily 
accepted 
   
 




Convenience issues Convenience issues Convenience 
issues 
We should be bar-
coded (or Marked) 
At birth to get rid 








other methods of 
transacting 
 
Ease of use 
 
Pain having it 
inserted 
   
 
Appendix 7.12 Uniqueness issues 
 
Uniqueness issues Uniqueness issues Uniqueness issues Uniqueness issues 
Destroys one's 
uniqueness as a 
human being 
Loss of Individuality 
 
Loss of Individual 
freedom & 
Anonymity 




Appendix 7.13 Benefits issues 
 
Benefits issues Benefits issues Benefits issues Benefits issues 
wide acceptance- 
would only use it if 
it could be used 
instead of other 
C/cards  
Cash etc not as well 

















Appendix 7.14 Equity issues 
 
Equity issues Equity issues Equity issues Equity issues 








Appendix 7.15 Spouse issues 
 
Spouse issues Spouse issues Spouse issues Spouse issues 
Spouse would hate 
the idea! 




Appendix 7.16 Existence issues 
 
Existence issues Existence issues Existence issues Existence issues 
This is putting our 
very existence in 
jeopardy. 
   
 
  
